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BACKGROUND FACTS: THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA

You have too many elections, that is my complaint against
your country ....
P. W. Botha, President, Republic of South Africa
The eradication of apartheid in South Africa is a major item on
the agenda of the international community.' The apartheid system
provokes continuing international concern because it fundamentally
threatens international peace and security. Moreover, human rights
violations in South Africa indict a system of governance fundamentally
incompatible with even the most limited interpretation of international
law and morality under the United Nations Charter. 2 Thus, the international community is being pressed to weave collaborative strategies
to bring the Pretoria authorities into compliance with contemporary
international obligations and expectations about peace, security, selfdetermination and human rights.
In the international system, states and other actors commonly employ the bases of power at their disposal in strategies designed to
influence others to behave in ways deemed more consistent with their
own interests or the common interest of mankind. 3 The strategies
invoked may be coercive or persuasive and may involve the use of
military force, economic policies, diplomacy or ideology. 4 With regard
to apartheid, an increasing international consensus is emerging that
the use of economic sanctions against the Pretoria authorities might
best facilitate political transformation from a racial oligarchy to a democratic state. 5

1.
ORDER

See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
521-60 (1981) [hereinafter WORLD PUBLIC ORDER]; RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE

1962-1986, (UN
Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 87-10593, 1987) [hereinafter RESOLUTIONS]; see also APARTHEID: THE FACTS (International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF APARTHEID

Africa in cooperation with the UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1983) [hereinafter APARTHEID:
THE FACTS].

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.
5.

Id.
Id.
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It is widely believed that economic sanctions involve the least net
losses to all parties interested in the resolution of the South African
crisis. Though far short of the leverage military intervention might
provide, economic sanctions may provide sufficient coercive leverage
against the Afrikaner elite to bring about fundamental change. They
may effectively facilitate these changes without compromising the
humanitarian values which would be sacrified by a military confrontation between blacks and whites.6
Long-standing concern of public opinion in the United States has
been the problem of apartheid in South Africa. Most central to this
concern is the nature of bilateral relations between South Africa and
the United States. Specifically, the issue is how the United States in
its bilateral relations and in diverse international fora should respond
to the apartheid problem.
The United States and South Africa share common problems concerning race relations, cultural diversity, social and economic inequality and human rights. Indeed, recent United States history recounts
a nation painfully coming to grips with racial prejudice and social
injustice. The United States has attempted to initiate a pattern of
common identity in the interest of all its people and a shared sensitivity
to the improvement of its race relations climate. 7 Through various
means, the United States has addressed real social and political injustices."
South Africa has confronted similar problems, but its Christian-National ideology has reinforced the policies and practices of apartheid.
Apartheid embraces the principle of white supremacy, or racial
hegemony, which, in both theory and practice, monopolizes power and
privilege in the ruling white elite. South African apologists have
scoured the Madison Avenue lexicon to create a peculiar language of
"doublespeak," in order to camouflage the operative reality that white
power, privilege, and prestige continue to exist - fueled by intoler-

6.

Id.; see also

SOUTHERN

THE REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMISSION ON U.S.

AFRICA:

TIME

RUNNING

SOUTH AFRICA SURVIVE (1977); Nagan,

OUT

(1981); R.W.

JOHNSON,

POLICY TOWARD

How

LONG

WILL

South Africa: The Limits of Peaceful Change, in

POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE STAKES AND THE STANCE Ch. VI (R.
Lemarchand ed. 1981) [hereinafter STAKES & STANCE].
7. See generally, G. FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981).
8. On the race relations background to the U.S. political culture, see generally, J.
FRANKLIN, RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (The 1976 Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities
presented by the National Endowment for the Humanities) (1976); Kinoy, The Constitutional
Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERSL. REV. 387 (1967).
AMERICAN
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ance, sustained by a political culture based on "Kragdadigheid" (brute
force) and implemented without restraint. The euphemisms of doublespeak include: "separate development" for the institutionalized pattern
of discrimination; "plural relations" for the political dynamics of cultural
and racial hegemony; "the extension of university education" for educational deprivations; and "law and order" for police brutality, torture
and repression. 9
9. See Cowell, Pretoria Imposes Harsh New Rules Aimed at Unrest, N.Y. Times, Dec.
12, 1986, reprinted in African Press Clips [AFPC] XXI, Dec. 12, 1986, No. 48, at 1, 15 (massive
media censorship in South Africa has virtually eliminated news coverage of South Africa in the
global community); see also World Public Order, supra note 1, at 521-32.

On the extent of official state violence targeted primarily at the black population of South
Africa see, Turk, Rule by White, Gun and Fire, The New Statesman, Sept. 6, 1985, (based on
documents given by church group to Prime Minister Botha). See also LAWYERS' COMMITTEE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, SOUTH AFRICA 1984: RENEWED RESISTANCE, INCREASED

REPRESSION, SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT ANNUAL REPORT (1984)

[hereinafter

RENEWED

RESISTANCE].

For a description of the relationship between law, justice and apartheid see, L. BOUILLE
CONSTITUTIONAL

REFORM AND THE APARTHEID STATE: LEGITIMACY, CONSOCIATIONISM,

AND CONTROL IN SOUTH
AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER

AFRICA (1984); J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
(1978); A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1973).

THE SOUTH

For a detailed account of the administrative processes by which the apartheid state regulates
and controls Black South Africans, see ACTA JURIDICA (1984); L. RUBIN, APARTHEID IN
PRACTICE, U.N. Pub. OPI/428 (1971); CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (G.
Anglin, M. Shaw, & G. Widstrand 1978) (papers from a Scandinavian - Canadian Conference).
On the restrictive repression and censorship in South Africa, see Claiborne, South Africa
Curbs Press, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXI, Dec. 12, 1986, No. 48, at 4;

Claiborne, 256 Children Are Detained, South Africa Says, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1986, reprinted
in AFPC XXI, Dec. 12, 1986, No. 48, at 5 & 14.
On the scale of political and legal repression, see RENEWED RESISTANCE, Supra.
For a carefully documented account that raises skepticism about the Botha reform package,
see REPRESSION IN A TIME OF "REFORM": A LOOK AT EVENTS IN THE TRANSVAAL SINCE

AUGUST, 1984 (Johannesburg) (1984).
For a careful study and appraisal of the mass removals of blacks, see REMOVALS AND THE
LAW (transcript of a workshop held in Grahamstown, July 1982) (published by SPP and AFRA

1984).
See address by Chief Buthelezi, reprinted in S. AFR. DIG, Nov. 8, 1985, at 1018. Referring
to the role played by the media, Chief Buthelezi said
it is painting a picture which looks something like the following: The forces of
violence have spread. A total of 23 South African black townships are controlled
by violence and states of emergency have been declared in thirty-six magisterial
districts (now increased to thirty-eight). The combined efforts of the South African
Police and Defense Force are unable to bring violence under control ...
Id. at 1018.
For a congressional overview of the internal strife in South Africa, see Internal Political

Situation in South Africa: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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Many American leaders, including those who reflect and influence
public opinion,1° have developed an empathetic understanding of South
Africa's ethnic diversity, economic stratification and cultural complexity. They have been justifiably concerned with the proffered "solutions"
emerging from the South African government. 1 In particular, after

10. Television coverage of South Africa has shaped public opinion in the United States. See
Freedman, The Power of TV: South Africa's Story as told in America's Living Room, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 3, 1985, reprinted in AFPC XX, Nov. 8, 1985, No. 44, at 2.
Television coverage, along with the activities by the Free South Africa Movement, has
greatly influenced U.S. public opinion of South Africa. See Corry, Tvs Coverage of South
Africa, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1985 reprinted in AFPC XX, Nov. 8, 1985, No. 44, at 2, 12.
Since 1984, U.S. public opinion regarding South Africa has developed and matured to unprecendented levels. This development has been largely due to the rejuvenated divestment movement which seems to have been triggered by Columbia University's anti apartheid coalition.
See Hentoff, Summing Up; Floyd Abrams ... Bishop Tutu, Village Voice, Apr. 30, 1985.
11. On South African reforms as indicated by South African governmental authorities, see
Southern Africa: Time for Reappraisal, S. AFR. DIG., Nov. 27, 1987, at 2. According to Mr.
Botha, important discriminatory acts have been "withdrawn" and other concrete measures have
been implemented:
1. Blacks have obtained full property rights in Black urban areas;
2. The Prohibition of Political Interference Act has been abolished;
3. Influx control, the pass-law system and 34 related measures have been
abolished or amended;
4. Central business districts have been opened to all entrepreneurs;
5. Forced removals for purely political reasons have been suspended;
6. The last vestiges of job reservation in the Mines and Works Act have been
abolished;
7. The color bar in the Liquor Act has been scrapped;
8. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and section 16 of the Immorality
Act have been abolished;
9. Cinemas and theatres could, on application, open their doors to all persons;
10. Thd permit system, in which non-whites had to apply to attend white
universities, has been abolished;
11. Restrictions on the movement of people of Indian origin have been removed;
12. White preference in the immigration laws has been cancelled;
13. A financial commitment to equal education opportunities for all has been
implemented;
14. A new urban development strategy has been accepted;
15. A uniform identity document for all citizens has been introduced;
16. A multiracial, provincial executive system has replaced the former all-white
provincial councils systems;
17. Multiracial regional services councils were established;
18. Black and multiracial trade unions have been legalized;
19. Work places have been desegregated;
20. Sports have been desegregated; and
21. The development of open urban areas has been accepted.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss1/3
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the 1976 Soweto insurrection, American policy makers believed that
the South African social process would have to undergo a significant
sociopolitical transformation to accommodate the intensified pattern
12
of demand by its Black subject population.
Three years after Soweto, in a speech to the White population,
South African President P. W. Botha appeared to acknowledge for
the first time that the Afrikaner elite had begun to recognize that
South African Whites could not suppress indefinitely the legitimate
aspirations of South African Blacks. Indeed, White survival would
ultimately depend upon the White capacity to change. In Botha's
words, White South Africa would have to "adapt or die."1s
It has since become evident that Mr. Botha was precise with his
choice of words. It is equally evident that he did not intend "change"
in the sense of reversing the notorious practices of apartheid; rather,
he intended to adapt the present power structure to meet current and

One of apartheid's key policies was to remove South African citizenship from the vast majority
of its black citizens. One of the promises of reform was that citizenship would be restored.
Botha's Parliament delivered this promise but in a way that provided more anger and distrust
than confidence in the reform process. Since some nine million blacks were affected by the
removal of citizenship, and since the new law only pertained to some 1.8 million of them, the
reasons for skepticism were not entirely unfounded. Sheene Duncan, president of the Black
Sash, said, "[I] was just plain stupid to believe what Botha was saying." Frankel, South Africa
Presses Apartheid Reforms Spurned by Blacks, Wash. Post, June 26, 1986, reprintedin AFPC
XXII, No. 46.
On the blunting of reform possibilities in South Africa, see Powell, Uprooting of Blacks
Resumed in South Africa, Nov. 23, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXI, Nov. 28, 1986, No. 46, at
6. See also Claiborne, South Africa Presses Removal of Shanties, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1986,
reprinted in AFPC XXI, No.46, Nov. 28, 1986, at 6.
On the blunting of reform, see Husband, Botha Rejects Plan to End Group Areas, Wash.
Times, Nov. 24, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXI, No.46, Nov. 28, 1986, at 7.
To date, the reforms of President Botha have not included the fundamental institutions of
apartheid: The Population Registration Act of 1950, The Group Areas Act of 1957, educational
apartheid, and the Separate Amenities Act. See Claiborne, Botha Offers to Negotiate With
Blacks: S. African Rules Out Basic Changes, Wash. Post, May 20, 1987, at A27, col. 1. It is
unclear whether this is at least partly stimulated by the Anti-Apartheid Act.
While Mr. Botha's reform policies have generated devastating criticism from liberal and
left-of-center critics, overlooked and frequently ignored, is the influence in Afrikaner politics of
its voluble, lunatic fringe on the extreme right. Perhaps the most dangerous of these lunatics
is Eugene Terre'blanche, head of the Nazi-oriented Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB).
See Sparks, Botha Attacked from the Right, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1987, at A29, col. 1.
12. A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on South Africa (Jan. 1987). See also supra note 6.
13. For a review of the Botha regime's "changes" promised in this "adapt or die" speech,
see Spring, South Africa: Positive Developments Continue, BACKGROUNDER 1983.
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anticipated problems without the loss of white control. 14 In fact, the
high point of the "adapt or change" philosophy was the promulgation
of a new constitution which granted Mr. Botha what amounts to dictatorial powers. 15 While this new constitution set up parliamentary
houses for Indians, Coloureds, and Whites, it totally excluded the
Black population. 16 This adaptation of the apartheid process further
escalated the pattern of resistance inside South Africa, so that Botha
was forced to declare a state of emergency under which thousands
were arrested, jailed, and many brutally tortured. 17 Furthermore, the
South African government imposed a pattern of censorship on news
originating from South Africa, which is among the most extensive
censorship controls in modern times.
The escalating violence, insurrection, and government brutality
intensified the concerns of pressure groups in the United States that
the American economic presence is South Africa might be more a part
of the repression process than of any positive transformation. These
heightened concerns led to congressional endorsement of limited
economic sanctions targeted at South Africa.' 8 President Reagan ve14. See Nagan, The White Revolution: Constitutional Change South African Style, The
Verdict reprinted in W. NAGAN, JURISPRUDENCE (1984) (available from the author). See also
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION; L. BOULLE, supra note 9.
15. See sources cited supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. See supra note 5.
18. Compehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 [Act], 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (West Supp.
1987). For an excellent summary of further background factors leading to the passage of the
Act, see Sanctions: The Time Has Come!, Washington Notes on Africa 4 (Summer 1985).
In 1985, the "issue of South African apartheid finally emerged as a dominant legislative
agenda item." Id. The proposed Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 was overwhelmingly approved in
the House, 295, to 127, on June 4, 1985. The broad support for the bill in the House was the
"direct" result of the agitation against apartheid generated by the Free South Africa Movement.
Id. The 1985 bill contained a laundry-list of sanctions including:
a ban on new corporate investment in South Africa;
a ban on U.S. bank loans to the South African government;
a ban on the importation of gold coins;
a ban on computer sales to South Africa;
a ban on nuclear collaboration with South Africa.
There were several Republican efforts to weaken the bill including an amendment that sanctions
not take effect unless the African National Congress [ANC] unilaterally renounced violence or
if a referendum among South African blacks disapproved of sanctions. Id. The most vociferous
defender in the U.S. Congress of the apartheid regime is Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina.
Helms led a filibuster against the bill and was supported by several conservative senators,
including: Jeremiah Denton (R-AL), John East (R-NC), Jack Garn (R-UT), Orrin Hatch (R-UT),
Chic Hecht (R-NV), Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), Paul Laxalt (R-NV), James McClure (R-ID),
Steven Symms (R-ID), Strom Thurmond (R-SC) and Malcolm Wallop (R-WY). The bill died in
the Senate.
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toed the measure; 19 nonetheless, Congress reacted to the enormous
strength to the insistence of public opinion in the United States and
overrode the presidential veto.2
In summary, the policies and practices of apartheid constitute a
systematic pattern of domination and subjugation, institutionalized and
sustained by the extensively coercive technologies of a modern garrison
state. Apartheid affects the distribution of all values, with the Whites
experiencing the abundance of monopoly and the Blacks the scarcity
of deprivation. 21 The system has been characterized as having elements
of slavery or, at the very least, caste and racial discrimination. These
composite elements make apartheid totally incompatible with the basic
value of simple respect the core value of legal and moral standards
of international society and, in the view of many, wholly incompatible
with contemporary- international law.
Apartheid poses a distinctive problem for U.S. foreign policy. The
United States views itself as a leader of the free world, with a deep

By 1985, the European Economic Community and other U.S. allies were no longer willing
to tolerate a "business-as-usual" posture regarding South Africa. Id. at 2. Moreover, the UN
Security Council, with the United States and Britain abstaining, passed a resolution to encourage
the adoption of voluntary economic sanctions against South Africa. Id. at 3.
For relevant background on the debate over U.S. sanctions see Lewis, House Panel Backs
New South Africa Sanctions, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, at Y6, col. 1. On the efforts of the
Reagan Administration to derail congressional sanctions, see also Gwertzman, Buying Time on
Sanctions, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1986, at Y1, col. 5. One administrative measure designed to
mollify Congress was the appointment of a black ambassador to South Africa. See Moffatt III,
U.S. Said to Pick Black Diplomat to be Ambassador to South Africa, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30,
1986, at Y4, col. 5.
19. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was passed by Congress over President
Reagan's veto. The President had been cautioned that exercise of the veto would cause great
harm to America's role in Africa. According to Senator Lugar, "This is a gut issue of whose
side you're on. We really need to be on the right side of history." Roberts, Reagan Plans to
Reject PretoriaSanctions Bill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at Y8, col. 1; Excerpts from Veto
Message on Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Sept 27, 1986, at Y4, col. 1 (excerpts from President
Reagan's Sept. 26, 1987 message announcing his veto). Regarding President Reagan's veto, see
Editorial, Mr. Reagan's Veto, Not America's, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, at Y18, col. 1. See
also Cowell, PretoriaDerides Vote by Senate for Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1986, at Y8,
col. 2. (The South Africans criticized the Senate vote and the Act as 'a form of protectionism
dressed in morality .... The measures will not help reform,' said Deputy Finance Minister,
Kent Duer. 'Reform has a cost."'). See also Senate Roll-Call on Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Aug.
17, 1986, at Y8, col. 1 (reprinting of Senate roll-call). The Senate roll-call vote of 84-14 demonstrated overwhelming bipartisan support for sanctions.
20. See supra notes 18 and 19.
21. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1.
22. Id.
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commitment to government under law. Yet, only recently did the
United States itself develop deep concern for matters of racial justice.
South Africa represents the complete antithesis of these concerns. It
is an "unfree" police state which indulges in the principle of unlimited
government and maintains race relations policies which are the exact
opposite of those in the United States. 23
It would seem that the policy choices for the United States would
be unproblematic; such however is not the case. First, South Africa
and the United States share long economic and cultural ties. These
ties have been valuable in strategic terms since South Africa was an
ally during World War II, and profitable at least to economic special
interests. Second, South Africa is a bastion of anti-Communism. Third,
South Africa is a model for displacing residual racist attitudes that
cannot openly be displaced at home.- The ambivalences implicit in
these perspectives were neatly encapsulated in the long-standing policy
of the U.S. Department of State regarding investments in the economy
of apartheid: the Department neither encourages nor discourages investment in South Africa. This has been changed legislatively by the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 [Anti-Apartheid Act].
Apart from the policy implications of the Anti-Apartheid Act which
is analyzed in this article, economic sanctions also implicates legal
issues surrounding the issues of divestment and disinvestment. Discussions of the divestment issue have focused almost exclusively upon
the standards of behavior for officials charged with the management
of corporate trust or pension funds.This article proposes to examine some of these problems in the
light of United States law, international law, and human rights. Such
a perspective is intended to deparochialize how we view United States
law in this context and demonstrate that innocuous fields, such as
trust law, pension fund law, and the law governing charitable corporations and corporate directors, cannot operate at the international
level and still derive immunity from the viable international legal
standards that define how law is made and applied.
Underlying the question of individual responsibility is the question
of state responsibility under the UN Charter and under emerging
standards of international law. Non-apartheid states must recognize
that by involvement in the economy of apartheid and by collaborating

23.
24.
25.
NAL OF

Id.
See G. FREDERICKSON, supra note 7.
See Nagan, The Black American Reaction to Apartheid, ISSUE: A QUARTERLY JOURAFRICAN OPINION (1973).
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in the security of the apartheid state, including its system of ideological
propaganda, the non-apartheid states effectually support the apartheid
system. The issue is two-fold: a) are the rational interests of the
United States broad enough to include the larger interests of global
society; and, b) are the interests of the United States so narrowly
defined that the international rule of law and the promotion of human
rights are subjugated to preoccupations with national security, superpower competition, anti-Communism, such that the maintenance of
international peace and security, and concerns for the delivery of justice and human rights sacrificed?
This article also reviews and clarifies the fundamental or basic
community policies regarding the apartheid problem and seeks to
clarify the policy implications of the use of the strategies of economic
coercion in the promotion of the demise of apartheid.
This article also reviews and analyzes the foreign policy doctrines
of U.S. Presidents Nixon, Carter and Reagan and analyzes recent
congressional efforts to rewrite U.S. foreign policy regarding South
Africa as witnessed by the agitation for divestment and disinvestment
26
and by the Anti-Apartheid Act.
The theoretical import of the article is to illustrate in the context
of economic sanctions, that international law is a vigorous living normgenerating process; that the agitation and promotion of international
legal norms occurs at every level of social process from the local and
national (the promotion of corporate and other forms of disinvestment,
as well as divestment from corporations doing business in South Africa
Anti-Apartheid Act) and the regional and transnational elements of
international law-making (for example UN decisions that mandate
economic sanctions). The article illustrates the utility of viewing the
international law-making process through a communications lens which
isolates the key actors and institutions, the channels through which
they communicate the prescriptive content of such signals; the bases
of authority and control that sustain those signals; the target audience
to which these signals of law-making are addressed.

II.

CLARIFYING THE BASIC POLICIES OF THE
GENERAL COMMUNITY

The escalating pressures on South Africa to eliminate apartheid
require that one clarify the policies of the general community towards

26.
ANN.

See Nagan, Professor Langbein and Social Investing: A Comment, IV HUMAN RTS.

81 (1986).
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apartheid as they relate to strategies for intervention to secure desired
outcomes. More precisely, the goal here is to identify the common
interest of the global community and then suggest how that common
interest might be most expeditiously and economically achieved. 7 The
goal of the more general international community is uncontroversial.
It is to terminate the policies and practices of apartheid because they
are incompatible with the principles of human dignity, human rights,
and contemporary conceptions of public order under the UN Charter.
Among the strategies most insistently asserted in the UN and
more recently in Western Europe, and in the United States is the
use of economic sanctions. s Much confusion and controversy have ensued about the nature of the preferred outcomes envisioned for the
future of South Africa and the utility or disutility of economic sanctions
in facilitating the realization of those outcomes. 29 Indeed, the preferred
modalities of change are highly controversial. Revolutionary modes of
change, supplemented by coercive military strategies, are frequently
identified in the West with Soviet hegemony.3° However, constructive
engagement, or persuasive, non-coercive, non-violent modalities of
change are sometimes seen as elaborate justifications designed to protect rather than to change the status quo in South Africa. 31 Moreover,
these modalities of change are seen as necessary to continue Western
hegemony and the protection of Western economic and strategic interests.3 2 In short, the policy issues as presented in the opinion-influencing media suggest a struggle of larger dimensions in which South
Africa is sometimes seen as a bit player and a side issue, while the
real issue revolves around interests of the major powers who are
deemed central to defining both the goals and the strategies of transformation. 33

27. On the action of the common interest and the general problem of clarifying policy in
the processes of international law, see WORLD PUBLIC ORDER supra note 1, at chapter 5; see
also M. McDOUGAL & M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 99, 148 (1981) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE].
28. On European sanctions, see West Europe to Consider FurtherSanctions against South
Africa, Christian Sci. Mon., Oct. 16, 1986, reprintedin AFPC XXI, Oct. 16, 1986, No. 40, at 9.
29. See generally Shultz, The DemocraticFuture of South Africa, Current Policy No. 1003,
(Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State).
30. See CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE supra note 27, at 159-88.
31. See A. SAMPSON, BLACK AND GOLD TYCOONS: REVOLUTIONAIRES AND APARTHEID
(1987).
32. Id. at chapter 5; M. MBEKI, PROFILE OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

33.

(1987).
See generally A.

SAMPSON,

supra note 31.
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It is therefore important from both a scholarly as well as a practical
perspective that an effort be made to clarify the basic policies of the
general international community as they relate to both the desired
outcomes, as well as the strategies of intervention, to clarify more
precisely, what the common interest is, and how it might be expeditiously and economically achieved.
III.

BASIC COMMUNITY POLICIES AND
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

There is a very broad consensus about the basic values that ought
to inform the more general community.- The values to which we refer
come under the label, human dignity.3 The historic if illusory task of
both scholars and opinion-leaders unhappily has been to assert a justification for human dignity that is objective, i.e., whose validity can
be objectively verified.- This search for objective verification or validity has carried the implied assumption that those who promote or
recommend identifications with human-kind as a whole, and with the
values of human dignity, are compelled, or influenced or motivated
by some external source or agent, and that the promotion or recommendation of human dignity values is done by scholars who are mere
transmitters of the message and who are themselves merely channels
of communication, being responsible only for the integrity of the channel and not the message. The way out of this dilemma is for the
scholar to accept responsibility for the core community values that
the scholar recommends.37 If the scholar's moral power is insufficient
to identify with the whole of humanity, a healthy sense of self interest,
might supplement the sense of personal responsibility for the basic
community values the scholar recommends as authoritative. Even if
the scholar is cavalier about the human dignity of others, he might
be sensitive to the concerns for his own human dignity. Knowledge
of a healthy sense of self-respect, buttressed by the concept of human
dignity, represent values in which the scholar is self-interested and
which he therefore might positively promote as basic community
policies. Indeed, the values shaped by the preference for human dignity, may be realistically seen as the best insurance of one's own value
position in social process.

34.

See generally WORLD

35.

Id.

36.

See Nagan, Book Review, 2 N.Y.L. SCH. J. COMP.
H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND

PUBLIC ORDER,

supra note 1.

McDOUGAL,

37.

INT'L

L. 106 (reviewing M.

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER).

Id.
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In this article, the author recommends as appropriate for the clarification of the more general policies of the international community,
the core value of human dignity. The empirical reference he gives for
the appraisal of any trend or constellation of conditions about any
specific problem in social process is whether the trend or conditions
is a consequence or a condition of a preferred pattern of value distribution in aggregate and in fact. The preferred pattern of value distribution he recommends is a pattern in which the core values of social
process: power, wealth, respect, enlightenment, affection, well-being
and health, rectitude, etc., are honored for all in highest possible
degree.- Correspondingly, the modalities for realizing such a preferred
pattern of value distribution and production must function in a cost-efficient manner to achieve the preferred value position. By cost-efficient
we mean strategies that involve the lowest or least net loss in realizing
the largest measure of production and distribution of all demanded

values. 39
In general, modalities conditioned by persuasive rather than coercive strategies in a public order committed to the goal value of human
dignity are always preferable. But sometimes coercive strategies are
indeed the most expeditious means of containing massive deviations
from the preferred human dignity goal. Economic strategies can be
persuasive (foreign aid and most-favored nation statuses) or coercive
(boycotts, sanctions, embargoes, etc. ).40 The critical question in context
of South Africa reposes first in the universally accepted policy that
apartheid must go, and must go soon. The apartheid system of internal
governance and regional state-craft poses an escalating challenge to
the maintenance of international peace and security and more generally, are admittedly incompatible with contemporary standards of international law, justice and morality.
The most fundamental deprivation imposed by the apartheid regime
on the majority of the South African population is the notion that the
value position of every individual in South Africa is meant to turn on
that person's racial pedigree.41 The pattern of racial discrimination is
so deeply entrenched in the social process and law of South Africa,
that thoughful commentators have viewed apartheid as more than
"mere" racial discrimination. Indeed, they characterize it as a systema-

38.
39.
40.
have to
41.

Id.
Id.
According to Senator Lugar, sanctions are one of the very few strategies foreign nations
intervene in South Africa, short of war. See A. SAMPSON supra note 31, at 257.
See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1.
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tic process of "domination" and "subjugation;" "intensely heirarchized"42
and sustained by the coercive apparatus of a modem, garrison state.
Perhaps the core policy summary of the apartheid edifice, including
the Botha reforms is that in fact as well as form, South Africa continues
to institutionalize, for the deprived majority, the elements of racialism
or racial prejudice, caste discriminations and a coercive labor regime.In short, apartheid attacks the principle of human dignity by attacking
the core value of respect: the cornerstone of what the general community means by the principles of human dignity and human rights.That one finds apartheid or neo-apartheid abhorrent and an affront
to human dignity is now fashionable. More critical issues have emerged
requiring the refinement - and clarification of policy options for which
the scholar as a responsible citizen must provide clarification and intellectual guidance. The use of economic coercion or sanctions presents
such a challenge for the clarification of the basic policies that shape
the strategies of international intervention in the South African social
and political process to promote the demise of apartheid by the most
expeditious and cost-efficient means.
Anti-apartheid pressure groups have increasingly promoted the
strategy of private economic coercion as an important element of the
general communities' response to the apartheid problem. Many states
including the United States have enacted law and policy to promote
economic sanctions against South Africa. As earlier indicated, it is
important to clarify the deeper community policies implicit in the use
of economic strategies as a base of power in international relations.
The issue is of particular importance to an appraisal of the objectives
of the Anti-Apartheid Act, since the American debate over the use
of economic sanctions has been guided less by the general community
policies in contemporary international law than by public discussion
and debate centered around parochial, unclear conceptions of national
interest and a vague distillation of moral, political, strategic, and
45
economic values.
From an international perspective, the apartheid problem has been
clearly established as a matter of international concern . 46 While controversy exists over what forms of international community intervention
are appropriate expressions of international concern, the broad policy

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 121-207.
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that most directly expresses the common interest of the larger community may be simply expressed: it is in the common interest that apartheid be terminated in the most cost-efficient manner, preserving the
human dignity values for all the relevant parties. It is probably the
case that any evaluation of any strategic modality of power, (military,
diplomatic, ideological and economic instruments), e.g., the modality
of economic coercion, will depend upon an intelligence base that will
permit reasonable predictability about the probable trends that may
result in either the consolidation or the dismantling of the apartheid
system as a result of either positive or negative economic sanctions
47
targeted at South Africa.
IV.

HUMAN DIGNITY AND ECONOMIC COERCION: STRATEGIES
FOR CHANGE IN THE COMMON INTEREST

In attempting to clarify policy it is frequently the case that the
prescriptive data a scholar confronts reflect the normative ambiguity
of high level abstractions, as well as the principle of complimentarity
that attends all normative systems.48 In the context of economic coercion and apartheid, the general policy guidelines from several different
areas of international law cross-cut each other in complex ways. First,
there are the policies against apartheid. Since apartheid attacks the
core value of respect - the heart of the principle of human dignity
- the fundamental policy, namely, the extinction of apartheid, promotes the corollary norm of nondiscrimination and the enhancement
of respect. These are well established policies whose congruence with
the common interest hardly needs further explanation. When these
policies are cross-cut with the policies behind internationally sanctioned
policies of action, the precise interplay between the policies of means
and the policies of ends is much less clear.
Second, there are the internationally sanctioned economic policies
in which economic matters are viewed in terms of goals rather than
strategies. And third, there are matters in which economic issues
figure more importantly in terms of the policies behind their strategic
employment to secure objectives that are noneconomic. Here we will
see policies of economic coercion, begin to incorporate the larger
policies of the international community that are concerned with the
control and regulation of coercive strategies of action to secure policy
49
objectives.

47.

See

48.
49.

Id. at 531-32.
Id. at 277-36.

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER,

supra note 1, at 532-60.
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POLICIES CONCERNING THE LARGER
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Although a review of the broad outlines of these policies may
appear, at first blush, to digress from the principle theme of this
paper, (e.g., an elucidation of the basic policies of the international
community that makes in particular context economic coercion licit),
it will be seen that this larger context enables us ultimately to focus
more sharply on the nature of the policies that underline the use of
economic leverage as a base of power in international affairs.- The
easiest way to distill the economic policies of the larger community is
to focus on the prime prescriptive instrument in which these policies
are codified, namely, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States [Economic Charter]. 51 It will readily be seen that the prescriptions contained in the Economic Charter exhibit the familiar principle
of complimentarity. The Economic Charter declares as its major purpose the realization of the "new economic order" founded on "equity,
sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation
among all states irrespective of their economic and social systems."-2
The Economic Charter also prescribes as the preferred community
policy the following: promotion of "wider prosperity and higher living
standards" for all; promotion of cooperation in economic, scientific and
technical fields, regardless of ideological systems; special support for
developing economies, including policies for the acceleration of
economic growth; and environmental protection.-

50. Id. at 232-34. Viewed in strategic terms, the economic instrument's role in the world
social process affects the global processes of production, conservation, distribution, and consumption of economic as well as other value processes. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER supra note 1,
at 227. The authors explain:
[I]t involves methods of and facilities for managing a flow of capital, goods, and
services across state borders. The economic instrument can be used by the general
community of states through a growing network of international governmental
organizations (both general and functional). It can also be used by individual states
to promote aggregate interests. The economic instrument can be employed positively to foster fulfullment of wealth and other values and negatively as a sanctioning
measure against deprivations of human rights. Given the enormous importance of
wealth (control and access to capital, goods, and services) as a base for all other
values, the economic instrument is clearly important for multiple purposes."
Id. at 227-28.
51. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No.31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A9631 (1974) [hereinafter Economic Charter].
52. Id. at preamble.
53. Id. at preamble.
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A counterpoint to these provisions is contained in article 16.- This
article places a duty on all states both individually and collectively "to
eliminate colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism
and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination, and
the economic and social consequences thereof, as a prerequisite for
development.- States practicing these coercive policies must compensate fully all "countries, territories and peoples" exploited or damaged.- Furthermore, all states have the duty to provide aid to those
so exploited. 7 Additionally, "[n]o State has the right to promote or
encourage investments that may constitute an obstacle to the liberation
of a territory occupied by force." '
The core policy of the Economic Charter appears to be the principle
of cooperation. However, one must view the principle of cooperation
in the context of the real world where economic coercion, i.e., noncooperation, is a major element of foreign relations between both
states and other actors. 59 Indeed, the flexibility of the economic instrument allows operative elites to shape behavior in ways consistent with
goals of the international community, such as maintaining peace and
security, and limiting the spread of violence using strategies of
economic deprivation or indulgence. Thus, while examining the
Economic Charter and its principle of cooperation, one must remember
that with economic sanctions against South Africa strategies of action
inherent in the use of the economic instrument involve both the principles of cooperation and non-cooperation (coercion).
Subsumed under the Economic Charter's principle of cooperation
are many state behaviors directly or indirectly linked to the purposes

54. We may also note as a further illustration of the principle of complementarity that the
Charter of the Organization of American States, article 19, holds that "no state may use or
,encourage the use of coercive measures of an economist or political character to force the
sovereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind." Charter of the
Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S.
3. Protocal of Amendment 6847, at art. 19. There is a similar - almost identical provision in
the 1970 U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations. Declarationon Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.28) 121, U.N. Doc.
A.8028 (1971) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration].
55. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 54, at 16.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. For an exhaustive survey of state practice, with a chronological survey from 1914 to
1984, see generally G. HUPBAUER & T. SCHOrr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED
(1985).
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and goals of the instrument. For example, article 4 states that "[e]very
state has the right to engage in international trade and other forms
of economic cooperation irrespective of any differences in political and
economic systems. '" Article 4 further states that "no state shall be
subjected to discrimination of any kind based solely on such differences."' 61 Article 5 codifies the right to participate in global economic
institutions especially "organizations of primary producers, '"- while
article 6 promotes the equitable and stable flow of goods, services,
and commodities. Articles 8 and 9 stress the principle of cooperation
in facilitating both the rationalization of the international economic
system and of the "economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological fields for the promotion of economic and social progress throughout the world. . . .
The Economic Charter would seem to draw sustenance from, inter
alia, articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter. Under article 55, the UN
is required to promote: "(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and the conditions of economic social progress and development;
(b) solutions of economic social health and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and (c) universal respect
for an observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
.... ," Article 56 holds that "all members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55. '"6 Both articles,
of course, must be read in light of article 113 which includes among
the purposes of the UN the achievement of "international cooperation
in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character . . . .
Reference might also be made to the Declaration on the Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States (Friendly Relations Declaration). Among the principles
codified in this instrument was the responsibility of states to cooperate
for the achievement, inter alia, of economic progress. 67 Additional
sources provide textual evidence of expectations to underscore the
evolving policy of international cooperation in common interest. Both

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Economic Charter, supra note 51, at art. 4.
Id.
Id. at art. 5.
Id. at arts. 8, 9.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
Id. at art. 56.
Id. at art. 113.
See Friendly Relations Declaration,supra note 54.
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articles 22 and 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) are consistent with the principles outlined above.6
Article 2 of the Covenant of International Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Economic Covenant) is also consistent with these principles.69 Indeed, article 2 honors the right of each person to a reasonable
standard of living, or in other words reasonable support within the
economic order. These instruments, and others such as the Establishment of the New International Economic Order 7° establish beyond

68. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at
71 (1948), arts. 22, 28 [hereinafter Universal Declarations].
69. International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (xxi),
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no.16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 2 [hereinafter ECONOMIC
COVENANT].

70.
(1979);

See generally M.

BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

CHALLENGES TO A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

(R. Amacher, G.

Haberler & T. Willett ed. 1979); ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (R. Lillich ed. 1976); THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP (R. Gardner &M. Millikan
ed. 1968); J. INGRAM, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (3d ed. 1978); P. JESSUP,
TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); A. KOUL, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF UNCTAD IN WORLD
TRADE (1977); E. LASZIo, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (1978); LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (K. Hossain
ed. 1980); R. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER
(1979); 0. DE RIVERO, THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
LAW

(1980); J. TINBERGEN,

SHAPING THE WORLD ECONOMY,

(1962); Agrawala, The Emerging

InternationalEconomic Order, 17 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 261 (1977); Bautista, The New International Economic Orderand ChristianCharity, 25 CATH. LAW. 171 (1980); Blair, Commentaries,
16 VA. J. INT'L L. 348 (1976); Borgese, The New InternationalEconomic Order and the Law
of the Sea, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 584 (1977); Brian, InternationalLaw and the Developing
Countries: The ABA Workshops of 1977, 12 INT'L LAW. 265 (1978); Brower, The Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States and the American Constitutional Tradition, 10 INT'L
LAW. 701 (1976); Dawson, The Role of the Private Banker in the New InternationalEconomic
Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 298 (1976); Fatourod, The InternationalLaw of the NIEO: Problems
and Challengesfor the U.S., 17 WILLIAMETrE L.J. 93 (1980); Ferguson, The New International
Economic Order, 3 U. ILL. L.F. 693 (1980); Haight, The InternationalEconomic Order and
the Chapter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAW. 597 (1975); Khan, The
Normative Character of the NIEO: The Framework of Inquiry, 18 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 294
(1978); Lillich, Commentaries, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 291 (1976); A REORDERED WORLD: EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (R. Cooper ed. 1973); Richard, The United Nations
Seventh Special Session: Proposalsfor a New World Economic Order, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 601 (1976); Rozental, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the New
InternationalEconomic Order, 16 VA. J. INTL L. 309 (1976); Ryan, Towards a New International Economic Order, 9 U. QUEENS L.J. 135 (1976); Schaehter, The Evolving International
Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976); Schukla, New International
Economic Order, 18 INDIAN J. INT'T L. 290 (1978); Simmonds, The Home Convention and the
New International Economic Order, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 315 (1976); THE UNITED
STATES, CANADA, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (E. Laszlo & J.
Kurtzman ed., Pergamon Policy Studies No. 51, 1979); Van Themaat, Some Basic Legal Issues
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question the right to participate in the global economy for the purpose
of promoting the common interest by realizing the economic component
of human dignity.
The instruments have stimulated academic debate about whether
a right to development exists, and, if so, what the nature of this right
is in international law. Some theorists argue that the nature of these
freedoms is tied to the principle of material existence. 7' It is further
argued that for existence to endure, improved living standards are
mandated. Therefore, the law of international cooperation in effect
has codified a right to development.2
Briefly stated, the right to development is a human right because
people cannot exist without development. - Jurist Karl Vasak provides
for a periodization of human rights wherein he views the emergence
of clusters of rights to represent a first, second and third generation.According to Vasak, the third generation of human rights encompasses
the principle of solidarity and within this principle he discerns a right
75
to development.
VerLoren van Themaat grounds the principle of cooperation in the
principle of solidarity and in turn he finds the empirical predicated
for the principle of solidarity in the condition of interdependence in
international economic order. Van Themaat views "the traditional international law of nations . . . [as] . . . predicated on the assumption
of conflicts of national interests, [while] cooperative international law
requires a community of interests.' 76 Through the emerging international organizations, nations tentatively express new interest "in security, survival, and cooperation for the preservation and development
77
of vital needs and resources of mankind."
Policies expressed in the various texts, i.e., the policies of cooperation, solidarity and economic justice, vindicate in their wake affirma-

of a New InternationalEconomic Order: A Western Point of View, 24 NETH. INT'L L. REV.
509 (1977); Vanzant, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Solution to the
Development and Problem, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP L. 446 (1974); White, New International
Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 323 (1976); White, New International Economic Order,
24 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 542 (1975); Zaphirou, An InternationalCode of Conduct on Transfers
of Technology, 26 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 210. (1977).
71. See K. VASAK, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); P.
VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1981).

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See sources cited supra note 71.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tive or positive strategies of action. The situation in South Africa
provokes the exact opposite policy, that is to say, a policy meant to
exclude South Africa from the benefits of international solidarity and
economic justice because of its apartheid policies. Apologists for the
South African government may claim, however, that international
practices against it violate the Economic Charter. Article 4 states that
"no state shall be subjected to [economic] discrimination of any kind
based solely on . . . any differences in political, economic and social
systems." 78 Additionally, states have a duty under article 5 to refrain
from using economic and political strategies that limit participation.79
South Africa's claim, however, is traversed by articles 780 and 16
which requires states to "individually and collectively . . . eliminate
. . . apartheid . . . -81 Article 4 clearly seeks to define the nature of
participation inclusively, recognizing that we live in a world of diverse
political, economic and social systems.- Article 16, on the other hand,
suggests that states practicing apartheid are not entitled to expect
cooperation, solidarity and economic justice in the international arena
while their behavior remains manifestly incompatible with the policies
and purposes of contemporary international law. In effect, article 16
implicitly suggests that states may licitly employ strategies of economic
coercion to "eliminate" apartheid.8
Obviously, under the Economic Charter solidarity and economic
justice are goals not only for achieving the broad purposes of that
Charter but also for securing the elimination of those forms of state
conduct deemed incompatible with the Economic Charter.- South Africa's apartheid system is one example, among others, specifically
enumerated in the Economic Charter as prohibited state conduct.8
Thus far, however, commentary concerning the nature of economic
rights and duties in international law has not appreciated the contextual importance of the economic or wealth process as an interdependent
and interdetermining process among several others within the larger
global community. The global social process reflects the vitally important goals of economic development, prosperity, and solidarity. While
pursuing these goals, the economic or wealth process may also be

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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used as a base of power to secure and protect other components of
world order. The economic process, therefore, may be used to secure
desirable outcomes involving the values of power, respect, enlightenment, health, etc.
The global wealth process operates collectively through the UN,
bilaterally through the foreign relations practices of the UN and
member nations, and individually through a large and diverse range
of actors, some in the private form of bodies corporate. The problem
which arises is how the global wealth process and its many diverse
actors and institutions may bring its influence to bear upon the Pretoria
Authorities and its still insistent commitment to apartheid.
The idea of an affirmative pattern of international economic cooperation may be viewed as a component of the larger obligation under
the UN Charter that states cooperate and promote friendly relations
with each other. Cooperation facilitates the realization of the values
of human dignity. The values of economic abundance and prosperity
achieved through economic cooperation are as important as any other
value realized through cooperation and enumerated within the
Economic Charter. And yet, the complementary policy that permits
or mandates a coordinated pattern of value deprivation, including deprivations in the economic sphere, which may be targeted at South
Africa, is also a major part of the broader policy landscape.
A.

The Economic Aspects of Sanctions

Probably the most important recent example of the use of international economic sanctions against a particular country is the example
of Rhodesia (today Independent Zimbabwe). The Rhodesian example
has been closely assayed by American commentators.M The impact of
sanctions against Rhodesia suggested advantages to the local economy
in the short and medium term with serious problems emerging in the
longer term. The advantages to the Rhodesian economy in the short
and medium term were a function of import replacement strategies.
However, without a broader market for locally produced consumer
goods, and as more sophisticated machinery began to wear out, the
7
Rhodesian economy began to grind down.8
While a measure of success may be imputed to the effect of sanctions on the political choices available to the Smith government, it

86.

SCHMIDT,

UNITED NATIONS

AND SOUTH AFRICA:

LESSONS FROM THE

CASE OF

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (UN Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents Feb. 1987); Malan,

South Africa and Economic Sanctions, S. AFR. DIG. (Mar. 13, 1981).
87. See sources cited supra note 86.
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should be remembered that sanctions, while important in influencing
negotiations towards majority rule, were not the most important
strategic instrument. This does not undermine the importance of sanctions, since the Smith regime had difficulty financing both the basic
economy of Rhodesia and the war effort. Economic sanctions in the
context of Rhodesia is therefore better seen as one of the important
elements of pressure along with military, diplomatic, and ideological
pressures that ultimately brought the Smith regime to accept the
Lancaster House Agreement. It may be parenthetically noted that
sanctions against Rhodesia were subject to a significant degree of
sanctions busting activity as well as poor enforcement. Additionally,
South Africa which shares a border with Rhodesia did much to undermine the effects of economic sanctions on the Rhodesian economy and
therefore indirectly on the war effort.
It is of course tempting to compare some aspects of the South
African economy with that of the experience with sanctions in the
Rhodesian context. The central question around which analysis might
focus would seem to be the extent to which the South African economy
is integrated into the larger world economy. If we view imports and
exports as a percentage of the gross domestic product, recent figures
indicate for example that in excess of fifty percent of the South African
economy depends on foreign trade as compared to in excess of seventeen percent for the United States. 8- South Africa has an open economy
with a significant reliance upon imports and exports. The immediate
effects of sanctions would be that South Africans would be forced to
sell their goods more cheaply and to buy their imports more expensively. If one considers moreover that forty percent of South Africa's
imports include sophisticated technology; computers, machines, and
spare parts, as well as technical expertise, it will be readily appreciated
that South Africa has more international linkages in its economy and
consequently more vulnerability, than Rhodesia. There can be no question that a fully implemented international sanctions program would
cost the South African economy billions of dollars. When economic
sanctions are moreover placed in the context of (1) the South African
war economy, (2) internal and external political pressures, and (3)
internal unrest and insurrection, the position of sanctions as one element in the overall strategic calculus designed to stimulate compliance
with U.N. Charter obligations would seem to be an important one.

88.

Id.
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B.

The Strategy of Economic Coercion as a Flexible Instrument of
Policy

The highly diversified bases of power of relevant parties and the
modes of their employment provide decisionmakers a wide range of
options. The economic instrument as a base of power, and as a strategic
tool in diplomatic relations broadens the choices and options available
to rational decisionmakers. The economic instrument permits the least
destructive choice of strategies in pursuit of national or international
interests. The economic instrument, viewed in this light, maximizes
flexibility in the strategic posture of the actor who seeks to use it.89
A further policy matter related to sanctions is the policy that seeks
to control and regulate the use of coercion in international law. It is
well-established that the use of coercion in the world community is
subject to the principles of necessity and minimal destruction of
humanitarian values.- As a rule, persuasion is a more desirable
stratagem than coercion to influence standards of conduct deemed
lawful in the international arena. Even so, when coercion is necessary,
then economic and ideological sanctions may be much more consonant
contextually with the purposes of the U.N. Charter than using the
military instrument either conventionally or covertly.
In the context of U.S. foreign relations, a wide statutory base
exists empowering the executive branch to use economic sanctions to
pursue U.S. international interests. 9' Let us consider one simple contemporary example. The Reagan Administration has maintained the
importance of economic sanctions to combat international terrorism in
addition to trade restrictions targeted against North Korea, Cambodia,
Vietnam, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua and of course Libya.9 One commentator noted: "[E]conomic sanctions are an integral part of peaceful
measures that we can take to deter states from supporting terrorism. 93 Whether a state, such as the United States, should use

89. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1, at 236; see also presentation by Tom T.
Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law (1984).
90. See sources cited supra note 89.
91. The debate over whether sanctions work is frequently less a matter of scholarly appraisal
than ideological commitment. Thus, for example, the Reagan administration was adamant that
sanctions would not work (whatever this means) in South Africa, but was equally adamant that
economic sanctions along with other pressures have worked in the war against state sponsored
terrorism from Arab states like Libya. See Bremer, Counterterrorism:U.S. Policyand Proposed
Legislation, Current Policy No. 1019 (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept of State, Oct. 15,
1987) (the Reagan Administration argued that economic pressures could be useful against countries supporting terrorism). Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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sanctions depends on many considerations, including: (1) effectiveness,
(2) economic consequences, (3) political consequences, and (4) diplomatic consequences for the target state. These considerations apply, of
94
course, to other states that consider imposing the sanctions.
What purposes or goals are to be achieved by using economic
sanctions? First, sanctions induce the targeted state to change its
policies and practices. Second, they signal to the larger, world community the seriousness with which the targeted state's conduct is being
censured. Third, they signal warnings to the targeted state's allies.
Finally, they strengthen those oppressed forces and interests inside
and outside the targeted state by reassuring their support and
strengthening their resolve to combat, or agitate against, continuing
the conduct that precipitated the sanctions.
When using any strategic instrument of coercion, a pattern of systematic and timely appraisal must be coupled with high levels of flexibility so that changes in direction, scope and intensity may be continually fine-tuned to secure broad goals of compliance with the desired
pattern of conduct identified with the common interest. For example,
if the pattern of conduct is changing, then strategic calculations have
to be made to determine whether intensified or deintensified economic
coercion will accelerate the process of change or reform. To further
this goal, the impact of sanctions must be appraised against effects
not only on the targeted state but also on the state imposing the
sanctions. Indices such as the direct and indirect cost to the national
economy are sometimes considered to be less important than the
economic consequences that might flow from, for example, the continuation of terrorism. The diplomatic costs of sanctions would also have
to be appraised in the light of the pressures that must inevitably be
exerted to secure collaboration from allies or from states whose
economies might be dramatically affected by the targeting of sanctions
at their principal trading partners.
These broad considerations have been fully assayed by the Reagan
Administration in its war on terrorism. The United States has specifically targeted Libya as the state most appropriate for the use of
economic coercion. 95 On the other hand, the administration has aggressively fought to insulate South Africa from the recommendations of

94. Id.
95. Id. Differences in scope and intensity of sanctions are reflected in the various forms of
export controls and foreign policy measures. See, e.g., Murphy & Downey, National Security,
Foreign Policy and Individual Rights: The Quandary of United States Export Controls, 30
IN PL & Coup. L.Q. 791 (1981).
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the UN, political pressure groups, and others around the world who
hold South Africa as a prime candidate for global economic sanctions.9
Nonetheless, the Congress has begun to address the issue more vociferously even to the extent as previously mentioned, of overriding a
presidential veto.
The important policy questions to be addressed are: a) What
strategies will transform South Africa's political process from a culture
of apartheid to a system in which the values of human dignity and
nondiscrimination are honored in the highest degree possible? b) At
what cost? The UN program demonstrates that both positive and
negative sanctions are being utilized. Negative sanctions have been
targeted at the South Africa government in the hope that such sanctions will precipitate changes in the apartheid edifice. Furthermore,
the UN has embarked on a program of positive sanctions in its support
for refugees and the liberation movement.
In addition, the Reagan Administration has implemented positive
sanctions, loosely styled "constructive engagement," which are based

96. See Whitaker, Manning & Resener, The Bankers Challenge Botha, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
27, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXI, Jan. 24, 1986, No. 3, at 4 (The termination of credit by
nearly 300 foreign banks that cancelled loans to South Africa after President Botha failed to
endorse reforms as expected is one of the factors that has influenced the efficacy of the economic
embargo against South Africa.). See also General Motors Looks to Black Africa for Growth,
Wash. Times, Nov. 12, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXI, Nov. 14, 1986, No. 44, at 2, 14; Feder,
Coke Plans Pretoria Pullout: Opposition to Apartheid Cited, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1986,
reprinted in AFPC XXII, Sept. 19, 1986, No. 36, at 2 (Coca-Cola's and General Motors' voluntary
withdrawal from South Africa is a good indicator of the effect the "no new investment policy"
of the Anti-Apartheid Act has upon disinvestment.).
Jackson, The Screws are Tightening on U.S. Companies, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 11, 1985,
reprinted in AFPC XX, Feb. 7, 1985, No. 5, at 9, 16 (private sanctions and local government
sanctions took the form of divestment from corporations presently doing business in South Africa
rather than general disinvestment). Booth, Polaroid'sExperiment In the Disengagement From
South Africa Debate, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLICY DEBATE
(introduced by R.R. James 1975). George M. Houser, former Executive Director of the American
Committee on Africa, states the political case for disinvestment:
[A]merican business as it increases its economic involvement in [South Africa)
becomes a partner of the [South African] state as it maintains its control over the
great mass of non-white people living within its boundaries. This economic aid has
helped [South Africa] on its way to a self-sufficient economy, has and continues to
provide important political and psychological support to the racist system, and now
helps the [South African] economy in its process of economic, military and political
expansion into the rest of Africa ....
To think that a few remedial changes made
by U.S. corporations allowing a few more Africans to get skilled positions and to
allow some increase in wages (even as the cost of living goes up) will challenge
the pattern of apartheid and minority control is naivete of the worst order ....
Id. at 88-89.
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on the theory that the changes or reforms effected by Mr. Botha
should be positively reinforced. It must be strongly noted, however,
that the Administration has also implemented negative sanctions
against opponents of the South African regime. Certain members of
the Reagan Administration take an especially negative view of the
national liberation movements, sometimes viewing them as instruments either of terrorism or the Comintern.
Economic sanctions against South Africa are essentially one part
of an overall strategic foreign policy program. Ultimately, this program
is intended to persuade the South African government to abandon
apartheid policies and practices and to implement meaningful political
change. Such change would ensure full and direct participation by the
South African Black majority in all the important value processes
which are crucial to the principles of self-determination and human
dignity. Since the type of economic sanctions supported by particular
states, or clusters of nation-states, differ considerably in scope and
intensity, it is difficult to gain an accurate picture of what might result
from a global economic process committed to the principle, in practice,
of total sanctions under chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
The United States has used two forms of economic coercion against
South Africa: private sanctions coupled with direct pressure upon corporations to withdraw from, or radically curtail doing business in,
South Africa.1 Pressures have been generated indirectly to have both
private and public investors withdraw their investments from corporations doing business in South Africa.9 Public sanctions are legislative

97.

On the problems posed for universities by divestment for social causes, see generally,

J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNEMANN,

THE ETHICAL INVESTOR: UNIVERSITIES AND

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ch. 3 (1972). A good illustration of the divestment effort at the
local level is the policy adopted by the City of Gainesville, Florida. The city voted to divest its
funds from corporations doing business in South Africa. The order required the city to divest
within a three-year period. Almost three years later, the City Commission voted unanimously
to proceed with its policy of divestment. The discussions before the City Commission are an
excellent illustration of the promotional or agitational function in decisionmaking. Speakers for
and against divestment were allied to the right with a strong republican flavor, and the left
with a centrist, democratic base. The right argued that divestment favors communism and that
the ANC was essentially a communist organization. The left coalition argued that divestment
would usher in inevitable political change. See Pena, Despite Opposition, City Commission
Proceeds with Divestment Policy, The Florida Review, Oct.-Nov. 1987, at 2, col. 1.
The strong political debate about divestment (economic sanctions) at local, state, and national
levels is part of the process of norm-creation or prescription. One may view the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 as an outcome of the "living law" in action cite. Indeed, it constitutes
a code with implications for international law-making or prescription.
98. Id.
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efforts from the state and local levels.9 Public sanctions are also evidenced in the promulgation of congressional legislation imposing
economic sanctions on South Africa., °From the United States' perspective, the strategy of divestment
should be seen as a private sanction targeted at corporations doing
business in the Republic of South Africa. The arguments justifying
divestment rest on the principle that investments in the economy of
South Africa are investments in support of apartheid. Investments
serve only to strengthen apartheid and to weaken the desire of the
ruling elite to implement anything other than cosmetic change. Under
this view, divestment is neither neutral or irrelevant to the international issue of racism in South Africa which has been on the UN
agenda since the late 1940's.
Divestment, then, is a strategy targeted at the principle of corporate social responsibility. The doctrine maintains that, from a moral
point of view, business cannot be blind to the moral values of the
culture that permits it to grow and flourish. Because investment frequently cuts across state and national lines, it necessarily involves
foreign policy considerations, such as the extent to which the U.S.
government will protect foreign investments. A question frequently
asked is whether it is appropriate for individuals and activists to
attempt to influence foreign relations through divestment.
Although the primary responsibility for conducting foreign relations
rests with the federal government 0 1 and specifically the executive
branch, U.S. foreign relations frequently affect individual citizens especially those who may have to fight foreign wars. In a democracy,
the concept of responsibility requires that people exercise their influence over matters of fundamental concern about public and private
power through legitimate channels of decisionmaking. The promotion
of human rights in the international sphere is not a monopoly of the
executive branch, it is a responsiblity of all citizens.
In summary, the weight of authority, as well as common sense,
suggests that without intensified coercive strategies, such as economic
sanctions, South Africa would not have incentive or desire to change.
Economic sanctions are a limited form of coercion; their structure and
process enable the actors to fine tune their positions giving them

99. Id.
100. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
101. On the relationship of U.S. law to international law, see Henkin, InternationalLaw
as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984). See also Nagan supra note 26.
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flexibility, and forcing decisionmakers, even in the most hardened
positions, to evaluate the costs and benefits of strategies of resistance
and accommodation.
The uncontroverted policy issue involved here is the elimination
of apartheid by the most expeditious means with minimal cost to
humanitarian values. The critical issue is whether economic sanctions
are a hinderance or a stimulus to change in a manner which minimizes
humanitarian costs and maximizes inclusive community values. 102 The
answer depends on both intelligence and a capacity to predict whether
the price of economic sanctions to the protected features of the larger
public order is worth the risk posed by not having them. The evidence
supporting economic sanctions as the best strategy of limited coercion
is not clear-cut, 103 but the decision has been made. 1°4 The key policy
choice now lies in appraising this strategem in light of unfolding trends
and conditions in South Africa. 5 Whether sanctions condition political

102. See generally FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLICY DEBATE
(introduced by R.R. James) (1975) (arguments about disinvestment ban revolved around whether
disinvestment will have economic efficacy, and further, if it has no economic efficacy, whether
disinvestment may still be justified on political or strategic grounds). See especially Harvey,
ForeignInvestments in South Africa: The Economics of Withdrawal, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLICY DEBATE (introduced by R.R. James) (1975). Harvey argues
that unilateral economic sanctions will not produce policy changes in South Africa but "an
international enforceable agreement" might be a remote but more promising strategy. See also
22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (West Supp. 1987).
103. In The FinancialTimes, July 29, 1985, Ian Davidson supported sanctions by asserting
"what is marginal in conditions of relatively internal calm ... may become critical in conditions
of unrest and uncertainty, cited in A. SAMPSON supra note 31, at 175. Robin Renwick, the
British diplomat charged with managing the Rhodesian sanctions policy, concluded that, notwithstanding the difficulties, Rhodesian sanctions worked. Renwick, Economic Sanctions,
HARV. STUD. IN INrL AFF. 45, No. 45 (1981) cited in A. SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 175.
104. But see also the policy of Margaret Thatcher's Britain - a leading trade-partner of
South Africa indicates that reluctance to support economic sanctions against South Africa still
exists. See Dennis Herbstein Questions the Reluctance to Cut Pretoria's Lifelines, London
Times, Sept. 2, 1985; A. SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 175.
For a critique of the efficacy of sanctions on influencing the South African ruling cast, see
Brumelow, Why South Africa Shrugs at Sanctions, FORBES Mar. 9, 1987, at 100.
Since South Africa is in the capitalist orbit, the relationship of business to the decisionmaking
of the ruling caste is a difficult problem. Indeed, the relationship between Afrikaner nationalism
and capitalism is an uneasy, difficult-to pin-down affair. Under the Vorster regime, South Africa
experienced phenomenal economic growth, yet Vorster can be fairly viewed as - if not anti-business - then lukewarm about business. Botha's South Africa has not had the same experience
of economic success, yet he is viewed as more pro-business than Vorster. See generally A.
SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 132-49.
On the relationship between capitalism and apartheid, see A. SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 96.
105. While it is difficult to estimate the cost of sanctions for South Africa, the party subject
to sanctions generally has to pay more for what it wants and has to sell cheaply what it wants
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behavior in a manner which ultimately promotes progressive change
at the lowest human cost must be constantly appraised and reappraised
in light of the actual conditions and progress towards the goals of the
international community.106
VI.

TRENDS IN PERSPECTIVE: ASSERTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC COERCION AND ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

In the United States, the dialogue about economic sanctions has
generally not taken place with a clear concern for international legal
standards. - Moral and political values have been invoked in support
of economic sanctions. Similar arguments have been promulgated for
both public and private sanctions. More recently however, practical,
intractable, economic considerations have entered into disinvestment
decisions. For example, the escalating pattern of violence in South
and Southern Africa is rendering the region more and more an insecure, unattractive investment market. 10 South Africa's economic prob-

to sell. See Scott, South Africa Will Pay to Evade Sanctions, Christian Sci. Mon., Oct. 16,
1986, reprinted in AFPC XXI, Oct. 16, 1986, No. 40, at 9, 14.
On the effects of sanctions in the wake of the divestiture, see also, What CanBreak Apartheid,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXI, Oct. 26, 1986, No. 42, at 5.
106. See Salter, Embargoes, Quarantinesand Sanctions: Is the U.N. Nagging Rhodesia
and South Africa?, 7 INT'L LAW 177 (1973). An exception to this trend is Dean Acheson, the
former Secretary of State, who strongly disfavored sanctions against both Rhodesia and South
Africa. According to Dean Acheson, "this is bare-faced aggression, unprovoked and unjustified
by a single moral principle." Id.
107. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
108. Regarding Destabilization, see Goshko, South African Diplomat Expelled; Schultz
Says Attacks on Neighboring Nations Cannot be Tolerated, Wash. Post, May 24, 1985, at Al,
col. 6; see also Hawkins, In Wake of Raids, S. Africa's Neighbor's Boost Calls for Sanctions,
Christian Sci. Mon., May 27, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXII, May 30, 1986, No. 29, at 3. The
article reads, "in the wake of South Africa's military strikes on targets in Botswanar, Zimbabwe,
and Zambia last week, six nations hear South Africans are putting their faith in two things to
bring political change to their southernmost neighbor - international economic sanctions and
internal unrest.
On the pattern of South African security and the destabilizing role of South Africa, see
Evans, The Frontline States, South Africa and Southern Africa Security: Military Prospects
and Perspectives, reprintedfrom Zambezia (1984/5), XII, THE JOURNAL OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF ZIMBABWE (1986).
On the effects of South African destabilization of Mozambique, see Honey, In Mozambique,
War and Terrorism Make Refugees of 1.5 Million, The Sun, Mar, 31, 1987, reprintedin AFPC
XXII, Apr. 3, 1987, No. 13, at 11, 12. See also Talliffe, Angolan People Feel Fearsome Effects
of Protracted War, The Christian Sci. Mon., Mar. 30, 1987, id. at 7.
An example of South Africa's destabilization policies is the recent South Africa inspired coup
in LeSotho. See Cowell, Military Topples LeSotho Leader: Capital Jubilant, N.Y. Times, Jan.
21, 1986, at 26, col. 1.
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lems have triggered a moratorium on debt repayments, a catastrophic
drop in the value of the Rand, a continuing state of emergency, rigid
censorship, and intensified militant activity by the insurgent national
liberation movements. 109 In addition, South Africa's efforts to blow up
the Gulf Oil installation in Cabinda, Angola, provided a sobering example of the expendiency with which South Africa views U.S. economic
interests in Southern Africa. Such efforts admittedly may not threaten
the large scale economic enterprises doing business in South Africa. 110
Arguments for and against economic sanctions targeted at South
Africa rest largely on prognostication. Both sides share the same perspective: it is in the interest of the United States that the policies
and practices of apartheid be terminated as quickly as possible. Processes to facilitate the emergence of a democratic South Africa ought
to be implemented - ones which honor the principles of justice, equality, freedom, and a commitment to the Rule of Law. Yet, it may be
too soon to know whether the arguments for or against economic
sanctions will prove most prophetic in orchestrating the rapid termination of apartheid. Nonetheless, since the sanctions movement has
gained considerable international momentum, and indeed, has been
embraced by the United States in the Anti-Apartheid Act, the arguments for and against sanctions are relevant today. These arguments
provide criteria for appraising the effects of sanctions on the behavior
of the Pretoria Authorities and the larger pattern of conflict in South
Africa.
Among the standard arguments against divestment and disinvestment aspects of sanctions are the following:
1. The victims of the apartheid system will become the victims
of economic sanctions. Indeed, it is suggested that the supreme irony

See also A ParadiseLaid Waste by War, The Guardian, Sept. 28, 1985, at 1 (this article
deals with the continuing Angolan civil war and the South African military invasion as well as
support for the insurgence of UNITA under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi).
109. On the rise of Black South Africa's discontent, see Parks, South African Blacks'
Discontent Increasing, L.A. Times, Sept. 30, 1984, reprinted in AFPC XIX, Oct. 5, 1984, No.
40, at 2, 14.
110. On the Cuban presence in Angola, see Hoagland, Castro Outlines Goals in Africa,
Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1985, reprinted in AFPC XX, Feb. 7, 1985, No. 5, at 10.
While American oil interests have found Angola a hospitable place for their investments,
Dr. Jonas Savimbi's group received foreign aid from the Reagan administration. See Ottaway,
U.S. Oil Firms Ignore Reagan Policy, Wash. Post, July 31, 1986, AFPC XXI No. 33, at 7.
On the U.S. support for the destabilization of Angola, see Gwertzman, U.S. Policy on Angola
Moves Closer to Rebel Aid, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1985, reprinted in AFPC XX, Nov. 8, 1985,
No. 44, at 11, 14; Robinson, Aid UNITA? No, Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1985, reprinted in AFPC
XX, Nov. 8, 1985, No. 44, at 9.
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of the "divestnik" strategy is that those sanctions imposed to eliminate
apartheid will punish, in disproportionate manner, those persons already victimized by apartheid - mainly the black population.111
2. Controverted polls exist indicating that the victims of apartheid, groups of rarely-consulted South African blacks, do not want
an economic embargo or, at the very least, they are ambivalent about
it. 112

3. The black nations in and around South Africa, including the
frontline states, will suffer massively and disproportionately from an
imposed economic embargo on South Africa. Moreover, as newly independent, poor countries, they will have to bear a substantial economic
burden imposed or advocated by rich, comfortable outsiders.113
4. To reform or constructively change the political economic race
relations landscape of South Africa, there must be a firm economic
base on which to build increased opportunities, to improve the standard
of living for all, and to realize and accommodate the increased pattern
of demand occasioned by rising expectations of a more just and fair
social and political process. To cripple South Africa financially and
economically would be to remove an essential condition of meaningful
prospective change.114
5. The advocates of divestment do not appreciate the psychology
of the ruling Afrikaner elite. Economic sanctions assume that rational
actors comprise the South African power elite who calculate in rational
terms the net costs and benefits of collaboration and conciliation with
western democracies. It may be that economic sanctions will provide

111. On the idea that the blacks of South Africa would be the prime victims of sanctions,
see Holliday, Avoid Imposing Sanctions, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXII,
July 18, 1986, No. 27, at 3, 15. Holliday concludes, 'this is hardly a moral course." Id. at 15.
Helen Suzman argues that sanctions will hurt the victims of apartheid. Suzman, What American Should Do About South Africa, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, (magazine) at 14.
On the effects of sanctions on blacks, see SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 257.
112. Schlemmer Poll, Christian Sci. Mon., June 10, 1985 at 7.
113. One of the key objections to sanctions was its predicated impact on SADDC states.
See Legum, Debate on South Africa Broadens, The Christian Sci. Mon., July 15, 1986, reprinted
in AFPC XXII, July 18, 1986, No. 27 at 3, 14.
114. In fact, the Anglo-American executive Michael O'Dowd argued that social injustice is
not merely normal in a developing economy but is "absolutely universal and if not inevitable,
it has never been avoided." A. SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 95. This is basically congruent with
the "Oppenheimer Thesis" that "economic growth would make apartheid wither away, as blacks
were drawn into skilled jobs and middle class life." Id.
See also id. at 115, 151-52; Schatland, U.S. Companies Push from Within, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 14, 1985, at 3, col.1.
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a further reason to react irrationally no matter what the political costs
better a dead South Africa than a South Africa controlled by
blacks.115
6. Economic sanctions are futile. They will not strangle the South
African economy or bring the country to its "political knees." Indeed,
economic sanctions have rarely been effective when invoked in the
complex world and underworld of global international business transactions. There are always enough actors, institutions and nations to
undermine, for profit, any sanctions program put into effect. Indeed,
to many business people, sanctions simply present another market
variable: one market-conditioned actor's loss may indeed be another
s
market conditioned actor's window of opportunity.11
7. In view of argument six, economic sanctions may strengthen
the intransigence of the Afrikaner elite who might now be far less
willing to negotiate, thereby strengthening apartheid itself and making
the very changes sought by sanction advocates an even more remote
possibility.
8. An economic withdrawal from South Africa will, in effect,
minimize any leverage the United States and other western countries
have with the South Africans. Moreover, American corporations within
South Africa can be used as a progressive force for changing work-related attitudes and labor practices by bringing industrial democracy
to South Africa. With economic strength would come political strength
for black employees.117
9. Economic sanctions will polarize a society in which race relations are at a crisis level and in which racial violence and polarization

115. Helen Suzman opposes sanctions because she believes they are ineffective. See Suzman,
Sanctions Won't End Apartheid, Oct. 4, 1987, reprinted in AFPC XXII, Oct. 9, 1987, No. 40,
at 2. She believes their effect on white Afrikaner politics, and on repression or continued
repression is negligible. Id. She expects sanctions will harm blacks (the victims) disproportionately, as well as neighboring labor exporting states. Id.
One of the interesting aspects of economic sanctions is their effect on South African investment
in the U.S. economy. See Potts, South African Investments in U.S. Draw Fire, Wash. Post,
Oct. 4, 1987, reprinted in AFPC XXII, Oct. 9, 1987, No. 40, at 3.
116. Economic sanctions will become less effective and less attractive as a coercive strategy
of change if sanctions imposed by one state are regarded as an economic opportunity for another.
See Potts, Apartheid Opponents Focus on ForeignFirms, Wash. Post, June 21, 1987, reprinted
in AFPC XXII, June 27, 1987, No. 25, at 1.
117. While the net effect of economic sanctions remains unpredictable, right-wing think
tanks are convinced that the effects are predictable, i.e., that economic sanctions have no effect
on changing the policies of the South African government. See Address to the Heritage Foundation by Herman Nickel, former U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, cited in S. AFR. DIG.,
May 22, 1987, at 8.
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are major, omnipresent conditions. Economic sanctions enhance these
conditions of crisis and accelerate revolutionary processes that can
only culminate in a racial conflagration reminiscent of the holocaust.
10. An economic sanctions policy against South Africa will ultimately mean a loss of jobs for American workers."n
Among the standard arguments for divestment and disinvestment
aspects of sanctions are the following:
1. There is no neutral ground with respect to South Africa. Involvement in the economy of apartheid ultimately strengthens the
institutions of apartheid.
2. Private sanctions (divestment) is an important part of the ethical framework of an economic system that gives business people a
great deal of entrepreneurial freedom. Policing the ethical practices
of business is not a purely governmental responsibility. We are all,
in some measure, responsible for how free institutions operate at home
and abroad. Pressuring businesses to repudiate racist practices is a
legitimate and responsible concern of every American citizen who values the constitutional protections of liberty and justice. The fact that
United States business operates extraterritorially does not negate the
concerns of individuals and corporations for the purposes of their own
civic culture. Therefore, individuals and corporations may legitimately
engage in business practices designed to improve the race relations
climate in South Africa or, as many businesses have determined, the
right to withdraw from South Africa because of its obnoxious racial
policies.
3. The South African Government operates an economy highly
integrated into the western economic sphere while its labor practices
are sufficiently exploitive of blacks as to approach a forced labor regime. Thus, corporations involved in South Africa derive profits and
benefits from a system that has little to do with free enterprise.
4. South Africa has gained enormously from western economic
influences, becoming a major, aggressive military power in the region.
It has used its military power to destablilize its neighbors in flagrant
violation of international law and continues to hold on to Namibia by
force of arms in direct violation of international law.
5. The South African reform process has been a exercise in cosmetology. The reforms have been both reluctant and, from the black
perspective, illusory. Every scheme devised by the South African

118. In the face of this self-evident proposition, Leon Sullivan, the father of the Sullivan
Principles, advocates total divestment from South Africa and full economic sanctions. Recently,
he was refused a visa to travel to South Africa. See S. AFR. DIG., May 22, 1987, at 8.
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government, including its new constitution, has resulted in a further
concentration of political power in the white elite. This concentration
of power has augmented the garrision state with enhanced power
being shared, not with the white electorate, but by the South African
Government and the military establishment.
6. The effort to engage constructively the South African elite has
been totally misread by that elite to mean that it could continue business as usual. Thus, the South African government has discarded the
public commitment to change, it had issued earlier. The government's
perception that the West was not deeply committed to full democracy
in South Africa and that white supremacy dressed in the guise of
Madison Avenue image-making is acceptable to its western economic
partners, has, in fact, made reform immeasurably more difficult to
achieve.
7. The only leverage available to the western industrial democracies between jawboning and military force is the leverage of
economic coercion. If economic coercion fails to convince the white
elite of the dangers the apartheid system poses for world peace and
security and for South Africa's own capacity to survive, then this elite
will ultimately have to confront the vast possibilities of international
military intervention in South Africa. The leverage of economic sanctions communicates in the strongest terms, short of military involvement, that South Africa's time is running out.
8. While it is true that the United States cannot implement its
policies worldwide, the United States can tremendously affect South
Africa. The United States has long-honored, historic and cultural ties
with South Africa, including a shared experience with the problems
and dynamics of cultural pluralism. Promoting negotiation by applying
economic and political sanctions is a responsible exercise of the United
States' power.
9. A comprehensive package of economic sanctions against South
Africa will damage its economy, distancing the United States from
the South African government. This result might compel South Africa
to negotiate with a view to ending discrimination and creating a meaningful pattern of power sharing. If this scenario is correct, sanctions
may be precisely the vehicle to avoid revolution and a bloody racial
holocaust. If the South African government proves intransigent, evidence of pluralized white politics, especially Afrikaner white politics,
may generate an alternative to the present Botha wing of the
Nationalist Party and open the door to a pattern of negotiations which
will contain at least the worst of the conflict.
10. On the whole, Blacks in South Africa support economic sanctions because they believe sanctions will accelerate the demise of aparhttps://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss1/3
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theid. And while they recognize that suffering will occur, they tend
to believe that short-term suffering to cast off the long-term chains
of apartheid justifies the suffering brought by economic sanctions. 119
11. Economic sanctions will accelerate the termination of the military and economic sanctions policy South Africa has used against the
frontline states. These sanctions have damaged the economies of those
states to the tune of twenty billion dollars.
12. Since the United States is not a racist society, it should take
the lead in eradicating racism at home and abroad. Economic sanctions
are a step in that direction.
In addition to these practical arguments about the benefits and
burdens of sanctions, there are theoretical arguments, the most salient
of which harbors curious implications. Conservatives back the progressive force argument that the U.S. private sector's economic presence
is a positive force. Liberal economic theory shares the view that "rational" economic decisionmaking will inevitably erode and destroy the
irrational, racial prejudice underpinnings of apartheid. Political
liberalism, however, suggests the opposite, namely that economic involvment in the economy strengthens the apartheid state and its capacity for repression.
Marxist thought is also not without its paradoxes. Under this view,
capitalism and apartheid are entirely compatible and reinforce each
other. Apartheid is strengthened by capital enabling it to create structures of a "labor repressive" society which then "facilitates the exploitation of Black workers by monopoly capital." By weakening the
capitalists, you will correspondingly weaken apartheid. An alternative
Marxist theory holds that the more investment there is in the economy
of apartheid the more you accentuate or telescope the contradictions
between capital, labor and apartheid. These telescoped contradictions
will, in effect, quicken the revolutionary demise of apartheid.
It should be noted, however, that the weight of authority suggests
that without increased coercive measures targeted at the white minority regime, that regime would have no incentive to change the policies
and practices of apartheid in any meaningful way. Additionally, the
conditions of destabilization and insurrection in South Africa may make
the coercive instrument of economic sanctions an attractive, strategic

119. According to Associated Press Reports, Black Trade Union Leaders are asking for
more, and stiffer sanctions. More Sanctions Urged by S. African Blacks, Wash. Times, Nov.
6, 1987, reprinted in AFPC XXII, Nov. 10, 1987, No. 44, at 9.
On black support for the divestment movement, see Davidson, South Africa Blacks Believe
Divestment is Worth the Pain, Wall St. J., June 27, 1986, at 3, col. 1-3.
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option for honoring the rights of the majority and for increasing the
price of maintaining the status quo. In this sense, economic sanctions
simply fine tune collective international coercion.
The more general goals of the larger international community can
be clearly stated: that it is in the common interest of all mankind that
international law seek to secure and enhance a public order of human
dignity, and that international law strategies be devised to secure the
eradication of apartheid since apartheid attacks the notion of a common
interest of the world community in protecting a public order committed
to the human dignity principle.
The arguments for and against sanctions ask a strategic question:
Will a program of negative or positive economic "sanctions" applied
to the South African context be the best stratagem to secure compliance with international law? The critical question therefore is
whether economic collaboration or economic coercion is the strategy
best suited to hasten the demise of apartheid at the most minimal
cost to humanitarian values for all. 12o The answer must in part depend
on the context of actual conditions concerning reaction and change in
South Africa. The evidence at present suggests that economic coercion
is justified. This view will become more evident as we review the
relevant trends in the decision.
VII.
A.

TRENDS IN DECISION

The General InternationalLaw Context

It is perhaps an irony of history that the great Afrikaner statesman,
Jan Christian Smuts, elected Prime Minister of South Africa several
times and a high ranking military leader, should have also become the
great conceptualizer of, and activist for, world unity.121 That vision,
reflected in his enigmatic writings on the philosophy of holism, found
institutional expression in his proposal during the Great War for an
organization that was to become the League of Nations. And it was
through Field Marshall Smuts' herculean efforts that a stronger expression of global unity and solidarity emerged after World War II:
the UN Charter System.'- If a single personality could be said to

120.
121.

See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1.
See generally W. HANCOCK, SMUTS I: THE SANGUINE YEARS 1870-1919 (1962); W.
HANCOCK, SMUTS II: THE FIELDS OF FORCE 1919-1950 (1968) [hereinafter W. HANCOCK];
see also, G. Ezejiofor's statement cited in Sundberg, What is 'Human Rights': The Universal
Declaration, 20 AKRON L. REV. No. 4, at 593-4 (1987).
122. See W. HANCOCK, supra note 121.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss1/3

38

Nagan: Economic Sanctions,
U.S. Foreign Policy, International Law and th
ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF 1986

have had a seminal influence on the institutional expression of the
principle of world unity and solidarity based on brotherhood (or sisterhood) of the human species, then Smuts, the Afrikaner guerilla leader,
is that person.'23 One of the great paradoxes of human experience is
that people cling tenaciously to high ideals, and yet, make the most
astounding compromises of principle in the name of realism and prac-

ticality. 1?4

Smuts abstained as the South African delegate on the adoption of
the UN Charter, an instrument which finds its roots in Smuts' unique
version of holism. It is indeed a supreme irony that Field Marshall
Smuts, the philosopher-statesman-idealist, was the product of one of
the most segmented, ethnically and socially divided nation-states on
the planet. Indeed, members of his own "white tribe" sought to inflict
upon the promise of the Charter system a framework of political and
social organization incompatible with virtually every major international law tenet and precept rooted in the Charter itself.'2 To use the
language of distinguished policy scientists, while the Charter system
was a dramatic evolutionary instance of the "World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, ' 'I26 the pattern of defiance of Charter
obligations evidenced in the policies and practices of apartheid have
posed, and indeed continue to pose, a severe challenge to the efficacy
of both the world constitutive process and the system of world public
12 7
and civic order it sustains.
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter allocates a significant measure of
power to the nation-state' 28 because it requires matters of internal
domestic concern (or jurisdiction) to be matters of exclusive state

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
See Sundberg, supra note 121.
Id.
See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1; SPECIAL ISSUE: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED

1962-1986,
(UN Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 87-10593, 1987) [hereinafter G.A.
BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF APARTHEID

RESOLUTIONS]; see also SPECIAL ISSUE:

RESOLUTIONS BY UNITED NATIONS

COUNCIL ON THE QUESTION OF APARTHEID

SECURITY

1962-1986, (UN Centre Against Apartheid, Notes

& Documents No. 87-10569, 1987) [hereinafter S.C. RESOLUTIONS].
127. Id.
128. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para 7. Article 2(7) reads as follows:
[N]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under
the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
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sovereignty. Accordingly, the insistent historic questions about international law and apartheid have been: 1) whether the policies and
practices of apartheid are matters of international concern, outside of
the exclusive reserved domestic jurisdiction of the state; '1 2) what
form of community intervention is mandated or permitted by interna3°
tional law if the answer to one is affirmative?1
The trend in emerging decisions from various national, regional,
hemispheric and transnational actors and institutions suggest global
compliance with human rights norms, such as the norm of non-discrimination, the prohibition of racial discrimination, and the suppression
and punishment of the crime of apartheid, and others. General community concerns have focused broadly upon the structure and process of
change, including the vehicles of negotiation and conciliation, as well
as support for the forces of national liberation. To better appreciate
the importance international law holds for the problem of apartheid
and its eradication, it is important that the apartheid problem be
placed in the larger context of norms and standards that establish
deeply-held constitutive expectations and public order for the larger
1 31
community.
The Charter's preamble refers to the "peoples of the United Nations" who are determined to affirm their faith in fundamental human
rights. 31 2 In effect, the preamble asserts that the dignity and worth
of individual persons mandates an honoring of those fundamental rights
at the international level. - Quite obviously, the policies and practices
of apartheid flagrantly contravene fundamental human rights and,
therefore, stand in sharp contrast to one of the major purposes of the
Charter. Im
Among the purposes expressly stated in the Charter are the obligation to cooperate in the solution of international economic, social,
cultural and humanitarian problems, and to promote human rights,
and to eradicate discrimination based upon race, sex, language or
religion.'I Additionally, article 13 may be read as an important limi-

129.

See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1; 0. OZGUR, APARTHEID, THE UNITED
(1982).
130. See CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 27; see also Advisory Opinion on
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa), Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [hereinafter "Namibia Case"] 1971 I.C.J.
16, 50-54.
131. See generally CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 27.
NATIONS & PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

132.

U.N.

133.
134.
135.

Id.
See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1, 2, 3, 4.

CHARTER

preamble.
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tation on the application of a member state's domestic law having
extraterritorial reach. If, for example, a domestic rule of law affirms
the obligation to cooperate, then courts must follow the affirming
interpretation. In addition, article 13(1)(b) specifically empowers the
General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations for
promoting human rights.
Article 2 of the Charter provides that members of the UN have
a good faith obligation to honor the duties they have assumed expressly
or implicitly by their voluntary membership in the UN. This Article
should be read in the light of articles 55 and 56 which provide that
the UN shall promote human rights and that all its members shall
pledge to jointly and separately support the Charter to achieve its
purposes. These provisions and others in the Charter establish, as a
cornerstone, that government policies based on racial prejudice and
discrimination are unlawful.
The Charter codifies as fundamental the principles of nondiscrimination, and expressly prohibits the policies and practices of racial
discrimination. This issue is a matter of fundamental human rights.
Articles 55 and 56 obligate both the UN, acting as an institution, and
its member states, acting individually or collaboratively, to promote
the racial harmony, to advance the norm of nondiscrimination, and to
advocate the end of racial discrimination.
While the Charter's human rights provisions are rather general,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,-", specifically states that
racial discrimination is incompatible with human rights envisioned by
the Charter. Article 2, for example, states that "[e]veryone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind as to a race . . . . ,,137
Furthermore, article 7
codifies the principle of equality before the law.1:'
Influenced by legal positivism, writers have frequently questioned
the legal status of the Universal Declaration. They question whether
the rights codified in that instrument are binding on states as parties
or merely forms of nonbinding positive morality. Since the International Bill of Rights was technically issued as a "declaration," the
critical question becomes whether the Universal Declaration is merely
a non-binding form of positive morality, or whether it has international
juridical status and, if so, what that juridical nature is?
Since it is accepted that UN resolutions are not binding, the question generally remains whether declarations, being neither treaties or

136.
137.
138.

Universal Declaration,supra note 68, at 71.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 7.
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the like, are also not binding. In 1962 the UN's legal advisors clarified
the answer, finding that a declaration is a codification of firmly-held
expectations that the members of the international community are
expected to honor. When those firmly-held expectations become operative state practice, the standards of conduct envisioned by a declaration
may become law by the process of prescription called "custom."' 39
Many national and international institutions of decisionmaking have
directly or indirectly accepted the Universal Declaration as an authoritative expression and interpretation of the Charter's provisions
on human rights. Moreover, in 1972, the UN Security Council, together with its five permanent members (including two superpowers),
adopted Resolution 310 dealing with labor relations in Namibia.' 40 Resolution 310 called upon South Africa to abolish Namibian labor practices conflicting with the International Bill of Rights. The Council
evidently assumed that the Universal Declaration must be read in
conjunction with the Charter which is binding on its member states.
Because the targeted practices were examples of apartheid, apparently, from the perspective of the Security Council's lawmaking process,
the Universal Declaration is law, though perhaps not self-executing
law. 141
Several other instruments of international lawmaking clarify the
status of apartheid. The first of these are the International Covenant
on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, 42 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 43 which more concretely reaffirm
the expectations codified in the International Bill of Rights. These
covenants, inter alia, prohibit racial discrimination.' In addition, two
other instruments target racial discrimination and apartheid. The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Elimination Declaration) triggered expectations about outlawing racial
discrimination. ' The Elimination Declaration was followed by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Elimination Convention).14r This Convention suggests

139. For a judicial application of customary international law, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
140. See 0. OZGUR, supra note 129, at 7.
141. Id.
142. See ECONOMIC COVENANT, supra note 69.
143. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 19,
1966. Entered into force March 23, 1976. G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 26.
144. Id. at art. 26. See also ECONOMIC COVENANT, supra note 69, art. 2.
145. See 0. OZGUR, supra note 129.
146. Id.
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states review their municipal legislation to secure compliance with the
norms of nonracial discrimination. It further recommends states adopt
effective measures to promote non-discrimination in fields of legitimate
state concern, such as education, culture, and information.
In 1973 the UN adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (International
Convention). 147The Convention declared that the policies and practices
of apartheid are crimes against humanity and international law, 148 constituting a threat to international peace and security. 149 In the investment context, the concern is the extent to which involvement in the
economy of apartheid serves to entrench and promote discriminatory
practices. In that regard, the law envisioned by the Convention seeks
to criminalize apartheid.
B.

InternationalLaw-Making at the Top:
The InternationalCourt of Justice

The most significant legal opinion concerning apartheid is the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences for states supporting the continued presence of South Africa
in Namibia.' - Since South Africa has administered Namibia under the
norms of apartheid, this decision effectively provides an appraisal of
the lawfulness of apartheid in international law. The court assessed
apartheid as prescribing and applying "distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin, which constitutes a denial of human
rights, [and] is [therefore] a flagrant violation of the purposes of the
Charter.' ' 5, The dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in the 1966 South-

147. Id. Professors Henry J. Richardson and Goler Butcher make a cogent, indeed, powerful
case that the South African regime's policies and practices are so incompatible with contemporary
expectations of international law, that the regime is itself an illegitimate one and that there is
an international law obligation to withdraw recognition from Pretoria. Richardson, The Obligation
to Withdraw Recognition from Pretoria as the Government of South Africa, 1 TEMP. INT'L
COMP. L.J. 153 (1987); Richardson, Self-Determination, InternationalLaw and the South African Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNArL L. 185 (1978); Butcher, Legal Consequences
for States of Illegality of Apartheid, 8 HuM. RTS. Q. 404 (1986). See also Paust, The Illegality
of Apartheid and the Present Government of South Africa (1975) (unpublished paper at ABA
annual meeting, seminar on the Legal Aspects of Apartheid, July 7, 1985) (on file with South
Africa Project, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, D.C.).
148. See 0. OZGUR, supra note 129, at 9.
149. Id. at 10.
150. See "Namibia Case", supra note 130.
151. Id. at 76.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

43

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 3
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

west Africa decision urged that the norm of nondiscrimination based
on race had effectively become a rule of customary international law
and that South Africa's control over Namibia was governed by that
legal norm under article 2(2) of the UN Charter. The 1971 Namibia
case makes this principle a rule of international law.152
Apartheid violates the UN Charter as well as numerous customary
international law standards that have evolved through the gradual
codification of the major expectations about international law built
into the Charter. Furthermore, apartheid provokes grave consequences for the international community. Charter members, both collectively and individually, as well as through the UN, have a good
faith obligation to assist in the termination of apartheid and the promulgation of a new system more consistent with the purposes of international law, human rights standards and international morality.
C.

International Law-Making in the UN: The General Assembly
and Security Council-

Apartheid first became a matter of international attention under
the Charter system when the Indian government feared the discriminatory policies of the South African government were targeted at
citizens of Indian ethnic origin living in South Africa- On December
8, 1946, the General Assembly adopted its first Resolution on the
treatment of Indians in the Republic of South Africa. A second Resolution adopted in 1949 invited the governments of South Africa, Pakis-

152. See 0. OZGUR, supra note 129.
153. See generally id., WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1, at 532-60.
For a short capsule chronological overview of the UN and South Africa, see UNITED NATIONS
ACTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID

(UN Centre Against Apartheid, Notes & Documents No. 86-

23206, Sept. 1986).
From 1946 to 1952, the General Assembly confined its discussions of South Africa's race
policies to the "treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa." United
Nations Review of United Nations Consideration of Apartheid, U.N. Doc. ST./PSCA/SER.A/2,
at 3 (1967).
In 1952, the more inclusive issue of apartheid itself was included as a separate agenda topic
under the title, "Question of Race Conflict in South Africa Resulting From the Policies of
Apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa." Y.B.U.N. [1952], at 297-306.
The two agenda items, namely, the treatment of ethnic Indians and the issue of South
Africa's overall race policies, were treated as separate issues until 1962. Id. In 1962, and
continuing thereafter, the issue concerning the treatment of ethnic Indians and the broader
question of apartheid were merged into a composite item under the heading, "The Policies of
Apartheid of the Government of South Africa." Y.B.U.N. [1962], at 93-100.
154. See Y.B.U.N. [1946-47], at 144-48; United Nations Review of United Nations Consideration of Apartheid. U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER. A/2 at 3 (1967); Y.B.U.N. [1952], at 297-306.
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tan and India to discuss the problem. 155 In 1950 the General Assembly
passed another Resolution urging South Africans not to enact certain
discriminatory legislation and urging that a commission be established
56
to assist in negotiations among the three states.
Two years later another Resolution created a three-person "Good
Offices Commission" to study the racial situation in South Africa and
to report back to the General Assembly. 157 The Commission submitted
its first report on October 3, 1953, and indicated that the apartheid
practices of the South African national party' contravened the UN
Charter and the International Bill of Rights. The Commission further
found that, if continued, these policies would impair friendly relations
among states. The report maintained that apartheid was extremely
dangerous to the maintenance of peace inside South Africa, as well
as to the stability of international relations. Finally, the Commission
strongly recommended an effort towards conciliation and proposed
setting up a roundtable conference with representatives from South
Africa's different ethnic groups and a number of UN representatives.
The Commission submitted a second report in 1954 reiterating the
need for communication between all relevant groups in order to promote the peaceful development of race relations in South Africa. 159
The Commission's third report further stressed that apartheid was a
serious and disturbing factor in international relations. Nonetheless,
South Africa ignored UN efforts to promote communication both internally and with nations outside of South Africa. This pattern continued
through 1960.
As the UN became increasingly concerned with apartheid, countries like India and Pakistan became more assertive in influencing UN
members to take a tougher stand. In the context of racial conflict in
South Africa, the UN position sought to promote dialogue and conciliation within the country. With regard to South Africa's treatment of
citizens of Indian descent, the UN encouraged negotiations with India
and Pakistan under the aegis of the Good Offices Commission and
reasserted South Africa's obligation under the Charter to promote
friendly relations.'

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See 0. OZGUR supra note 129, at 55; WORLD PUBLIC
0. OZGUR supra note 129, at 55-6.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
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In the aftermath of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, the Security
Council became seized of the apartheid problem, noting that it generated international friction which, if continued, might endanger international peace and security. 16 1 In 1961 the General Assembly again
adopted resolutions condemning apartheid. 162 Furthermore, it referred
the South African Government to article 2, paragraph 2 of the UN
Charter which imposes upon member states a good faith standard in
honoring Charter obligations. The General Assembly also expressed
concerns identical to those of the Security Council. The Assembly
requested all states to consider both individual and collective action
under the Charter to bring about the termination of South Africa's
apartheid policies. In 1961 both the Security Council and the General
Assembly again noted the serious international consequences of South
Africa's policies and practices of apartheid.'rEvident in the UN effort from 1946 to 1961 is the UN's considerable
foresight and temperance in attempting to force South Africa to comply
with its Charter obligations.- These obligations include addressing
its human rights violations, particularly within the race relations context, lessening the friction between nation-states generated by South
Africa's racial policies, and joining other nations in their obligation to
uphold Charter obligations at the international level.
After 1961 the General Assembly began to focus its attention on
the strategies through which the UN might secure the termination of
apartheid. In 1962 that body passed Resolution 1761 in which it recommended several specific measures designed to pressure the South African government to abandon its apartheid policies.' The recommended pressures included:
(a) Breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of South Africa or refraining from
establishing such relations;
(b) Closing ports to all vessels flying the South African
flag;
(c) Enacting legislation prohibiting ships from entering
South African ports;
161. Id. at 58-9; U.N. SCOR (85 lst-55th mtgs) (1960), Y.B.U.N. [1960], at 142-147.
The Sharpville massacre occurred on March 21, 1960. Peaceful African demonstrators were
protesting the pass laws. The police opened fire on them without provocation. See A. REEVES,
SHOOTING AT SHARPVILLE: THE AGONY OF SOUTH AFRICA (1961).

162.
163.
164.
165.

See 0. OZGUR, supra note 129, at 62.
Id. at 62-3; WORLD PUBLIC ORDER supra note 1, at 533-534.
See G.A. RESOLUTIONS, supra note 126, at 3.
G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/4986 (1962); G.A.
RESOLUTIONS, supra note 126, at 3.
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(d) Boycotting all South African goods and refraining
from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition,
to South Africa;
(e) Refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft
belonging to the Government of South Africa66 and companies
registered under the laws of South Africa. 1
In addition, Resolution 1761 approved the establishment of a special
UN subcommittee created solely to monitor the apartheid policies of
South Africa and obligated to make periodic reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. 167 Not surprisingly, the Special Committee developed a voluminous record of the policies and
practices of apartheid. 168 Today, South Africa's race problems are
among the most carefully documented international problems within
UN jurisdiction.' 69 It follows that the intelligence functions for decisions and recommendations issued from UN agencies have been based
on data that are complete, accurate and, in many instances, scientific.
Indeed, it is difficult to challenge the intelligence base of UN decisonmaking regarding the policies and practices of apartheid. Even rightwing factions in the United States have not challenged the credibility
of the UN database on South Africa. Instead, they have sought to
undermine its agenda on the ground that expenditures of effort addressing the human rights violations of South Africa have been dispropor-

166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 5.
168. If we view international law-making as a living, dynamic process, and if it is seen
empirically as a process of communications, then the role of the special committee and its
offspring is of seminal importance to those who want to know how international law is made.
The subcommittee has generated a flow of "messages," as well as "intelligence" about the
apartheid process, that has significantly crystalized the norms generated by the larger community
seeking to outlaw apartheid. The following document illustrates the key role the subcommittee
and its allied organs have played in effectively making international law concerning apartheid:
SPECIAL ISSUE: PUBLICATIONS LIST AND COMPREHENSIVE INDEXES 1967-1982 (UN Centre
Against Apartheid, Notes & Documents 1982).
The Special Committee Against Apartheid has sponsored many intelligence gathering as well
as scholarly assessments of the apartheid situation. See DECLARATION OF THE SEMINAR ON
OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR (UN Centre Against
Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 86-21788, Aug. 1986). These Declarations are, of course,
not "law" in the positivist sense. But since they are communications targeted at audiences that
wield effective power and whose decision-making institutions can make authoritative responses
to these "signals," they are an important element in the international law-creating process. They
serve as instructive instances of how international law is empirically made and applied.
169. Id.
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tionate to efforts to eradicate the human rights violations of other
countries. 170

By 1969, the situation in South Africa continued to deteriorate and
the General Assembly recommended a much more precise framework
of economic sanctions in Resolution 2506.171 Recent developments in
United States commitments toward economic sanctions are similar to
those envisioned by the General Assembly in 1969. The Resolution
provides that member states shall:
(a) desist from collaborating with the Government of South Africa,
by taking steps to prohibit financial and economic interests under their
jurisdiction from cooperating with the Government of South Africa
and companies registered in South Africa;
(b) prohibit airline and shipping lines registered in their countries
from providing services to and from South Africa and to deny all
facilities to air flights and shipping services to and from South Africa;
(c) refrain from extending loans, investments and technical assistance to the Government of South Africa and companies registered in
South Africa;
(d) take appropriate measures to dissuade the main trading
partners of South Africa and economic and financial interests from
collaborating with the Government of South Africa and companies
registered in South Africa.172
Under article 11, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter, the General
Assembly may "call the attention of the Security Council to situations
which are likely to endanger international peace and security.'" 7 In
little over a decade, the General Assembly has acted five times under
this article and, along with other members states, requested the Security Council to act affirmatively consistent with international peace
and security.1 7 4 The Security Council responded by supporting an internationally honored arms embargo against South Africa. Perhaps

170. Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile and Illegal, in NAT'L LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST DIVESTMENT:
IS IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? Is IT PRODUCTIVE? (1985).
171. G.A. RESOLUTIONS, supra note 126, at 11, 12.
The economic coercion envisioned in this resolution was only a part of this framework. The
principal signficance is that it specifically endorced the struggle for liberation as an aspect of
the inalienable right to self determination.
See also 0. OZGUR, supra note 129, at 71; WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supranote 1, at 552-554.
172. Id.
173. U.N. CHARTER art. 11, par. 3; OZGUR, supra note 129, at 82.
174. 0. OZGUR, supra note 129, at 78-87.
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the best expression of the Security Council's posture is contained in
75
Resolution 282. 1

The recommendations and decisions relating to both economic and
arms embargoes are among the most important actions to emerge
from the General Assembly and the Security Council. They are relevant to the complex question of maintaining an economic presence in
South Africa. Additionally, the General Assembly considered many
other related issues between 1962 and the present. 176 For example, in
Resolution 1881 (XVIII) it addressed the human rights violations committed against South Africa's political prisoners.1 77 In 1966 the General
Assembly condemned apartheid as a crime against humanity and
criticized South Africa's main trading partners for their collaboration
with South Africa in the maintenance of the apartheid system.17 In
1967 the General Assembly expressed support of freedom fighters
against apartheid, demanding that they be treated as prisoners of war
under the Geneva Convention.79 In 1968 it supported a cultural, educational and athletic boycott of South Africa.'S°
Between 1969 and 1972 in particular, the General Assembly continued to condemn the brutal treatment to which South African officials
subjected their political prisoners. In 1973 the General Assembly
adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.'' In that same year it called for the
repeal of all repressive South African laws. Especially targeted was
the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960 which declared unlawful the
South African national liberation movements; namely, the ANC and
the PAC. The General Assembly took special note of the effort to
Balkanize South Africa with its Bantustan policies and the attendant
denationalization of vast numbers of South Africa's black population.
On June 16, 1976, a date commemorating the massive insurrection
in the black township of Soweto, the General Assembly again expressed its concern over conditions in South Africa and criticized states
that continued economic and strategic collaboration with the South

175. S.C. Res. 282, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council (1970), at 12, 25
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970).
176. See generally, G.A. RESOULTIONS, supra note 126; OZGUR supra note 129, at 55-78;
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1, at 552-554.

177. See G.A.

RESOLUTIONS,

supra note 126, at 4.

178. Id. at 6-7.
179. Id. at 9-10; see especially id. at 58-60.
180. Id. at 3-11, 26-68.
181. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, art. 1, 28 GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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African regime. 182 The General Assembly also proclaimed June 16 the
international day of solidarity with the struggling people of South
Africa. Acting in part on a strong recommendation from the General
Assembly in 1977, the Security Council adopted a mandatory arms
embargo against South Africa.'1'
Finally, the General Assembly condemned the South African government as an "illegitimate, minority, racist regime."', The political
and legal symbolism of this renunciation is noteworthy. Here the UN
sought to create a symbolic focal point to legitimize the struggle of
the black people of South Africa by a global expression of solidarity
with the martyrs of Soweto. The political-legal symbolism was created
to generate the kind of authority symbol that would legitimize black
liberation and its international support throught the UN.'1
In 1980 the General Assembly called for an international conference
on sanctions against South Africa. Held in Paris in May 1981, the
Conference adopted a Declaration reaffirming and emphasizing that
the problem of South and Southern Africa were matters of significant
international concern.- The Conference also supported the notion that
the sanctions honored by member states and provided for under chapter 7 of the UN Charter would be an appropriate and efficient means
s
to bring South Africa into compliance with its Charter obligations.1 7
The Declaration expressed the opinion that the economy, and therefore
the political process of South Africa, could be made vulnerable if the
sanctions envisioned were widely and uniformly applied.'In 1984, Security Council Resolution 554 addressed the promulgation of South Africa's "new constitution" which was affirmed on
November 2, 1983, by the white electorate. 189 Since the new constitution made provision for Whites, Coloureds and Indians, but not Blacks,
the Security Countil declared itself "convinced that the so-called 'new
constitution' endorsed . . . by the exclusively white electorate . . .

182. Resolutions of the 42nd and 58th plenary of the General Assembly (Oct. 26, 1976; Nov.
9, 1976) set out concerns of the General Assembly about the Soweto uprising. These resolutions
relate to Security Council Resolutions 392 (1976) of June 19, 1976. See G.A. RESOLUTIONS,
supra note 126.
183. 0. OZGUR, supra note 129, at 102.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 97-98; see also G.A. RESOLUTIONS, supra note 126, at 84-85.
187. 0. OZGUR, supra note 129, at 98.
188. Id.
189. See also Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983; S.C. RESOLUTIONS,
supra note 126, at 554.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss1/3

50

Nagan: Economic Sanctions,
U.S. Foreign
Policy,
1986 International Law and th
ACT OF
ANTI-APARTHEID

would continue the process of denationalization of the indigenous African majority, depriving it of all fundamental rights, and [would]
further entrench apartheid, [and continue to transform] South Africa
into a country for 'whites only."',The Security Council maintained that the provision for Coloureds
and Indians in the new constitution was targeted at "dividing the
unity of the oppressed people," and as such was designed to promote
internal conflict among them.191 The Council also indicated that the
new constitution would "aggravate tension in South Africa and in
Southern Africa as a whole."', The Security Council then declared
the
the new constitution "contrary to the principles of the Charter of
1
United Nations,1 ' 93 rejecting it and declaring it "null and void."'
In effect, what the Security Council did in Resolution 554 was to
evaluate the new constitution first in terms of its compatibility with
the Charter, second for its impact on maintaining minimum public
order inside South Africa, and third, for its impact on maintaining
minimum order in Southern Africa as a whole.95 The Council viewed
the new constitution as a strategic ploy by the Botha regime to promote
conflict between the oppressed peoples of South Africa - divide and
rule - while further entrenching white control and supremacy.19
The new constitution, viewed by the Botha regime as a significant
departure from the "old style apartheid," furnished the centerpiece of
the promised and long-awaited reform package. However, the Security
Council's reaction, it appears, repudiated the notion that any such
reform, and the constitutional blueprint that buttressed that reform,
would meet contemporary international legal obligations. The prediction of the Security Council that the new constitution would trigger
further turbulence in South Africa has proved quite accurate. In the
aftermath of the new constitution, political unrest in South Africa
resulted in the imposition of a state of emergency in thirty-six South
African districts and involved massive acts of repression by South
African security forces.
In Resolution 569 of 1985, the Security Council condemned the
imposition of the state of emergency and the mass arrests and deten-

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Nagan, supra note 14.
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tions, calling for the total elimination of apartheid. 197 The Council urged
all UN members to adopt the following measures:
A. Suspend all new investment in the Republic of South Africa;
B. Prohibit the sale of Krugerrands and all other coins minted in
South Africa;
C. Restrict the field of sports and cultural relations;
D. Suspend guaranteed export loans;
E. Prohibit all new contracts in the nuclear field; and
F. Prohibit all sales of computer equipment that may be used by
the South African army and police. 19s
In Resolution 558 of 1984,199 the Security Council drew attention
to Resolution 418 of 1977 in which it called for a mandatory arms
embargo against South Africa. 2° The Council reaffirmed Resolution
418 and stressed the need for a strict application of all its provisions,
specifically requesting all states to "refrain from importing arms, am'' 2 1
munition of all types and military vehicles produced in South Africa. 0
Furthermore, the Council also drew attention to Resolution 421 of
1977 which concerned a study of techniques used to make the arms
2
embargo more effective. 02
The legal status of apartheid under international law is clear. The
policies and practices of apartheid violate several major UN Charter
undertakings and almost every precept in the International Bill of
Rights. 2° Moreover, since 1946 South Africa has been unwilling to

197.

See S.C.

RESOLUTIONS,

supra note 126, at 569; SOUTH AFRICA 1986: A PERMANENT

STATE OF EMERGENCY (1987); A.S. MATHEWS, SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY LAW AND THE

(Carte Lectures) (1987).
A.S. MATHEWS, supra note 197; S.C. RESOLUTIONS supra note 126, at 554.
Id. at 558.
Id. On the arms embargo, see ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, DOCUMENTS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS (UN
Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 86-00654, 1985).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. The UN Charter is part of the law of the United States, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
Although the Universal Declaration and the UN Charter provided an important
foundation, many important human rights were not binding upon states until the
passage of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [G.A. Res. 2200A,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49]. These 1966 covenants and the Universal
Declaration form what has been termed the International Bill of Rights.
Hassan, Solidarity Rights: Progressive Evolution of International Human Rights Law?, 1
N.Y.L.S. HUM. RTS. ANN. 51 (1983). See also Sohn, The New InternationalLaw; Protection
of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982). By forcing the
GROWTH OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL VIOLENCE

198.
199.
200.
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cooperate or to act in good faith towards facilitating communications
with those states most concerned with the imposition of discriminatory
norms on persons whom South Africa has ethnically identified as nonwhite. As the U.N. has gained a greater appreciation of the international implications of the apartheid system, the South African government has continued and even heightened its defiance of the UN South
African intransigence has permitted the internal and regional situation
to deteriorate with profoundly destabilizing effects inside South Africa
and throughout the rest of Southern Africa. Perhaps what is most
perplexing is that the UN call to impose an arms, oil2- and an economic
boycott against South Africa has been largely ignored by South Africa's
principal trading partners. 20 5 Although the arms embargo has had some
effect on the South African capacity for military preparedness, the
economic embargo has had little influence over trade policies in such
countries as the United States, Britain, West Germany, France and
Japan.206

Nonetheless, the international law framework provides the best
possible international response to the problems of South Africa, short
of force. And since the United States, the European Common Market,
the Commonwealth of Nations and other clusters of states have embraced some form of economic sanctions against South Africa, the UN
framework is once more becoming a relevant blueprint for collective
0 7
and individual action in eradicating apartheid policies and practices.

world of investors to consult the world of international law, I mean only to be consistent.
Investments are made worldwide, and all standards should be considered. Conservatives, on
the other hand, tend to be less adventurous than they should be in searching for laws that bind
the individual.
204. See M. BAILEY & B. RIVERS, OIL SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA (UN Centre
Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 85-24460, 1985).
UN studies indicate that the South African economy is especially vulnerable to an effective
program of oil sanctions. It is maintained that if all South Africa's oil imports were cut off,
"then the country could probably last for a maximum of two years (even after SASOL II comes
on stream). During this time, however, there would be enormous economic and social disruption."
Id.
205. Id. at 32-37.
206. See text accompanying notes 473-76.
207. Recent developments at the UN include the Report of the World Conference on Sanctions Against Racist South Africa, No. 86-21774, UN Sales No. E 86.1.23 (June 1986).
G.A. Resolution 41/35A of 1987 reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the liberation
movements and appeals for assistance to them. The resolution was adopted by 130 votes to 8
with 18 abstentions. The United States voted against. Id.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
SUPERPOWER AS INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKER208

A

Since the United States is an important power player in the international system, United States support for UN policy will tend to
provide efficacy to that policy. When U.S. policy diverges from UN
policy and international law, both UN policy and international law will
weaken.
It may simply be an accident of history that the complex and
sometimes controversial relationship between U.S. foreign policy and
its obligations under international law are, as an institutional matter,
referred to as the semi-official, but nonetheless influential publication
of the American Law Institute (ALI), not in terms of international
29
law, but foreign relations law. 0
Thus the ALI Restatement in this field is an "unofficial" Restatement of foreign relations law. However, the title of the Restatement
may also reflect the symbolic ascendance of the positivistic idea that
international law is made and applied principally through the organs
of state craft and state practice. Not only do the words "Foreign
Relations" underscore this ascendance of positivism, but they may
also reflect the nativistic sentiment in some influential circles that the
United States will not be subject to international obligations to which
it has not expressly consented. In effect, the emphasis on foreign
relations may place national interests above international interests.
The title may, however, simply reflect a deeper reality: that the nationstate is still a major repository of global power; that the charter
system, despite its significant development, is still a primitive system
organized around the major power brokers of our time, the nation
states, and that the efficacy of the world constitutive process depends
in part on a realistic appreciation of the fact that nation states still
hold a major monopoly of effective power in the global war system210
and the patterns of lawful and unlawful violence that are a by product
of it.
208. This section discusses important foreign policy doctrines and practices of the United
States and invites comparison with the position of the UN. It will be readily apparent that
U.S. foreign policy has not conformed with the United Nations mandate. Indeed, in many
instances, U.S. foreign policy has completely contradicted the position of the world body. Apartheid in South Africa is one of the grave issues that divides the United States and the UN.
For a general overview of these tensions see Bernstein, The United Nations Versus the United
States, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, (magazine) at 18.

209.

See generally,

RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

(1962).

210. For the view that non-state actors are major players in the world of global violence,
see Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INTL
L. 1 (1973).
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Since the United States holds a significant position in the global
power process, 21' the conduct of its foreign policy which is based upon
the "national interest" has important consequences for the content and
efficacy of international law itself. To isolate the position of the United
States is only to underscore that in the global power process, it, along
with the Soviet Union, is a major player.212 So major, in fact, that
there are those who conceptualize the global power process in essentially bipolar terms: 213 the United States and its allies occupying the
capitalist camp and the Soviet Union and its allies occupying the communist camp. Such models have prompted the major players to seek
to stabilize the framework of power and influence in complex patterns
of competition and reciprocal tolerances that seek either to consolidate
their respective spheres of influence or to expand them. 21 4 One might,
for example, see the so-called Nixon doctrine as focused on the processes of super-power consolidation of respective spheres of influence:
detente. On the other hand, one may view the Reagan doctrine as
expansionist, implying a greater instability in the global power process
itself.
The precise relationship of the global power process to the global
constitutive process is a complex and dynamic affair, beyond the scope
of this paper. 21 5 Nonetheless, it is important to at least recognize that
once more we deal with an age-old jurisprudential problem: the relationship of law - fundamental law - to power. 216 While major expectations about the allocation of power and decisional competence
are already well-established and well-codified in international law, the
system itself is in flux; and a major element of change is indeed the
configuration of power in the global power process. 21 7 The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision is still a primitive system,
and the dynamics of naked power will from time-to-time blunt the
principle of "legality," making international law, like all law, incomplete in its desire to secure decisions in the common interest that are
both controlling and authoritative.

See generally McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
INTL L. 1 (1959). See also U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA
(F. Arkhurst ed. 1975); INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (G. CARTER & P.
O'MEARA) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL POLITICS].
212. Id.
213. See e.g. Lasswell, World Organizationand Society, 55 YALE L.J. 889-909 (1946).
214. Id.
215. For a thorough analysis of this concept see McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUCATION 253, 403 (1967).
216. Id. at 257.
217. Id. at 255.
211.

Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J.
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In reviewing the major tenets of U.S. foreign relations regarding
South Africa, the larger context of the global power and constitutive
process must be kept in mind. The World Constitutive process, with
its allocation of independence to nation-states and its principles of
non-interference and non aggression, is under pressure from regional
and global power alignments. These pressures have generated distinctive outcomes for the world power process which imply that spheres
of influence are a major element of public order. The claims of major
international actors to spheres of influence are reflected in the claims
both the Soviet Union and the United States have made in the name
of national security for a right of intervention abroad: the Soviet Union
in Hungary, Czechslovakia, Afghanistan; the United States in Cuba,
Grenada, Nicaragua and Vietnam.
From this broad perspective it is important to understand how the
United States defines its interests and concerns through foreign policy
directives aimed at South and Southern Africa and how these concerns
augment or inhibit the UN position. Generally, three major doctrines
have directly or indirectly influenced U.S. foreign policy towards South
Africa. These doctrines may be identified with Presidents Nixon (the
Nixon Doctrine), Carter (the Carter Doctrine) and Reagan (the Reagan
Doctrine).
A.

218
The Nixon Doctrine

President Nixon's policy was premised upon the assumption that
the conditions of white supremacy in Southern Africa would endure
indefinitely. Regardless, white control of Southern Africa, while
freighted with international legal and moral liabilities, had a strategically positive side to it: it was a strong, dependable bulwark against
the spread of international Communism. Since the liabilities of support
for the white regimes were more than offset by the strategic political

218. See also Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South
Africa) Hearings Before Subcommittee on Africa, Mar. 20, Apr. 6, 1973.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA (F. Arkhurst ed. 1975). For a general survey of the Nixon,

Carter, Reagan policies toward Southern Africa see R.
TIONAL AFFAIRS:

U.S.

PRICE, POLICY PAPERS IN INTERNA-

FOREIGN POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN

AFRICA: NATIONAL INTERESTS

45-54 (1978).
Future Directionof U.S. Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Africa, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
See also, National Security Study Memorandum 39: The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa
(M.A. El-Khawas and B. Cohen eds. 1976); INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 211; A.
AND GLOBAL STRATEGY

LAKE,

THE

"TAR

BABY"

OPTION:

AMERICAN

POLICY

TOWARD

SOUTHERN

RHODESIA

(1976).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss1/3

56

Nagan: Economic Sanctions,
U.S. Foreign
Policy,
1986 International Law and th
ANTI-APARTHEID
ACT OF

and military significance of keeping the Communists out of Southern
Africa, it seemed logical for the United States to reappraise the relationships it had with Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. That
reappraisal was memorialized in National Security Study Memorandum
39 (NSSM 39) adopted in January 1970.219
The central policy change was reflected in Option 2 of NSSM 39
which read in part: "[T]he Whites [in South Africa] are [there] to stay
and the only way that constructive change can come about is through
them. There is no hope for the Blacks to gain the political rights they
seek through violence."-0 The author of Option 2 suggested, somewhat
deviously, that the United States "continue public opposition to racial
repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on
the White states ... broadening the scope of our relations and contacts
gradually."2' ' It was further assumed that the degree to which closer
collaboration with the White states would be realized, depended on a
"tangible albeit small and gradual moderation of White policies. ' ''-22 In
order to promote moderate policies among the White regimes, Option
2 suggested the following: "[w]e would indicate our willingness to
accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward
majority rule, provided that they assured broadened political participation in some form by the White population. '"The National Security Council discussed NSSM 39 on December
9, 1969.224 It is unclear exactly what conclusions emerged from those
discussions but the State Department has maintained that Option 2
was never adopted as official U.S. policy.2 5 This is probably true, but
it should also be noted that on January 2, 1970, Henry Kissinger
recommended, and President Nixon adopted, "a general posture of
partial relaxation along the lines of Option 2. " - 6 The full text of NSSM
39 was ultimately leaked to Jack Anderson, the Washington Post columnist, in the fall of 1974.227 The Nixon Doctrine, as reflected in South
African policy defined by NSSM 39 and supplemented by the general
interpretation of Option 2, envisioned the following for South Africa:

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See sources cited supra note 218.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(1) Relaxing the voluntary arms embargo imposed by the United
States in 1963. This goal was to be realized by redefining the "grey
areas" by giving them an expansive and liberal interpretation.
(2) While neither expressly encouraging nor discouraging trade and
investment in South Africa, trade and investment was to be tacitly
encouraged.
(3) Credit was to be made available to South Africa through the
Commodity Credit Corporation.
(4) Restrictions on Export/Import Bank guarantees to South Africa
were to be relaxed.
(5) The expulsion of South Africa from the UN was to be prevented
by using the veto if necessary.3
The policies envisioned in Option 2 of NSSM 39 proved to be a
massive strategic miscalculation. For example, U.S. policy towards
Portugal's African colonies fell apart when a coup generated through
elements of the Portugese army toppled the Portugese Government.
The change dramatically affected the realization of independence in
Angola and Mozambique. Although Henry Kissinger sought to intervene by backing a minority faction led by Holden Roberto (a relative
of Joseph Mobutu and a man on the CIA payroll), the ensuing CIAfunded civil war fizzled. Even tacit approval of a South African invasion
of Angola served only as a justification to introduce Cuban troops who
defended Angolan independence.
As viewed by the imperatives of the Nixon doctrine, a worse
scenario for American interests could not have been imagined. The
fall of Angola and Mozambique caused a significant shift in the balance
of strategic forces in Southern Africa. The change precipitated escalating violence in Rhodesia, including revolutionary violence, repression
and counterviolence in Namibia. The change also subjected South Africa to increased militancy by the ANC operating openly outside of,
and clandestinely inside of, South Africa.
B.

The CarterDoctrine-

The Carter doctrine projected a more circumscribed role for the
United States in foreign affairs at a time when the conditions of world
power were unstable. In an effort to limit potential super-power con-

228. Id.
229. For a transitional appraisal of U.S. foreign policy from Nixon to Carter see U.S.
Corporate Interests in South Africa: Report to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 173 (1978) (statement of Susan Mowle, analyst in International Relations,
C.R.S., Library of Congress).
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frontations, Carter sought to use the United States' capacity to influence events by appeals to ideals and the principle of "regional solutions
for regional problems."' 0 This policy depended upon mutual rather
than unilateral restraint by the super-powers. Since it was not in the
Soviet Union's interest to match the United States' restraint, the
policy change was untimely as far as the U.S. national interests were
concerned. Moreover, a decreased willingness by the United States
to assert itself in the foreign affairs arena was taken in some quarters
as a sign of weakness. This perceived weakness stimulated regional
adventurism that both the United States and the Soviet Union were
powerless to control.
The Carter Administration based its Southern African policy on
three basic principles: concern for human rights, equality in race relations, and concern for democratic rule. The key interplay between
fundamental values of the domestic political arena and foreign policy
were, in a sense, given consistency when the Carter Administration
articulated national interest concerns in the external arena. According
to Richard Moose:
A basic theme of this Administration has been consistency
between what we see as fundamental American principles
and the substance of our foreign policy. We have acted on
the belief that American principles and American interests
should be mutually reinforcing - justice at home; justice
abroad. In Southern Africa, this meant that our policies
should be directed at progress toward respect for human
rights, economic opportunity, and full political participation
for all peoples regardless of race.-'
The cornerstone of the Carter Administration's policy was addressed by Vice President Mondale. He stated that the nature and quality
of U.S. relationships with South Africa would depend on the progress
made toward eradicating apartheid, and more importantly, the progress actually being made toward full political participation for all South
Africans. It should be added that U.S. strategic concerns relating to
economic, as well as geopolitical, conditions were not always clearly
expressed. Both Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance appreciated the
prospect of a complex pattern of competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union in South Africa. But the chief U.S. concern

230. On Carter's African policy see generally STAKES & STANCE, supra note 6.
231. Carter Foreign Policy: Before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 26, 1977) (statement of Richard Moose).
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was the growing resurgence of National Liberation Movements in
Southern Africa. The new impulse of the ANC and, to a lesser extent,
the PAC, sought to destroy white supremacy in South Africa by force
of arms, if necessary.
The strategy for limiting a Soviet presence in South Africa was
thought to rest on the transformation of the South African political
landscape by purposeful, peaceful change - the full political participation formula. The Administration's tactics were controversial in both
left and right-wing circles in the United States. To the left, the tactics
amounted to mainly token or symbolic gestures, often accompanied
by an increasingly voluble, if not exactly clear, rhetoric. To the right,
Carter policies were radical and naive: the rhetoric clouded the central
issue that, in effect, we were on the side of black liberationists who
32
were, in the last analysis, simply Communist pawns.
The Carter Administration felt that its policies were more stringent
than those of the Nixon-Kissinger era. The principal coercive measures
taken during the Carter Administration were as follows:
(1) Full support for the UN Security Council arms embargo,
November 1977.
(2) Suspension of nuclear cooperation with the Pretoria authorities
pending acceptance of the non-Proliferation Treaty, and Safety Provisions.
(3) Unilateral expansion of the arms embargo.
(4) Further limitation on official sports contacts.
(5) Further limits to official military cooperation and representation.
(6) Restricted visas for high level Pretoria's military and police
personnel.
(7) Support for UN resolutions condemning apartheid repression.
(8) Public and private condemnation of persecution of individuals
by the Pretoria authorities.
(9) Observers sent to political trials.
(10) Support for the Sullivan Principles.
(11) Assistance to black leadership in unions.
(12) International visitors program restructured to reflect a more
realistic slice of the South African population.
(13) Limitations on credit facilities through Exim Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation.

232.
GOALS,

For an indirect attack on Carter's policies from the right, see generally

WESTERN

RED LOCUSTS: SOVIET SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

[hereinafter

(1981)

WESTERN GOALS].
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(14) Broadening of contact points with black leaders and black
3
organizations.2
While the overriding concern of the Nixon doctrine was to contain
the Soviet Union in a bipolor world, the underlying concern of the
Carter doctrine was to downplay the importance of super-power rivalry
in regional conflicts. To influence progress towards majority rule, however, the Carter strategy regarding South Africa and Rhodesia applied
more stick and less carrot. While the Carter Administration policy
was crucial to the evolution of majority rule in Zimbabwe, policy
relations with South Africa deteriorated rapidly due to an insistence
that South Africa's policies reflect the principle of "one person, one
vote." From the South African perspective, the Carter Administration embraced UN suggestions and strategies but fell short of adopting
in full the General Assembly and Security Council recommendations.
Consequently, relations between the Pretoria authorities and U.S.
government reached one of the lowest points in history.35
C.

The Reagan Doctrine-6

Ronald Reagan's election to the Presidency of the United States
in 1980 was viewed as a major political victory for the Pretoria au-

233. See Nagan, The U.S. and South Africa: The Limits of "Peaceful Change," ill STAKES
& STANCE supra note 6, at 203; According to Gorman, the central theme of Carter's foreign
policy in Africa is that "African problems must be viewed from an African perspective and that
African nationalism must be scrupulously respected in the process." Robert F. Gorman, Carter's
Preventive African Policy, The Christian Sci. Mon., Sept. 21, 1979. Gorman adds that Carter
has "sought to avoid viewing Africa as a battle ground for confrontation and competition with
the U.S.S.R. Such a cold war perspective . . . would be counterproductive." Id. But compare,
Carter's U-Turn in Foreign Policy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 28, 1980.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Since the Reagan Administration gained support from far right constituencies, who
viewed the South Africa issue as a key agenda item, it is important to note some of the sources
of this perspective.
The right-wing think tank that has perhaps been more strident about South Africa policy,
and insistent that the forces of black liberation are Moscow-conditioned dupes in Western goals,
is chaired (at least recently) by Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald. For a representative
sample, the reader is invited to see generally WESTERN GOALS, supra note 232. The introduction
by the charismatic North Carolina Senator, Jesse Helms, is noteworthy because it effectively
attempts to persuade using half-truths. Id. at 1.
For a vintage example of the perspective that left oriented movements of National Liberation
are simply agents of communist influence, see Silber, In South Africa, Black Leninism, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1986 at A35, col. 1-4; this article was widely distributed by the Embassy of the
Republic of South Africa. See also P. VANNEMAN & W. JAMES, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN
SOUTH AFRICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (1982).
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thorities.- 7 As a Republican presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan
had little track record in international affairs. Consequently, his effectiveness as a leader was unknown in the complex, global arena. Ronald
Reagan, the presidential candidate, evidenced strong, right-wing
views. It was expected that, should he become President, his views
would radically reshape the principles and practices governing U.S.
foreign relations.- Although Reagan avoided detailing specifics during
the election campaign, the broad outlines of his foreign policy perspective were clear. For Reagan, the issue of world power was the struggle
of two super-powers in a bipolar world. In that struggle, the United
States represented freedom, while the Soviet Union represented
hegemonic tyranny.2 9

We should contrast this with a major study that failed to influence Reagan Administration
policies. THE STUDY COMMISSION ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA, SOUTH
AFRICA: TIME RUNNING OUT (1981).
237. On the South African response to Reagan's election in 1981, see Murphy, South Africa
Looks Forward to Better U.S. Ties. Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1981, reprinted in AFPC XVI, Apr.
10, 1981, No. 15 at 1.
238. William Pascoe, who is the Heritage Foundation's Third World specialist, is responsible
for much of the intellectual content - such as it is - of the Reagan doctrine. According to
Pascoe, "[t]here are anti-Soviet insurgencies in eight countries and right now only four are
receiving U.S. aid . . . . If you look at a map of the world right now, the United States is
batting 50-50" quoted in Ottaway, Stunning Blow to a Doctrine, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1987 at
A32, col. 1-4.
As a presidential candidate, Reagan's close advisors initially included Richard V. Allen and
Fred Ikle classic cold warrior types, whose knowledge of African conditions was minimal, and
whose expertise on East-West relations would make detailed knowledge peripheral to their
conceptual scheme. Reagan himself wrote as follows:
'Whether Communism as an ideology has a future or not is beside the point. The
Russians are determined to have important bases for strategic reasons and for
control over vital resources and they are doing well at getting them: Angola,
Mozambique, support for the Rhodesian terrorists, and now in the Horn of Africa
... . The Soviets wasted no time in taking advantage of opportunities as they
have arisen. Their Cuban foreign legion moves about at their bidding .... Soviet
objectives in Africa are clear: domination of the ocean oil routes, from the Red
Sea to the Atlantic, and control of Southern Africa's mineral riches." [emphasis
added]
Quoted in Richard Deutsch, Reagan's African Perspective, AFRICA REPORT July-Aug. (1980).
Reagan's African advisors included such right-wingers as Raymond Tanter (Michigan), Univ
Ra'anan (Fletcher school of Law and Diplomacy); Robert Neumann (Georgetown); Peter Duignan
(Stanford); Adda Bozeman (Sarah Lawrence); Ernest Lefever (Georgetown); Kenneth Adelman
(Stanford). Of this [partial] list of advisors, it is perhaps Duignan and Bozeman that third world
observers find most suspect, because the recurrent undertones of racism that pervade their
scholarship.
For an overview of these views, see Deutsch Reagan's African Perspectives, AFRICA REPORT, July-Aug. (1980).
239. Id.
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In the context of Africa, the struggle for global hegemony between
the United States and the Soviet Union presented simply a continuation of the long-standing hegemonic drive of Soviet expansionism reflected in both latent and overt super-power confrontations. South
Africa presented simply another arena of conflict between the superpowers.- ° Indeed, during the election period, a Reagan aide, Joseph
Churba, maintained that a Reagan Administration would fundamentally reevaluate U.S. and South African relations and would place
them squarely in the context of the global struggle between "tyranny
and freedom."-, In Churba's view, "[i]f the United States had to make
a choice between close ties with Black Africa and South Africa," the
choice would be the latter because South Africa was essentially a
bastion of anti Communism.- To this end, a Reagan Administration
would be disposed to end the arms embargo, would be willing to
establish a naval presence in Simonstown, and would assist the Pretoria's armed forces in strengthening themselves for the defense of
the strategic Cape-Sea Route.
Peter Duignan, "a long time Reagan associate,"
suggested that
the United States should lead the way in blocking the UN led program
of cultural, economic and strategic isolation of South Africa. According
to Duignan, "[w]e should extend, rather than diminish academic, cultural, diplomatic and economic contacts with South Africa."
The
Duignan policy saw change through the "neo apartheid, '' 5 or the
6
Botha reform, formula as the only realistic option for the free world.He argued for "conciliation" with the apartheid regime and quiet pressure for change within the apartheid system. The changes he supported
were more "self government for urban blacks" and more "democracy"
in the homelands.-7

240. Id.
241.
Burns, Aide [Churba] to Reagan in South Africa Says Arms Embargo Should End,
N.Y. Times, June 13, 1980. Reagan and his advisors need to be reminded that 80% of mankind
is not white, but are people of color with whom we shall have to "adapt" or "die." See Goshko,
Vance Emphasizes U.S. Stake in Their World, Wash. Post, June 24, 1979. And more pragmatically, that 800,000 American jobs are tied directly or indirectly to exports to the developing
countries. Id. And from the perspective of the consumer - 93% of our tin, 85% of our bauxite,
100% of our natural rubber and 40% of our petroleum comes from developing countries. Id.
242. Id. It should be noted that Duignan's changes are even more grudging than those
envisaged in Mr. Botha's neo-apartheid program.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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The basis of Duignan's Southern Africa perspective was supported
by two great moral judgments. First, that the tyranny of apartheid
is morally better than the tyranny of Marxism. Second, that colonialism
is morally better than the independence and self-determination of decolonization. These startlingly simple postulates, if accepted, would
have suggested radical changes in U.S. relationships with Western
Europe, the Third World and the Sino-Soviet Block.- 8 If implemented,
such a perspective would have served less the national interests of
the United States and more the radical bipolarization of world power,
isolating the United States, at least in the long term, from friend and
foe alike. It would have been a radically simple-minded policy, with
the most dire consequences for world peace and the economic and
strategic security of the United States.249
The policy formulation that came to characterize the Reagan Administration's position towards South Africa is known as "constructive
engagement." The broad philosophic themes of constructive engagement were first articulated in a major article by Chester Crocker,
Assistant Secretary of State.250 The Crocker piece was both compelling
and effective because it focused on a careful dissection and analysis
of the positions held by those whom Crocker presumed were "shaping
and challenging the current order in South Africa."~1 While the thrust
of the article focused upon both the Black and the White elites in
South Africa, the centerpiece remained fundamentally consistent with
the assumptions of the primacy of white power in NSSM 39's Option
2. By providing a careful dissection, analysis and appraisal of the
Afrikaner power elite, and a perfunctory, somewhat crude analysis of
the scattered and untidy face of Black politics, Crocker suggested that
the most important focal point in South Africa was the Afrikaner
power elite and the reformist agenda proposed by that elite under the
leadership of President P. W. Botha.

248. Id.
249. Reagan's more sophisticated advisors include global power through east-west competition with an effort to integrate the global picture into specific problem areas. it was hoped that
Adelman would play a leading role on Africa policy if Reagan were elected. For an overview
of conservation republican perspectives, see Deutsch, African Issues and PresidentialPolitics,
AFRICAN REPORT, Jan.-Feb. (1980). As it turned out, Chester Crocker became Reagan's Africa
advisor.
250. Crocker's view may be compared to the African policy in the Carter Administration.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
251. Crocker, South Africa: Strategy for Change, 59 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 323 (Winter 1981).
The influence that this article had on Reagan policies is nothing short of remarkable. For
an early articulation by Reagan functionaries see B. Dlouhy, Remarks at the Symposium on
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Through the policy of constructive engagement, Crocker effectively
proposed positive sanctions. Specifically, Crocker recommended "publicly expressed encouragement and support of positive steps" taken
by South Africa and "a tone of empathy" for the injustices suffered
by the Blacks "but also for the awesome political dilemma in which
Afrikaners and other Whites [find] themselves. ' ' 2 2 Since a great deal
of distrust had been generated between the United States and South
Africa, it became extremely important initially to determine how constructive engagement would be presented to the American public and,
then, how the United States would communicate to South Africa that
it was embarking upon a radically different policy.
The policy of constructive engagement emerged from speeches
given by Reagan Administration spokespersons, the gist of which is

Educational Needs of Black South Africans v. Racine, Wisconsin, (June 19, 1981) (available
from U.S. Dept. of State).
For an updated version of the Crocker doctrine, see Crocker, South Africa: Toward Peace
and Stability, Current Policy, No. 897, (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Dec. 1,
1986); Does South Africa Have a Future? Current Policy, No. 857 (Bureau of Public Affairs,
U.S. Dept. of State, July 21, 1986); see also Crocker, Regional Strategy for Southern Africa,
Current Policy, No. 308 (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Aug. 19, 1981); address
by Princeton Lyman before the conference on African-American Relations under the Reagan
Administration, University of South Florida, (Mar. 12, 1982); Crocker, Challenge to Regional
Security in Africa: The U.S. Response, Current Policy, No. 431 (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of State, Oct 28, 1982); Current Policy, No. 438 (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of
State, Nov. 19, 1982); Crocker, The Search for Regional Security in Southern Africa, Current
Policy, No. 453 (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Feb. 15, 1983); Eagleburger,
Southern Africa: America's Responsibility for Peace and Change, Current Policy, No. 497
(Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, June 23, 1983).
Chester Crocker explains his position well when he says,
The main impetus for change is internal. It is the demands of a modernizing
economy for a stable skilled workforce and the demands of apartheid's victims for
full political and economic opportunity that constitute the major pressures on the
system. Black Africans have no formal political rights at the national level in South
Africa, and the physical power of the state remains awesome. But as we are
witnessing daily, the black communities of South Africa have growing influence
through their numbers, their role as workers and as consumers, and their ability
to discredit and disrupt an outdated and unacceptable system.
We should develop rather than withdraw our influence and be prepared to use
it, while taking into account the strength and self-sufficiency of a state halfway
around the world that cannot be coerced by outsiders on whom it is only marginally
dependent. Finally, we should recall that our strongest tools in this situation are
moral and political. That being the case, it won't be effective to walk away and
sever our contact. We don't intend to do so.
Crocker, The United States and South Africa: A Frameworkfor Progress, Current Policy, No.
732 (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State).
252. Id.
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substantially similar to Mr. Crocker's theory and contains the following
propositions:
(1) The continued existence of apartheid inhibits the development
of the kind of relationship with the United States that South Africa
might desire.
(2) The United States cannot "endorse a system that is racist in
purpose or effect."
(3) So long as Mr. Botha actively continues a policy of "constructive
evolutionary change," the United States will positively assist those
who support such constructive change to both gain and consolidate
such policies.
(4) The United States will not support proponents of violence in
the region.
(5) The United States will not support the proponents of the "status
quo. "
(6) The United States will not "aid" or "abet" terrorism or terrorists.
(7) The United States believes that progress to "a decent, stable
and non-racialist political system" has already gained momentum, indeed the "dynamic of change is already underway."
(8) The United States also believes that international bodies can
(should) promote a more constructive dialogue about South Africa.
(9) The rule of the United States in the evolutionary transformation
of South Africa should be based on "fundamental values" not "conditions," on "dialogue" rather than "confrontation" or "threats."
(10) The key tactic of U.S. policy involves one of not walking away
from a problem, and not indulging in "moral posturing" or "idle gestures."
(11) U.S. policy remains optimistic about the long-term evolution
to a non-racial democracy: "[i]n the final analysis there are not political
''
obstacles which cannot be overcome.
President Reagan gave his personal stamp of approval to the constructive engagement policy in his 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite.2 In that interview, Mr. Reagan described South Africa as a
"friendly country." He then asked rhetorically: "Can we abandon a
country that has stood beside us in every war we ever fought? A
country that is strategically essential to the Free World in its production of minerals that we must have?"-

253.
254.
(Winter
255.

Id.
March 3, 1981, TV Interview with Walter Cronkite, Washington Notes on Africa 4
1981).
Id.
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A 1981 catalogue of events illuminates the concept of constructive
2
engagement. 5
(1) The first official from the African continent to be received by
President Reagan was Foreign Minister Pik Botha.
(2) Two days later the Administration announced its policy of constructive engagement.
(3) The Administration set aside the twenty-year-old ban on military contacts with the Republic of South Africa. It permitted five
military intelligence officers to meet with Pentagon and National Security Counsil officials as well as United States Ambassador to the
UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick.
(4) The United States offered to increase the number of military
attaches and honorary consuls that each country could have in the
other.
(5) The United States offered to train South Africa's coast guard
personnel.
(6) Tourist credentials were given to police officials of South Africa
to allow them to visit the United States.
(7) The State Department allowed the Springbok Rugby Touring
Team to visit the United States for rugby games in the face of the
UN sports boycott of South Africa.
(8) South African exiles had serious visa problems. The most notable examples are Dennis Brutus and Cosmo Peterse. Both are writers
and established academicians.
(9) The United States used its veto to stifle four UN resolutions
calling for sanctions against the Republic of South Africa for the unlawful occupation of Namibia.
(10) The United States vetoed the Security Council's condemnation
of South Africa's invasion of Angola. The Administration justified the
veto citing the lack of appreciation of the "full context," meaning the
Cuban troops were in Angola.
(11) The Administration has also tried, but has failed, to repeal
the Clark Amendment of 1976 which prohibited CIA involvement in
Angola.
(12) The Administration also proposes to cut all contributions to
the UN trust fund which provides humanitarian aid to South Africans
victimized by apartheid repression, including refugees.
(13) Data from leaked State Department documents indicate that
the United States is prepared to give Pretoria attractive incentives
to settle the question of self-determination in Namibia.

256. Id. Toward Southern Africa: A Year of Constructive Engagement, Washington Notes
on Africa 4 (Winter 1981).
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(14) The United States rejected a French proposal to protest the
destruction of squatter camps outside Cape Town.
(15) Leaked documents also reveal a return to elements of the tar
baby option, specifically changing South Africa's "polecat" status in
the world community.
(16) On March 26, 1981, the Commerce Department approved the
South African purchase of a Cyber 257 (Control Data Cyber 750) computer which can be used in its nuclear program.
Perhaps the most important and illustrative example of the depth
of the Reagan Administration's commitment to a constructive engagement with the Afrikaner power elite is reflected in the adoption of a
foreign policy assumption that would ensure South Africa's continued
presence in Namibia by force of arms for the indefinite future. First,
that policy made South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia contingent
on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. But since South
Africa remained a constant direct threat to Angolan security (having
invaded Angola on numerous occasions), the Cuban presence in Angola
was clearly intended to provide a measure of self-defense from South
African attacks. Second, South African (and U.S.) support for Jonas
Savimbi's insurrectionary movement, UNITA, further threatened Angola's stability and security.
Since U.S. policy, in conjunction with other western powers, expended a great deal of effort attempting to negotiate the independence
of Namibia, it became all too obvious that the linkage of Namibian
independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola would
destroy the only hope for a diplomatic victory in Southern Africa that
would justify the price of constructive engagement. Since South Africa
did not deliver Namibia as the price for constructive engagement, the
policy had nothing to show for the enormous expenditure of moral
and political capital. Ultimately, it was a net loss to the United States
in the conduct of its foreign relations. Indeed, South Africa's effort
to sabotage Gulf Oil's installation in Cabinda, Angola- was a major
embarrassment to the Reagan Administration inasmuch as the South
African government had targeted a major American corporate presence for its policies of terrorism and sabotage.

257. For a full discussion of this issue, and its effect on weakening the UN arms embargo,
see Washington Notes on Africa 4 (Spring 1982).
258. While American oil interests have found Angola an hospitable place for this investments, Dr. Jonas Savimbi's guerillas have attacked U.S. oil interests there. Savimbi's group is
supported with aid from the Reagan administration. See Ottaway, U.S. Oil Firms Ignore Reagan
Policy, Wash. Post, July 31, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXI, No. 33, at 7.
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With increasing turmoil, repression and violence inside South Africa, the U.S. Congress grew ever more impatient with the Reagan
Administration's policy - a policy which seemed to amount to all give
and no take, all carrot and no stick. Even conservative lawmakers in
Congress began to feel a shift in public opinion indicating that constructive engagement amounted to no more than a blank check for white
supremacy.2 9 In a lengthy and frequently acrimonious debate concerning the U.S. corporate presence in South Africa, Congress addressed
the demands for both public and private economic sanctions. In what
amounted to an effective repudiation of constructive engagement, Congress enacted into law a significant program of economic sanctions
against the Republic of South Africa. Faced with a presidential veto,
Congress reaffirmed the repudiation and overrode the veto leaving
the Reagan doctrine and the policies of constructive engagement in a
260
complete shambles .

259. The attitude of Senator Dole best examplifies the change in congressional perspectives
about South Africa and the constructive engagement policy of the Reagan administration. Dole
reportedly said to former White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan the following: "What the
hell does constructive engagement mean? It would be my hope that the administration would
toughen its approach towards South Africa .... ." Quoted in Cannon, Sen. Dole Challenges
U.S. Policy on S. Africa, Wash. Post, July 12, 1986, reprinted in AFPC XXII, July 18, 1987,
No. 27, at 3, 15.
On the failure of constructive engagement see Epitaph for Constructive Engagement, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1987, reprinted in AFPC XXII, No 7, at 2.
Informed journalists regard the "Irangate" scandal as a major blow to the continued efficacy
of the Reagan doctrine. See Ottaway, Stunning Blow to a Doctrine, Wash. Post, Feb. 1987,
reprinted in AFPC XXII, Feb. 15, 1987, No. 7, at 10, 13.
Critics of U.S. Policy in Africa maintain that the Reagan Doctrine as applied to African
reality has been a boom to Moscow's African Policy. Frankel, Moscow's Gains in Africa, Wash.
Post, May 25, 1986, at C2, col. 1-5. According to Frankel, quoting informed sources: "The Soviet
Union is doing better . . . and to be frank, the reason they're doing better is because of the
counter-productive nature of U.S. policy. They are the passive beneficiary of our mistakes.
These results are attributed to a 'Senior Western European Diplomat."' Id.
According to Anthony Sampson, "Crocker, Nickel and Kirkpatrick all encouraged American
companies and bankers with the same hopeful message: that after the shocks of Soweto, South
Africa would be helped by American capital and trade along the road to democracy; and over
the next years Washington showed few signs of criticizing Pretoria. It was a tragic misreading
....
" A. SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 144.
For an appraisal of Chester Crocker's constructive engagement policy and its similarity to
the tar baby option, see id. at 143-44.
The policy of constructive engagement has undergone significant criticism and finally explicit
repudiation by the Congress itself. For a background of the criticism, see Goshko, "Constructive
Engagement" Author Sits at Storm's Center, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1985 reprinted in AFPC
XX, Aug. 30, 1985, No. 34, at 2.
260. Id.
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IX. APPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY
UNDER PRESIDENTS NIXON, CARTER, AND REAGAN FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
The extent to which the Nixon, Carter and Reagan policies supplement or conflict with the policies adopted by the General Assembly
and the Security Council is important. As discussed previously, the
United States' role as a power player within the international system,
as communicated by the U.S. Presidential Doctrines, can directly influence the efficacy of international law. Ultimately, the question of
how the policies of these decisional fora relate to the purposes of the
UN Charter is central to this issue. It was President Nixon who first
gave us the policies envisioned in Option 2 of NSSM 39. These policies
completely countered UN efforts to eradicate apartheid. To appreciate
this situation, one needs only to analyze the mindset of Henry Kissinger as illustrated in his remark to the Committee of Forty: 26' "I don't
see why we need to stand by and permit a country to go Communist
due to the irresponsibility of its own people.' ' 262 This perspective, in
effect, was intended to free the United States from international law
constraints in the conduct of its foreign relations. This view is consistent with the Nixon Administration's view that, while international
law may be useful, it cannot always be honored in the fight against
Communism. Under Kissinger's influence, the United States provided
at best only verbal or rhetorical support for some UN positions. However, at the covert level, the United States did much to undermine
not only the UN position on Southern Africa, but also the UN itself
as an important factor in the maintenance and enhancement of the
purposes of the UN Charter.
When we compare perceptions of the Nixon-Kissinger policies with
perceptions of the Carter-Mondale policies, we find a common impression that the United States under Carter lacked the will to define
and secure its national interest especially in regard to the Soviet
Union. However, in its aggressive pursuit of human rights standards
and its concern that regional conflicts not explode into super-power
confrontation, the Carter Administration did much to secure the integrity of international law under the UN Charter. Moreover, its posture
on South and Southern Africa was more in line with positions taken
by the UN than the posture of any other Presidents' administration.
Furthermore, its grudging recognition of the forces of revolutionary

261.

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE,

262.

Id.
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nationalism in Southern Africa reflected a keener perception of regional
reality than the "anything but Communism" perspective of the predecessor and successor administrations. In sum, the Carter position
on South and Southern Africa was more in line with UN positions
and the mandate of international law.
Reagan Administration, policies contrasted starkly with UN positions. The most charitable conclusion one can draw from the policy of
constructive engagement is that it was a monumental gamble that
failed. At worst, it was an effort to impose upon international legal
order the perspectives of ideological anti-Communism without an appreciation of the key conditions of power or the operative forces at
work.2- It was a futile effort to rewrite the standards of normative
conduct in the international legal arena 214 and to undermine the UN's
place as an important forum in the promotion of international peace,
justice and security in Southern Africa.
The Reagan doctrine differs in material aspects from the Nixon
doctrine. In effect, the Reagan doctrine partially rejects the spheres
of influence assumptions of the Nixon and Brezhnev doctrines. These
spheres of superpower influence were formulated to stabilize the status
quo of superpower competition and to work toward detente in the
pattern of superpower relations. The spheres of influence assumed a
degree of stability as well as superpower control and influence over
the peripheries of containment that, in retrospect, over-simplified
political reality and the nature of superpower hegemony. The Reagan
doctrine went beyond containment to make clear to the Soviet Union
that the policies it followed in the 1970's were an unworkable extension
of Soviet influence and power.
To the extent that the Reagan Administration rejected the superpower status quo codified in the Nixon and Brezhnev doctrines, the
Reagan doctrine differed from the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente.
Unlike Kissingerian Conservatism, the Reagan doctrine sought to encroach upon rather than contain Soviet hegemony, particularly in lesser
developed countries. 2- Allied to this perspective was the principle that
Communist revolutions are not irreversible. It may be readily conceded
that the term Communist has a rather vague, inclusive meaning in
right-wing circles. If we accept the broadest connotation that a Communist is anything left of center (perhaps even left of right), then the
number and range of regimes that are potential candidates for a "re-

263.
264.
265.

See infra text accompanying notes 487-93.
Id.
Id.
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verse" of "Soviet" influence or control are exceedingly numerous. In
other words, many regimes are subject to encroachment policies because of real or imagined affinities with the Soviet Union.
The assumptions that this approach makes about revolutions in the
Third World might be viewed with a degree of skepticism if it were
acknowledged that many so-called "Third World Revolutions" are not
revolutions at all. Elites who act in the name of this or that revolutionary ideology may indeed verbalize the rhetoric of revolution and yet,
in power and in practice, may deliver the pragmatics of capitalist
prudence wrapped in the rhetoric of vague Socialistic morality.
Moreover, if these regimes are moderately successful, they will indulge
an ideologically open-ended, problem-oriented search for practical solutions to the improvement of their societies, or they will use the
rhetoric of anti-imperialism (or anti-colonialism) or of anti-Communism
to seduce the superpower that, in context, is the more generous aid
giver. Indeed, such elites may simply be unrepentant opportunists,
tin-pot dictators ignorant enough to put even their ideology above
self-preservation, or who are cunning enough to put survival above
brutality and exploitation. The world will generate its statespeople
(or statesmen and stateswomen) and its rascals whatever ideological
label they assume. Swiss banks are an important instrument for the
conservation of the revolutionary spoils of such processes.
X.

INTERNATIONAL

LAW-MAKING AT THE INFORMAL LEVEL:

PRIVATE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS -

DIVESTMENT

AND DISINVESTMENT

A conceptual theme of this paper is less a practical understanding
of the problem of economic coercion directed at South Africa than a
deeper appreciation of how international law is made and applied. If
we view international law as a process of communication, we will find
that the problem of economic coercion directed at South Africa reflects
communication symbols and practices at all levels of social process
from the local to the state, to the national and to the international.
Non-governmental efforts to promote the divestment, and agitate
for corporate disinvestment from firms doing business in South Africa
is an instructive example of the influence of norm-creating activity at
the bottom, which in turn influences norm-creation at higher levels of
formal governmental process. It also reflects the influence of transnational organizations on informal groups and individuals who are in turn
influenced by the anti-apartheid norms communicated through various
international organizations.
In the United States, divestment and disinvestment activities have
been evidenced in the stockholders' meetings of large corporations, in
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss1/3
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university investment policies, in local and state efforts to control and
regulate how and where state funds are to be invested, and ultimately,
at the national level where, as we have mentioned, a comprehensive
anti-apartheid bill has been enacted. In the United States, the divestment problem has been subject to a vigorous literature emanating
from the extreme right which essentially argues that, to a large extent,
divestment is unlawful in U.S. domestic law. Professor Langbein is a
leading advocate of this view.
Professor Langbein's legal analysis focuses on pension trusts and
university endowments. As his and other writings elsewhere indicate,
a wide range of institutions have fiduciary duties regarding the management of a capital corpus.2 6 The general thrust of Professor Langbein's writings have been to pull most charities within the ambit of
common law trust traditions. 267 His weakest arguments concern what
may loosely be called charitable organizations, which include at least
some university endowments. His strongest argument for imposing
2
strict standards deals with pension funds that are subject to ERISA. 68
Quite understandably, his discussion begins with ERISA, in order
to influence all other fiscal institutions to adhere to their strict responsibilities. In effect, Langbein would prefer ERISA standards to be
extended to all fiduciaries, because these standards, actually more
rigid than common law standards, are a step in the right direction,
both morally and ideologically.2;'. This strategy has at least been par-

266. Langbein, supra note 170; Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts,
79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 75 (1980) [hereinafter Langbein & Posner III]; Langbein & Posner,
Market Funds and Trust-ITvestment Law: II, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 [hereinafter
Langbein & Posner II]; Langbein & Posner, Market Fuvds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 [hereinafter Langbein & Posner I]. See also Troyer, Slocombe S.
Boisture, Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications .for Foundations,
Other CharitableInstitutions, and Pension Funds, 74 GEO. L.J. 127, 129-30 (1985) [hereinafter
Troyer].
267. Troyer, supra note 266, at 132-133 n.ll.
268. Langbein, supra. 266, discussing ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1), from
the Employees Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 001-1461 (West 1985).
269. Professor Langbein states, "Since the employee is in this important sense the 'settlor'
of his own pension-trust account, there is good reason to prevent plan sponsors (whether union
or employer) from using the authorization doctrine to impose social investing upon him." Langbein, supra note 266, at 22. The individual is thus paramount and cannot be dominated by
others. However, as Langbein continues, the individual cannot be given any real choice because
society, through ERISA, has taken away the individual's power to use these funds for anything
other than profit-maximization. Id. at 22-23. If society has overridden the will of the individual
with its official organs, what makes informal action such an imposition? Governmental arbitrariness is supposed to be the nemesis of conservatives, and here Langbein hides behind it to save
himself from social pressure.
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tially successful in making the responsibility of managers of charitable
funds, whose standard of conduct has been moving from the traditional
trust model toward a corporate director model, an object of serious
discussion in academic literature.270 To turn the tables on Professor
Langbein, it is a good strategy to start with his weakest argument,
that concerning charitable organizations, and then address the strictures of ERISA.
In their well-known article, The "Income" of Endowment Funds,
Cary and Bright maintained that
the law governing charitable corporations is not merely a
branch of trust law, or corporate law, or contract law, but
is sui generis, drawing to some extent from all three. Where
the issue involves the investment of funds . . . the courts
show a marked tendency to apply corporate principles rather
than trust principles, in order to accord charitable corportions a maximum degree of flexibility in their operations.271

270. Troyer, supra note 266, at 132 n.ll. In terms of Probert's law of theory games, many
sections of this paper draw heavily on the insightful work of Walter Probert, a pioneer of "words
consciousness." His jurisprudential writings are seminal for the interrelationship of lawyering
and communication responsibility. See generally W. PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (1972); Probert, Words Consciousness and the Control of Language, 23 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 374 (1972). Langbein emphasizes ERISA to give his opponents the weakest
counter-argument. He criticizes his opponent's for merely playing the "feelings" game, and
denigrates their sources of information. The true legal theorist would start with the idea that
there is no law, and that some set of information is accepted by all. Langbein states that there
is a law, and that it fits the facts.
271. Cary & Bright, The "Income" of Endouwment Funds, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 396, 407-08
(1969). This article advocated, in the context of university endowments, the abrogation of the
distinction between appreciation of a trust corpus which would belong to remaindermen, and
income of a trust which would belong to beneficiaries. The authors found that "[1]egal impediments
which have been though to deprive managers of their freedom of action appear on analysis to
be more legendary than real." Id. at 417. The authors saw in court decisons "a marked tendency
to favor charities in their disputes with others over property," resulting in "corporate or trust
law [being] used less for guidance than to rationalize the desired result." Id. at 411. Therefore,
the authors ackowledged that "[t]he law is moving in the direction of applying to management
of university funds the more flexible principles applicable in the case of corporations." Id. at 396.
On the other hand, Langbein seems intent on freezing standards instead of letting them
evolve. For example, ERISA become the LaBrea tar pits in which pension trust are to be
fossilized. Langbein, supra note 266, at 6. Langbein and Posner's first article begins with the
South Sea Bubble of the 1700's which was essentially speculation without substance. Langbein
& Posner I, supra note 266, at 3. As a result of the Bubble's collapse, laws governing finance
were confined in scope. Id. Corporate law gradually escaped those strict rules with industrialization and the growth of capital markets, and trust law has begun to catch up. Id. at 4-5.
Clinging to strict rules in the face of social investing by trusts begs two questions: are trusts
likely to be caught in the collapse of another Bubble; and is it possible that South Africa, or
another target of social investing, could be the genesis of another Bubble.
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In an early statement of the loosening of legal standards regarding
charitable organizations, the Attorney General of New York stated
the principle as follows:
Unless modified by statute, charter or by-law, the powers
of the trustees of an educational, religious or charitable corporation in respect to the administration and investment of
the corporation's funds are fundamentally no different than
that of the directors of a business corporation in respect
to
272
the administration of property held by the corporation.
This rule has since been codified in the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, which requires that trustees use ordinary business care and prudence in investment decisions.273 The distinction between charitable trusts and charitable corporations, however, is important. 274 Under this formalistic bifurcation, charitable corporations are
governed by corporate standards, and charitable trusts are governed
27
by trust standards. 5
Characterizing charities as corporate does not automatically validate blunderbuss divestment. As broad as the protection afforded by
the business judgment rule is, charitable directors must still qualify
for its protection by acting within its requirements.276
A careful and deliberate decisionmaking process is of paramount
importance. Moreover, in practice, it is important not only that there
be such consideration, but also that it be clearly documented in the
organization's records. Thus, the board's minutes should reflect a
thorough consideration of the arguments relating to divestment. Before reaching a conclusion about the financial cost of divestment, the

272.

N.Y. Att'y Gen., 1951 Ann. Rep. 159, 161 (citation omitted), cited in THE ETHICAL

INVESTOR

143 (1972).

273. Uniform Management of Institutional Funds § 6, 7A U.L.A. 711, 721 (1985) [hereinafter
The Uniform Act]. In addition to the list of 26 jurisdictions that had passed this act or similar
legislation in Troyer, supra note 266, at 131-32 n.10, North Carolina passed the act in 1985.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36B-1 to -10 (Supp. 1985).
274. Most prior legal analyses of divestment have dealt with the issue in terms of traditional
trust law standards, focusing on the so-called "prudent man rule." The resulting legal advice
has generally been cautionary and restrictive. However, most charities are organized as corporations, not trusts, and review of the modern law applicable to most charitable institutions
considering divestment reveals much greater lattitude for governing boards to make good faith
divestment decisions. Troyer, supra note 266, at 129.
275. Id. at 130-31.
276. For an analysis of the business judgment rule with regard to divestment by charitable
corporations, see id. at 134-38.
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directors should, with the aid of qualified investment advisors, carefully review the investment implications of divestment and should
ensure that this review is clearly documented. 277
In other words, in the case of charitable corporations, the business
judgment rule requires that there be some reasonable basis for investment decisions. A divestment decision which advances the interests
of the corporation, among many of its constituencies, could be considered reasonable, as would a decision conforming with an international
obligation.278 The directors' liability would be minimal where the decision to divest minimizes financial costs and assures long-term financial
ends.279 The charitable purposes of the institution may also be advanced
by divestment 5 0 For example, divestment may help a charitable organization clarify its role in the world by forcing a conscious decision
to promote human rights in the place of a half-conscious decision to
invest in a corporation that is endeavoring to develop technology aimed
at the extinction of other races.2 1 Barring the narrowest definition of

277. Id. at 144-45.
278. The difficulty of determining what is in the interest of a charitable corporation is
compounded by the absence of marketplace determiners on which business corporations rely.
Share price and corporate raiders give business corporations a yardstick unavailable to nonprofit
entities. Kurtz, Non Traditional Revenues Ventures of Tax-Exempt Organizations: The Role
of Trustees, 39 N.Y. City Bar Rec. 129, 133 (1984).
279. The decision to divest is analogous to the decision to make a charitable donation, which
once was limited to gifts that could directly serve the interest of the corporation. Garrett,
Corporate Donations, Bus. LAW., Jan. 1967, at 297.
280. Troyer, supra note 266, at 142.
A charity's board may, in appropriate circumstances, reasonably determine that
adopting a divestment policy would strengthen the organization's credibility when
it adopts potentially unpopular positions on other issues, enhance its ability to
appeal to certain groups for financial support, or improve its relations with the
community in which it is located or with communities otherwise important to it.

Id.
281. The involvement of the corporate giant, I.G. Farbin, in the war effort and "final
solution" of Nazi Germany is the prime example of business leaders needing social protest to
inform their "economic" decisions. See generally J. BORKIN, THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
OF I.G. FARBIN (1980). The conflict between greed for profits and duty to humanity (or even
to a nation) is too easily resolved by corporate functionaries in favor of the former, as shown
by the act of Standard Oil, I.G. Farbin, and Ford Motor Company in funneling supplies and
technology to Germany during the 1930's, and maintaining business as usual during the war.
Id. at 76-94. See also C. HIGHAm, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY: AN EXPOSE OF THE NAZIAMERICAN MONEY PLOT 1933-49, 130-77 (1983). American subsidiaries of German corporations
even changed their names to prevent small stockholders from learning that they were financing
Hitler. Id. at 134. After these stark examples, no voice for humanity should ever by silenced,
even by arguments from immutable principles of trust law, and no social investors should be
barred from investigating their company's activities.
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"profit maximization, '"22 and taking all factors into account, the board
of directors of a charitable corporation may legally divest, but, to
borrow a word from trust law, should do so prudently.2 Indeed, a
decision to divest in accordance with international law could hardly
be viewed as imprudent.
Some charities are organized as trusts rather than corporations.
In those organizations, financial managers face more restrictive standards.- Encountering these standards on the heels of corporate standards, one is lead to consider whether the restrictions are necessary,
or even as explicit as is argued.- The discretion of trustees is far

282. Through a process of circular definition, Langbein determines that average return is
profit maximization because attempting to maximize profits by picking stocks creates a risk of
lower-than-average return by reducing diversification. See Langbein & Posner II, snpra note
266, at 77-83.
283. "Prudently" does not always mean "conservatively." If the beneficiary is not entirely
dependent on trust income to live, a trustee may prudently make high-risk investments because
of their high potential returns. Id. at 33. Thus, the beneficiary's interest is the key to the trust's
investment.
Langbein makes the preservation of the trust corpus a moral absolute. But is the pension
benficiary's interest in the preservation of the trust corpus tantamount to life itself, as threatened
by a -murderous foreign regime? Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) with
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) for a stratification of such "economic" rights.
284. The duty and the liability of the fiduciary in both situations is somewhere between
absolute liability and no liability. The difference between levels may not be that great in practice.
Troyer, supra note 266, at 129-130. Cf. Cary & Bright, The Delegation of Investment Responsibility for Endounent Funds, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 207 (1974).
Our conclusion remains the same regardless of whether principles of trust law or
corporate law are applied. It is true that trustees are not normally permitted to
delegate to others the making of investment decisions for the trust. That rule
reflects the emphasis placed by the typical grantor on the investment expertise of
his chosen trustee. But the typical donor to a nonprofit institution focuses on the
welfare of the recipient institution, not upon its investment skill. With the factor
of investment expertise removed from the picture, the trust principles discussed
above seem to us to sanction the delegation of investment decisions by nonprofit
corporations to investment experts.
Id. at 233.
285. The standard that has been applied is not always the standard that should be applied.
The Uniform Act, supra note 273, is an attempt to change the standard applicable to charitable
trusts.
The explicit reference to "unincorporate organizations" seems intended to make
the Uniform Act applicable to charitable trusts. The limitation included in the
definition of "institutional funds" appears to exclude only trust funds held for the
benefit of a charity by a bank, trust company, or other noncharitable trustee. The
fundamental premise of the Act is that application of the traditional trust law
fiduciary standards to the investment decisions made by governing boards of universities, hospitals, and other large, nonprofit, institutions could be debilitating.
Troyer, supra note 266, at 146 n.65.
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wider, in the view of some authorities, than that accorded them by
opponents of social investing.
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts allocates a fair measure of
reasonableness to trustees in meeting their responsibilities, and indicates courts will consider the following when faced with allegations of
improprieties:
(1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee
by the terms of the trust; (2) the purposes of the trust; (3)
the nature of the power [being exercised by the trustees];
(4) the existence or nonexistence, the definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the motives
of the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the
power; [and] (6) the existence or nonexistence of an interest
6
in the trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries.The trust standard in the divestment context covers two issues:
the financial implications of divestment, and the relationship of divestment to trust purposes. In meeting these standards, trustees will bear
the burden of showing that their financial judgments were reasonable.
In most cases, they will have to consult investment analysts, and be
assured that the advice thereby obtained is not unreasonable.Trust purposes vary widely. There are as many trust purposes as
there are trusts. Some trust instruments may mandate divestment,
others may never contemplate divestment, and still others may vary

The evolution of standards may make qualified persons more willing to work for charities
because of the decreasing chance of personal liability and of the increasing freedom to act as
they see fit for the charity so as to serve the community. "Communities that do not grow and
evolve become brittle and frail - become something other than communities. To be genuinely
free, a community must be just; to be sustainable, justice must be embedded in community."
Barber, A New Language for the Left: Translating the Conservative Discourse, HARPER'S 47,
49 (Nov. 1986).
286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 comment d (1959).
287. Divestment has been attacked as unreasonable, but there are far more irrational uses
of economic power. For example, rumors that Procter & Gamble was supporting satanism cut
into sales of the company's products so much that it stopped using the century-old logo that
had sparked the rumors. N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1985, at C3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1985,
at D4, col. 4.
288. The real purpose of most charitable trusts may be tax avoidance. Today's largest
medical foundation began as an unfunded tax scam. See Brinkley, The Richest Foundation,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. The general policy of societal good may, under
the right circumstances, override the express intent of a settlor who never funded a trust until
the I.R.S. sued his estate.
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the trust purpose in quixotic or idiosyncratic ways.z19 A leading authority has maintained that a trustee may justifiably consider social and
moral issues in making investment decisions regardless of whether
there is a nexus between those factors and the ostensible purposes of
the trust.
Trustees in deciding whether to invest in or retain, the
securities of a corporation may properly consider the social
performance of the corporation. They may decline to invest
in, or to retain, the securities of corporations whose activities
or some of them are contrary to fundamental and generally
accepted principles. They may consider such matters as pollution, racial discrimination, fair employment and consumer
responsibility . . . . [Trustees] may well believe that a corporation that has a proper sense of social obligation is more
likely to be successful in the long run than those that are
bent on obtaining the maximum amount of profits. But even
if this were not so, the investor, though a trustee of funds
for others, is entitled to consider the welfare of the community, and refrain from allowing the use of funds in a manner
detrimental to society.LThis position may be too broad, but there is no clear-cut decisional
authority on point. Langbein's argument that "[s]ome of the schemes
favored by proponents of social investing are incompatible with these

289. The only prohibition is that a trust may not be set up for an illegal purpose. This rule
could be interpreted as requiring or or precluding divestment, depending on the decisionmaker.
Bequests to charity have at times been limited to a certain percentage of an estate. See, e.g.,
Garner v. Purcell, 160 P.2d 682 (1916). This disbelief that anyone to whom a large sum of money
is given could use it solely for the benefits of others and obtain it without terrorizing the
decedent is the ancestor of the disbelief of foes of social investment that one can invest a sum
of money in a way that makes the world a better place to live without appearing in the GNP.
Benjamin Franklin created a trust in his will to make loans to artisans for a period of 100
years. In re Franklin's Estate, 24 A. 626 (1892). The money was then to be used by the trustee,
the City of Philadelphia: a social investment in the local economy. The trust to the municipality
for accumulation was illegal. But the money did not become a trust for which the city became
liable to private persons, but a gift to the city. Id.
With the correct circumstances and a sympathetic judge, a trust could be used for many
purposes that might otherwise be beyond the pale. A father who bribed Brazilian jailers to
make conditions less harsh for his imprisoned son was denied reimbursement from the son's
trust because bribery was against public policy. In re Sage, 97 Misc. 2d 790, 412 N.Y.S.2d 764
(Albany Co. Sur. Ct. 1979). The court's decision does not reflect the conditions of the jail or
the reason for imprisonment. With the correct factual presentation, a court might authorize
such an expenditure.
290. A. ScoTT, 3 THE LAW Op TRUSTS § 227.17 (Supp. 1985).
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legal standards" relies on only three cases, the most recent of which
dates from 1959.291 Rather than follow these archaic arcana blindly,
trust purposes should be interpreted with an eye to the major purposes
of our legal culture as reflected in prevailing standards of constitutional
and international law.2
The rule of international law is informed by the principle of reasonableness.2 3 If trustees were made to comply with international law
obligations, those standards would only require divestment decisions
to be made prudently, and to result from a decision process carefully
calculated to minimize net value losses. Nothing in international law
could be construed to compel a trustee to disregard protecting the
trust corpus. International law does not require divestment to be a
sacrifice, but international law does require reasonable compliance
with its mandate.
The most compelling argument against divestment lies in ERISA,
where private pensions are subject to strict trust standards.- Even
under this scheme, a careful decision process and reasonable implementation would prevent trustee liability.2 5 From an international perspec-

291. Langbein, supra note 266, at 27 n. 90, nn. 93-95; Langbein & Posner II, supra note
266, at 109-110 n. 89, nn. 92-94.
See also National Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. Inland Revenue Commrs., (1947) 2 All. E.R.
217, (1948) A.C. 31; Deichelmann Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 2d 659 (1959); Trustees for the Roll
of Voluntary Workers v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (1942) Sess. Cas. 47 (Scotland); In
re Wilkinson, (1941) N.Z.L.R. 1065. The real import of these cases is that organizations were
denied tax exempt status. This issue is clearly addressed in our own federal tax laws, making
Langbein's analysis superfluous. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 501(h) (West 1984). See also Troyer,
supra note 266, at 151-154.
292. If the terms of a trust conflict directly with the norms of the investment marketplace,
it may be impossible for the trust to follow Langbein's hold-the-market strategy. If Langbein's
theory became the legal test, many trusts would revert from charitable purposes to avaricious
remandermen. See, e.g., Evan v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968), affd 396 U.S.
435 (1969). Should trust purposes not evolve and absorb the norms of society at large and not
fall apart when the conflict between concrete provisions and external rality becomes irreconcilable? There is considerable debate whether the standard of "impossibility" should be "inexpediency" and whether the trust should be administered at the discretion of the trustee, instead
of reverting to the remaindermen. See Comment, Cy Pres Inexpediency and the Buck Trust,
20 U.S.F. L. REV. 577 (1986).
293. WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1, at 15.
294. Langbein & Posner III, supra note 266, at 96-107. Cf. Ravikoff & Curzan, Social
Responsibility and the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1980).
295. After considering the issues of risk, liquidity, country risk, financial performance,
comparative analysis, transaction costs, and the implications of divestment laws, Baldwin and
Brown conclude that 'the evidence clearly shows that divestment policies can be financially
beneficial for even the largest portfolios." B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, ECONOMIC ACTION
AGAINST
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tive, ERISA should not be construed as the sort of congressional
enactment that automatically overrides other sources of law that could
be harmonized with ERISA without doing violence to the precepts of
2
either source of law. 9

IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (a study funded by The New World Foundation
& the Africa Office of the National Council of Churches) and available from The Africa Fund,
198 N. Broadway, New York, NY 10038 (undated, post 1984). "In short, the apartheid regime
has conducted business with the U.S. corporations in South Africa in fields directly related to
the oppression of blacks for decades. Id. at 7. The Internal Security Act, §§ 54(1)(a) and 54(2)(b),
maintains that support for divestment is "subversion," punishable by five years to life imprisonment. Id. at 3.
296. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AT THE UNITED STATES
102 comment h (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
By reducing the discussion of the interaction of law and economics to "neutral principles,"
Langbein creates a series of buffers through which American political impulse must pass before
impacting on South African political action, a process designed to preserve the status quo even
if reform takes place. Langbein's position expands traditional trust fiduciary obligations, but
not in a manner that expands state control over the business of investment. Indeed, South
African business leaders have been laying the groundwork for opening up South Africa society
to adapt to the needs they see evolving in their business culture. The South African business
community had provided a modest agenda that would completely undercut any support for
economic sanctions. "South African businessmen have already defined what the Government
must do: end the state of emergency, release political prisoners, abolish apartheid, and start
negotiating the political future of the country." Lewis, Sharp and Short and Dramatic, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 1985, at A35, col. 1. See also Lewis, South Africa Says No, N.Y. Times, Sept.
23, 1985, at A19, col. 1.
Arguing that economic change is sufficient and political change unnecessary for the present,
American conservatives have relied on Lawrence Schlemmer's poll that "reveals that more than
75 percent of black workers surveyed oppose divestment as a strategy to liberate them." D'Souza,
Liberals' Hypocrisy on South Africa, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at A13. Working for freedom
and equality through the layers of privilege that constitute apartheid, however, leads only to
more stratification and fragmentation, making politics more intransigent. J. LELYVELD, MOVE
YOUR SHADOW: SOUTH AFRICA BLACK AND WHITE 278 (1985). See also E. SCHMIDT, ONE
STEP -

IN

THE WRONG DIRECTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES AS A

STRATEGY FOR OPPOSING APARTHEID 11-17 (rev. ed. 1985) (available from Episcopal Church

People for a Free Southern Africa, 399 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012).
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 134
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
The other aphorism born of admiralty jurisdiction is that "[i]nternational law is part of our
law." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
Municipal law concerning divestment can be federal, state, or local. It is used here to mean
"[t]hat which pertains solely to the citizens and inhabitants of a state, and is thus distinguished
from political law, commercial law, and international law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 918 (5th
ed. 1979).
RESTATEMENT

(REVISED) OF FOREIGN

RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES §

135(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
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When the problems of divestment and disinvestment are thrust
into the larger framework of both national policy and the broader
international law context which have generated expectations that apar-

ERISA would have to supersede all prior enactments, including treaties like the UN Charter.
In the same way that ERISA denies individuals and states the power to allow a lesser standard
for pension trusts, international human rights agreements deny individuals the liberty to violate
human rights. A treaty may increase the power of the federal government to invade the liberty
of individuals. See, e.g. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). "Here a national interest of
very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert
with that of another power." Id. at 435. There, the action was supposed to protect migratory
birds, a lesser magnitude than human life.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 135
comment (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985):
[S]ince any treaty or other international agreement of the United States, and any
rule of customary international law, is federal law (§ 131), it supersedes any inconsistent State law or policy whether adopted earlier or later. Even a non-self executing agreement of the United States, not effective as law until implemented by
legislative or executive action, may sometimes be held to be federal policy superseding State law or policy. In principle, a U.S. treaty or international agreement
may also be held to preempt a field or subject and supersede State law or policy
through it is not necessarily in conflict with the international agreement.
For example, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub.
L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 8m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (West 1981)
to prevent foreign bribery in commercial contexts from contributing to problems in foreign
relations, the perception of corporate immorality, and the erosion of the free market system.
A Comparison of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Draft InternationalAgreement
on Illicit Payments, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 795. This act was intended to limit the power
of corporations based in the United States from acting in certain ways even outside the United
States. On May 18, 1979, the United Nations Committee on an International Agreement on
Illicit Payments adopted the draft report (Agreement) of its first and second sessions, U.N.
ESCOR, (2d regular session, agenda item 9), U.N. Doc. E/1979/104 (1979), which had the same
basic aim as the FCPA - to discourage illicit payments in an international context. Id. at 796.
Although both use a combination of disclosure and criminalization to achieve their goal, there
are significant differences between the two. Id. It has been suggested that before the United
States can lend support to the Agreement, the FCPA must be reconciled with the Agreement
in the following ways:
The type of business covered under the FCPA accounting provisions would have
to be expanded. Furthermore, the permissibility of "grease payments" under the
FCPA would have to be eliminated. Finally, United States foreign policy is not in
alignment with the Agreement's southern Africa provisions. The last objection is
mitigated, however, by the significant dissension over inclusion of the provisions
in the final text and by the changing attitude of the United States towards South
Africa.
Id. at 822. Domestic law is arguably overreaching its jurisdiction, and international law may
not be applied by a court.
On the relationship of the municipal law of the United States and international law, see
Nagan, supra note 26, at 98-100 and notes accompanying.
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theid is a crime against humanity, and that it be abolished by individual
and collaborative strategies that are expeditious and cost efficient,
important questions of both principle and strategy arise. For example,
should local governmental authorities, state legislatures, university
foundations, private sector, wealth maximizing corporate bodies, as
well as individuals be in the business of "making" foreign policy relating
to sanctions against South Africa? Are they "obliged" to do so in the
light of national policy as expressed in the major purposes of such
national legislation as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act; the
major purposes of internationally sanctioned prescriptions criminalizing apartheid and requiring an obligation to cooperate in the demise
of the apartheid system?
What we urge is that both national and international law constitute
a larger more comprehensive system of world public order. The processes of prescription in this system operate at every level of social
organization - responsibility for the system of public order we defend
is the obligation of all. In decisional terms it is suggested that local
law and local institutions frame their responsibilities and interpret
their work in ways that are congruent with national policy and in turn
that national policy be interpreted - made and applied in the light
of the full mandate of international law.
The decisional trend assayed thus far indicates a law making and
law applying process that has prescribed from the global and from
the local level. Divestment and disinvestment strategies may thus be
seen as part of the prescribing process in both national and international law. As will be seen in the next section, pressures for divestment
and disinvestment have led directly to the generation of important
national legislation. This legislation in turn will significantly influence
the emergence of an international "hard" law of sanctions against
South Africa, since the United States has the control and authority
to give efficacy and impetus to a universalizing trend in the sanctions
process.
XI. CONGRESSIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING:
THE COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF 1986

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 19862 7 must be viewed
against a background sketch of escalating pressures within South Africa, and the Southern Africa region,- 8 and also within the United
297. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (West Supp. 1987).
See supra note 18.
298. For a summary of an Afrikaner perspective of the region, see A. SAMPSON supra
note 31.
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States for strong action against apartheid. South African politics is
presently characterized by insurrectionary violence and reaction.
Numerous political parties, pressure groups, nation-states and international organizations (e.g., the UN and the OAU) continue to demand
some level of international intervention to minimize the human cost
of the South African transformation. 300 In the United States, pressure
groups operate at every level of the social process to encourage public
and private sector actors to observe humane standards in their involvement with South Africa - or to divest from South Africa altogether
in a collective economic embargo. These pressures culminated in a
remarkable piece of legislation: the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid

Act of 1986.301
The Act reflects a widely held perception in opinion-leading circles
within the United States that white control over the South African
power process is by no means assured for the indefinite future. The
Act must be seen as a partial response to the problems of repression
and reaction by South Africa and also to the accelerating consciousness
of liberation and intensified patterns of resistance to racial oligarchy
30 2
in South Africa and Southern Africa.
The Act must also be seen and evaluated against the insistent
mandate of international law and morality that apartheid must soon
end.3°3 Otherwise, a major breakdown in public order within the Southern Africa region may result. The long term prospect of economic and
security destabilization may quite conceivably provoke a superpower
confrontation at great cost to all regional and hemispheric actors, and
3
particularly to the people of Southern Africa. 04
299. It is generally conceded that under the present state of emergency, South Africa is
effectively under military rule. See Younghusband, South African Liberals Decry Military Rule,
Wash. Times, June 24, 1987, reprinted in AFPC XXII, No. 23, at 2. On the emergence of
neo-nazi forces in South Africa, see Cornell, To the Far Right of Apartheid, N.Y. Times, Nov.
23, 1986, reprintedin AFPC, XXI, No. 46, at 2. According to Sampson, the essential ingredients
of revolutionary success are present in South Africa. First, the rulers have lost confidence in
their theories. Second, the ruled are convinced they can win. A. SAMPSON, supra note 31, at
180. A poll taken in 1985 showed that 63% of the whites and 59% of the blacks believed "apartheid
would not exist in 20 years' time." Id.
300. See supra note 19.
301. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (West Supp. 1987).
302. For a documented account of repression in the midst of Mr. Botha's reforms, see
REPRESSION IN A TIME OF REFORM: A LOOK AT EVENTS IN THE TRANSVAAL SINCE AUGUST
1984 (1984) (published' by a large number of South African anti-apartheid organizations such as
the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Black Sash and the Transvaal Indian Congress). Cf.
SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1964: RENEWED RESISTANCE INCREASED REPRESSION, Southern
Africa Project Annual Report, Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights Under Law (1984).
303. See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1; APARTHEID: THE FACTS, supra note 1;
0. OZGUR, supra note 129.
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The Act must also be viewed against the evolution of U.S. foreign
policy towards South Africa - specifically,305 the inception and application of the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine and the more recent extension
of that doctrine known as the Reagan Doctrine. Stripped of its verbal
frills, the Reagan Doctrine holds that the key problems in Southern
Africa are not white supremacy and black liberation, but the projected
spread of international communism. In effect, the Reagan Doctrine
seeks the roll-back of "imperial" communism - not merely its containment. Thus the United States has moved from a policy of containment
under President Nixon to encroachment under President Reagan. In
the judgment of Mr. Reagan's many critics, his policy of "constructive
engagement" with South Africa is more or less a label designed to
36
package and sell the legitimacy of white supremacy.
This article cannot elucidate all the possible ramifications of the
background facts which brought about the Act. Attention is called,
however, to what is probably its most vocal harbinger from an international perspective. Mr. Reagan's South African policies are in stark
contrast to the position long advocated by the international community
and the United States pre-Reagan. The international position is reflected in a growing consensus that apartheid is a major thorn in the
side of a global system committed to the principles codified in the UN
Charter. The UN's position on apartheid relects realism, insight and
7
wisdom. South Africa's crisis is one of the best documented problems ever
put before the international community. However, the constructive
engagement policy of the Reagan Administration is a failed effort to
circumvent UN efforts over a 30-year period. Indeed, the charitable
view of constructive engagement is that it is a monumental political
gamble that failed. Constructive engagement sought to impose upon
the international legal order a more refined perspective of ideological
anti-communism with a keen appreciation of the nature of South African problems and Southern African dynamics.- It was a futile effort
to rewrite the standards of normative behavior in the international

G. MBEKI, PROFILE OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1987).
305. G. CARTER, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1985).
306. It is simply beyond the scope of this paper to essay the collapse of the Reagan policy
in southern Africa. However, the fundamental point is broadly underlined throughout the paper.
See, e.g., Constructive Engagement Fails Namibia Again, in Washington Notes on Africa 4
(Summer 1985).
307. Id.
308. Id.
304.
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legal arena and undermine the UN as a central and important player
in the promotion of international peace, security and justice in Southern Africa. An examination of the policies behind the Act demonstrates
this failure.
XII.

THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OF THE ACT

A.

Preliminary Consideration

30 9

The Act effectively repudiates the policy of constructive engagement in South Africa. Indeed, it virtually rewrites the policy that the
United States 310 must pursue in South Africa and Southern Africa. In
section 5002, the Act sets out as its principal purpose a "comprehensive
and complete framework to guide the efforts of the United States in
helping to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and lead to the
''
establishment of a nonracial, democratic form of government. a11
The
Act reaches far into the priorities of the executive branch by defining
what U.S. policy must be "toward the government of South Africa,
3 12
the victims of apartheid, and other states in Southern Africa.
The Act sets out the specific policies and key strategies that the
U.S. government must pursue regarding the critical political actors
in the region to reduce the use and minimize the consequences of
violence undertaken in defense of the apartheid state or in the efforts
to end it.
The Act also expresses in policy terms three matters that are
unusual if they are meant to evidence the molar, as distinct from the
molecular, characteristics of legislative policy-making. One example is
found in section 5018 which reflects the "sense of Congress that the
African National Congress should strongly condemn and take effective

309. See 22 U.S.C. § 5001-5116 (West Supp. 1987).
310. The Act may be viewed as a key symbol that the West is withdrawing support from
South Africa and beginning to "change sides." A. SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 257. Pressure to
secure the passage of the Act came from any sources including church groups such as the
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility under the directorship of Tim Smith. See id. at
172 and authorities cited therein. If an individual or organization can be singled out for triggering
the sustained public reaction to the South African problem, it is probably Randall Robinson and
the black lobby group TransAfrica. Id. at 165. According to Senator Lowell Weicker, "[i]t was
not a Congressman, a Senator or a President who brought the matter of South Africa to the
attention of the American people . . . it was a citizen - Randall Robinson." Id. That honor
may also be shared with Senator Edward Kennedy who traveled to South Africa, following in
Bobby Kennedy's footsteps. According to Winnie Mandela "[i]t took a Kennedy to emphasize
the conditions we have to live with to the rest of the world." Id. at 167.
311. See 22 U.S.C. § 5002 (West Supp. 1987).

312. Id. § 5011.
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actions against the execution by fire, commonly known as 'necklacing,'
of any person in any country."3 13 It may be noted parenthetically that
this carries the obvious implication that the ANC is responsible, either
directly or indirectly, for the necklacing incidents. The author has
discussed the necklacing problem in the context of the larger patterns
of violence in the townships of urban South Africa with a wide variety
of informed South Africans.3 1'4 According to them, diverse but identifiable groups are responsible for necklacing. They include extremist
groups of the left who may or may not operate autonomously from
directives of groups like the ANC and groups identified with the right
who deem a program of nonracialism to be abhorrent. The latter are
loosely identified with extreme black consciousness groups and may
or may not have direct or indirect links with the Pan Africanist Congress (hereinafter PAC). In effect, much of the necklacing problem
reflects a fight between ethnocentric black nationalism and nonracial,
national liberation groups.3 15 Both groups have targeted alleged police
informers.
Moreover, an opportunistic gangster element thrives on the fringes
of the breakdown of law and order in the ghettos. This element indulges in necklacing its rivals, as well as others, and may have loose
affiliations with major political groupings either working to overthrow
apartheid or in support of the security forces (as was the case with
3 16
the so-called "Witdoekke").
313. For a U.S. account of the practice of necklacing, see Zucchino, The Necklace of Death,
Tallahassee Democrat, Aug. 12, 1986, at B1, col. 1; Zucchino, The Necklace of Death, id., Aug.
17, 1986, at B1, col. 2.
314. A field trip to South Africa was undertaken in May 1986.
315. A significant example of "black on black" violence is the Inkatha-UDF, supra note
302, feud which reflects the complex political dynamics of black politics in South Africa. Tensions
exist between the ethnically based, Zulu political organization, Inkatha, and the non-white, but
non-racially based, UDF. Tension has also been generated due to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's
partial acquiescence in the bantustan program of the South African government, his standing
as a homelands leader and the strong antipathy that exists between the exiled ANC leaders
and Buthelezi. See Temko, Different Tactics to End Apartheid Behind Tribal Violence in S.
Africa, Christian Sci. Mon., Oct. 22, 1987, reprinted in A. SAMPSON, supra note 31, at 157-158.
Sampson notes that the police seem more "tolerant" of violence directed at the ANC or the
UDF. See also Towards a Black Civil War, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 7, 1987, 45 (U.K. ed. at
61), but cf. Battersby, Zula Chief Defends His Role in New South African Panel, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1987, at Y8, col. 3; Honey, Zulu Chieftain Says He's Vital to New South Africa,
Baltimore Sun, Nov. 9, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 45, at 4. Buthelezi says that
"[n]either the South African government nor the African National Congress can hope to bring
about change here, whether through violence or non-violence, and try to leave Inkatha or myself
out of it." Id. Cf. Battersby, Edendale Journal: In Apartheid's Shadow, Zulu Wages War on
Zulu, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1987, at Y4, col. 3.
316. Personal observations of the author during a recent field trip to South Africa concerning
Pretoria-sponsored violence in the townships.
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Section 5018 is grounded in faulty intelligence and approaches the
very real problem of atrocities in South Africa with a less than even
hand. It is well-documented that the government of South Africa
widely indulges in torture and township killings as regular instruments
of governmental policy'17 Furthermore, the government's destabilization program in Southern Africa has been effectuated by the liberal
use of assassinations.
The policy pronouncement in section 5019 is equally interesting.
It recounts the "sense of the Senate" that the "United States Ambassador should promptly make a formal request to the South African
government for the United States Ambassador to meet with Nelson
Mandela.' ' 38 It is not clear what the purpose of this formal request
is; nor is it clear what exactly the meeting with Mr. Mandela is to

accomplish .319
To place this provision in its proper context, it should be read in
light of the major purpose of the Act embodied in subchapter I entitled,
"The Policy of the United States with Respect to Ending Apartheid.""32
Since ending apartheid is the goal and since Nelson Mandela represents
the leading opposition group, it would seem that this provision is
meant to initiate the first formal tie to the South African black liberation movement. Indeed, Secretary of State Schultz recently had direct, formal meetings with the exiled leader of the ANC, Oliver
Tambo.32' Thus, section 5019, while placed innocuously under the heading "United States Ambassador to meet with Nelson Mandela,"
suggests congressional encouragement for stronger, more formal ties
between the U.S. government and the South African opposition movement.

317.

See A.S.

MATTHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: DILEM-

(1986); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1987 99-107
(1988).
318. See Dash, A Rare Talk with Nelson Mandela: The Man Nobody Knows, N.Y. Times,
(Sunday magazine) June 7, 1985; M. BENSON, NELSON MANDELA: THE MAN AND THE MOVEMENT (1986). See also Sullivan, Mandela Allowed Visit by Opposition Leader, Wash. Times,
May 6, 1986, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 17, at 1.
The South African government actively opposed meetings between white "verlighte" Afrikaners and leaders of the ANC in exile. See Parks, S. Africa Will Bar Meetings of White and
ApartheidFoes, Botha Says, L.A. Times, Aug. 14, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 33, at 6.
319. Recently the South African authorities have granted "amnesty" to ANC leader Govan
Mbeki. Mbeki maintains that a free Mandela [a recommendation of the Act] would aid the peace
process in South Africa. See Editorial, Deeds and Words in South Africa, N.Y. Times, Nov.
9, 1987, at Y22, col. 1, on the release of Mbeld and a call for Mandela's release.
320. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5020 (West Supp. 1987).
321. See Goshko, State Dept. Describes ANC's Communist Ties, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1987,
at A18.
MAS OF THE APARTHEID SOCIETY
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It may be that meeting Mandela (still the symbolic head of the
ANC) at the formal ambassadorial level is meant to signal to anti-apartheid forces in South Africa that the United States is willing to view
the question of black leadership with more realism than the Pretoria
Authorities. The Pretoria Authorities has always sought to "choose"
the black leadership. Thus, credibility problems arise for men like
Gatsha Buthelezi whose status is derived in part from working through
the homelands political process.
Section 5012 may also be an important signal because it recognizes
the ANC and PAC as crucial to negotiating the implementation of
black rights in South Africa. 3- Additionally, section 5012(b)(4) encourages the liberation movements to "reexamine their ties to the South
''
African Communist Party. 3

The importance of sections 5012 and 5019 is that the process of
internationally recognizing the ANC, and its leadership as symbolized
by Mandela, ultimately requires that the liberation movement demonstrate its genuine independence as the principal force pursuing the
goal of self-determination for South Africa's deprived black population.3 4- The assumption behind section 5012(b)(4) is that the presence
of the South African Communist Party in the ANC will undermine
its independence and, in effect, make it an instrument of the Soviet
Union's foreign policy rather than an instrument of independence and
national liberation. However qualified, the Act still reflects a significant change' in U.S. policy because it recognizes that the liberation
movements and their leaders must be reckoned with and are not
simply mouthpieces of international communism23

322. See 22 U.S.C. § 5012 (West Supp. 1987).
323. Id. § 5012(b)(4).
324. On self-determination, see U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A14684 (1961); SUMIDA,
THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION:

POWER AND LAW

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND ORDER IN

7 (Barker ed. 1971).

325. For the position of the South African authorities, see Viewpoint, S. AFR. DIG. 1110,
Dec. 5, 1986. The Botha regime's promotion of the South African crisis as a purely ideological
struggle is explicitly set forth in an interview with journalist Bruce Louden. Botha is quoted
as follows: 'The struggle in South Africa is not one between Blacks and Whites. It is an
ideological struggle between supporters of genuine freedom and stability, and those who wish
to force a socialist dictatorship of a small clique on South Africa with the support of international
terrorism." Id.
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The implications for U.S. foreign relations are substantial. Recognition is not a single isolated executive act. Instead, recognition is a
multi-dimensional process that sets in motion increasing levels of deference - national, regional, and transnational - to the national liberation movement. These levels of deference may eventually become
formally encompassed within the relationships between governments
and international bodies to the liberation movement. Moreover, the
processes that augment the recognition of a liberation movement also
constitute a challenge to the status quo in South Africa.3 26 Thus, the
authority signals contained in section 5019 are of extraordinary importance. They accord a mantle of international deference and authority
upon the man who symbolizes, in large measure, the goals and aspirations of the black majority of South Africa. Conversely, this recognition
by the United States diminishes the authority component of the status
quo government of Mr. Botha and the Nationalist Party.
Section 5020 also reflects a policy that is peculiar for its particularized character. Therein, Congress mandates that U.S. corporations operating in South Africa are "obliged" to oppose apartheid and
train blacks in decisionmaking roles. This implies that, in the future,
blacks at all levels of the South African political and economic spectrum
will be involved in decisionmaking roles in United States corporations
operating in South Africa. Consequently, these corporations should
prepare for this coming reality. Section 5020 also implies that white
hegemony cannot and, indeed, will not endure indefinitely.
B.

Further Considerations

As was noted, the principal purpose of the Act, as stated in section
5002, is to provide a "comprehensive and complete framework" to
channel U.S. policy in a manner that helps "to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa. ''1 27 This purpose is consistent with the position
taken by the UN, and the vast majority of states, that U.S. policy
should facilitate the establishment of a nonracial, democratic form of
government. Other related policies specifically set out in the Act include: recommendations regarding the U.S. government's relationship
with the Pretoria authorities; 3 - U.S. policy towards the national liberation movements (the ANC and PAC) and their affiliates; 32 social and

326.
327.
328.
329.

supra note 27, at 377.
See 22 U.S.C. § 5002 (West Supp. 1987).
Id. § 5011.
Id. § 5012.
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE,
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economic reconstruction programs for victims of apartheid; 0 policies
that promote regional integrity, security and human rights;"1 consideration of the economic dependence of frontline states on South Africa;3 2 the processes by which a negotiated settlement between the
contending interest groups and political parties might be realized; 3.
recognition of the importance of international cooperation in achieving
the Act's objectives;1 and finally, policies with respect to U.S. employers doing business in South Africa - specifically recognizing that they
are "obliged both generally to actively oppose the policy and practices
of apartheid and specifically to engage in recruitment and training of
black and coloured South Africans for management responsibilities."C.

Analysis and Critique of the Policies Codified in the Act

Section 5011(a) of the Act sets out the policy that the U.S. government has adopted toward the government of South Africa - to promote "reform" within the South African governmental system that
"will lead to the establishment of a nonracial democracy."6 The term
"reform" reflects the constraining notion that foreign policy is still
largely a matter of government-to-government relationships. Indeed,
it is easier to encourage reform through the framework of diplomacy
than to promote change - possibly radical change - through unofficial
channels. Yet radical change is precisely what the Act is mandating.
"Reform" is simply a more palatable term. Discussion about any kind
of alteration to the apartheid system that results in a genuine nonracial
democracy addresses revolutionary change within South Africa. Although the concept of revolutionary change does not necessarily imply
a violent and coercive overthrow of the status quo, it does imply rapid,
fundamental change. Indeed, the degree of change required to move
from white supremacy to nonracial democracy is profoundly radical
and can hardly be viewed as a reform of the apartheid system.
When the notion of reform is read in light of section 5011(b), the
concept loses much of its restraining import. For example, section
5011(b) strikes at the heart of the garrisoning of the legal and political
culture of South Africa by attacking the police state apparatus and

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 5013.
§ 5014.
§ 5015.
§ 5016.
§ 5017.
§ 5020.
§ 5011(a).
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its centralized structure of executive control. Section 5011(b)(1), in
effect, requires that South Africa adopt the rule of law "for citizens
of all races." This provision carries very large implications about the
nature of civil rights in South Africa. For example, it specifies the
conditions under which civil rights must be honored and the institutional arrangements for honoring them, including constitutional
guarantees that have not been a meaningful part of South Africa's
33
legal culture .

Section 5011(b)(1) must be read in conjunction with section
5011(b)(2) which calls for the release of major figures in the political
and trade union movements and also for the release of all political
prisoners incarcerated in violation of the rule of law. Section 5011(b)(5)
also requires, in effect, that the government of South Africa "negotiate
with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa." The prescribed negotiations (rather than violence) as the cure for South Africa's race problems are dependent upon: (1) the establishment of a
rule of law; (2) the release of political prisoners with whom the Pretoria
authorities should negotiate; and (3) a legal and constitutional structure
envisioned in section 5011(b)(3) which permits "the free exercise by
South Africans of all races of the right to form political parties, express
political opinions, and otherwise participate in the political process.'"However, the legislative language of section 5011(b)(3) only requires the Pretoria authorities to permit the political freedoms recommended. This provision falls short of requiring the government to
guarantee the fair exercise of political rights. But section 5011(a), in
effect, provides a comprehensive framework wherein the U.S. government establishes conditions that the Pretoria authorities must meet
to move toward a nonracial democracy. These conditions are actually
preconditions for the negotiating process that must lead to the democratizing and de ethnicizing of South Africa's political and legal culture.
Section 5011(b)(5), which sets forth the policy of a negotiated settlement, must be read in light of sections 5012, 5016, 5018 and 5019.
Section 5012 is of vital importance because it calls for explicit recognition of the South African national liberation movements (the ANC
and PAC) and their affiliates and recognizes the role they will play
in the process of projected negotiations designed to end apartheid.
The recognition of a national liberation movement - however unified
- by the U.S. government sends a powerful signal to the global

337.

See J.

DUGARD,

supra, note 9; A.

MATHEWS, LAW, ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH

AFRICA (1971).

338.

See 22 U.S.C. § 5011(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987).
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community that the liberation movement is a legitimate force. Section
5012 is ambivalent, however, about the relationship between any
strategies of violence which may be employed by the national liberation
movements and the initiation phase of projected negotiations which
are "designed to bring about a nonracial and genuine democracy in
South Africa."' 9 Although U.S. policy clearly discourages the use of
violence, section 5012 is ambiguous whether the "suspension of violence" is a precondition for the start of negotiations. Since strategies
of coercion and persuasion can be used concurrently, as well as sequentially, to secure the objective of negotiations, section 5012 may require
clarification.
It should be noted that the Botha regime publicly maintains that
it will not entertain any kind of communication or negotiations with
the ANC until the ANC agrees to suspend violence.34 It seems unlikely
that the U.S. Congress intends to adopt this position taken by the
Pretoria authorities. The rational objective of U.S. policy in sections
5011 and 5012 of the Act is the de-escalation of violence on both sides
and the concurrent development of a structure and process for realistic
negotiations. Section 5011 requires the Pretoria authorities to adopt
and apply the constraint of the rule of law in controlling and regulating
state violence against internal opponents and to cease military destabilization of the frontline states. Section 5012(b)(1) directs U.S.
diplomatic efforts towards the suspension of "terrorist activists" sufficient to make negotiations with the Pretoria authorities possible. This
provision does not require the termination of terrorist activities but
only their suspension implying that the Act approaches the problem
of violence and counter-violence with an even hand in this contextY3
It is true that section 5016(b) states that "[i]t is the sense of the
Congress that a suspension of violence is an essential precondition for
the holding of negotiations. The United States calls on all parties in
the conflict to agree to a suspension of violence." 2 Since this language
is prefixed by the words, "[i]t is the sense of Congress," this provision
does not suggest that termination of violence is "an essential condi-

339. Id. § 5012.
340. However, Anglo-American, South Africa's industrial giant, has urged that white South
Africans consider multi-racial power-sharing under the theme of "negotiate or be doomed." See
Parks, South Africa Woos ANC for Role in Peace Process, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1987, reprinted
in AFPC, XXII, No. 38, at 3.
341. The term "suspension may also imply that terrorist activities are appropriate if state
violence does not abate as sought by the Act.
342. See § 5016(b) (West Supp. 1987).
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tion ''343 that must be satisfied before the South Africans may negotiate
with each other. In contrast, section 5016(c) mandates the United
States to work for an agreement to suspend violence and begin negotiations. This language is a significant departure from that of section
5016(b). Specifically, section 5016(c) states "[t]he United States will
work . . . toward[s] the achievement of an agreement to suspend
violence and begin negotiations.''1 4 The concept of "an agreement to
suspend violence and begin negotiations" must be read conjunctively,
not disjunctively. Thus, if we view this provision in a process oriented
way, we see the concurrent objectives of de-escalation of violence and
simultaneous promotion of negotiations and settlement.
In order to steer the Pretoria authorities towards a satisfactory
negotiations process, Congress, in section 5016(d) of the Act, has proposed that the United States and its major allies urge the Botha
regime to honor this four-point plan:
(1) an end to the state of emergency and the release of
the political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela;
(2) the unbanning of the African National Congress, the
Pan African Congress, the Black Consciousness Movement
and all other groups willing to suspend terrorism and participate in negotiations and a democratic process;
(3) a revocation of the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act.'1 5 and the granting of universal citizenship to all South Africans, including homeland residents; and
(4) the use of the international offices of a third party as
an intermediary to bring about negotiations, with the object
of the establishment of power-sharing with the black majority.
Moreover, section 5012(b)(1) makes it plain that negotiations with
the Pretoria authorities must involve the liberation movements as
well as "other groups" representing black South African constituencies.
However, section 5012(b)(2) requires that the ANC and the PAC make
"known their commitment to a free and democratic post-apartheid
South Africa, ' '46 and, in section 5012(b)(4), the liberation movements
are encouraged to "reexamine their ties to the South African Communist Party."-7 This requirement codifies congressional expectations

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id.
Id. [emphasis added].
See J. DUGARD, supra note 9, at 14.
See 22 U.S.C. § 5012(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
Id. § 5012(b)(4).
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about the nature of global society and the role of post-apartheid South
Africa within it. The idea of a "free and democratic" society could be
viewed within the broad framework of the UN Charter.8 Unfortunately, there are many unfree and undemocratic societies still viewed
as legitimate by the UN.
The term "free and democratic" could also mean a South Africa
defined by strategic, political and economic considerations within the
framework of the Western industrial alliance. From this perspective,
the United States would not tolerate South Africa falling under the
sphere of Soviet control. South Africa is certainly a strategic interest
within the Western industrial alliance and the broad outlines of the
Reagan Doctrine.
For the forces of nationalism, the term "free and democratic" implies both independence from any particular sphere of influence and
political orientation free from the apron strings of both superpowers.
Thus, it is possible (and desirable) to place a construction on sections
5012(b)(2) and (4) which suggests that principles of freedom and democracy mean genuine independence from all superpower hegemony.
Since "all parties" to the conflict are called upon to suspend violence,- 9
it is reasonable to assume that all parties to the conflict are invited
to the negotiation table.
Nonetheless, section 5012(b)(4) reflects congressional concern that
the Communist presence in the national liberation movements will
detour the process of change in South Africa away from racial democracy and towards ideological hegemony. In section 5016(a)(1), Congress "recognizes that some of the organizations fighting apartheid
have become infiltrated by Communists and that Communists serve
on the governing boards of such organizations."- Yet this statement
does not qualify the broad purpose and framework of section 5016 and
must be read, as suggested, in light of sections 5012(b)(2) and (4).
Section 5016 is primarily concerned with the policy of promoting
a negotiated settlement. It details in broad outline the policy of seeking
to "promote negotiations among representatives of all citizens of South
Africa to determine a future political system that would permit all
citizens to be full participants in the governance of their country."'This seems to suggest that, at a minimum, the freedom and democracy
referred to in section 5012(b)(2) means the full political participation

348.
349.
350.
351.

See U.N. Charter at art. 1.
See 22 U.S.C. § 5016(2)(b) (West Supp. 1987).
Id. § 5016(a)(1).
Id.
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which the Carter Administration had defined, in part, as "one person,
one vote. ' 352 Moreover, if section 5016(b) is read in light of traditional
U.S. political liberties, the language requiring all participants to "respect the right of all South Africans to form political parties" 35 would
seem to include even those with whom the United States profoundly
disagrees.
Section 5016(a)(1) acknowledges that "important and legitimate
political parties" in South Africa have been banned and views their
"unbanning" as important to the negotiations process. It is unclear
how the fact some of the political opposition have "become infiltrated
by Communists," or have "Communists serve on the governing
boards," will affect the negotiating process. But since "all parties" are
called to join the negotiations, it is reasonable to assume that the
communist elements are included.
XIII.
A.

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

Subchapter II: Positive Sanctions: Black Reconstruction

Subchapter II of the Act provides economic and moral support to
the victims of apartheid. It embodies the recognition that the process
of racial discrimination and domination has resulted in a massive arrest
of the political, social, economic and cultural development of a sizable
segment of South Africa's nonwhite population. The disparity between
the privileged and the deprived is a major contributor to the escalating
pattern of the South African conflict. Thus, U.S. policy now seeks to
initiate a process of economic and social reconstruction targeted at
the most besieged sectors of the South African society. In the original
session laws section 201, for example, the Act earmarked four million
dollars annually for fiscal years 1987-1989 for scholarships to black
South Africans. Funding is also provided for nongovernmental human
rights groups in South Africa which promote an end to apartheid.
Moreover, the Act provided funding for legal assistance to political
detainees and political prisoners, as well as for their relatives.
Subchapter II also contains provisions designed to encourage the
fuller emergence of black business enterprise. In addition, section 511
of the original sessions laws allocated forty million dollars annually
for economic aid to disadvantaged South Africans, with three million
of this amount specifically set aside for the training of trade unionists.

352.
353.

See G. CARTER, supra note 305.
See 22 U.S.C. § 5016(b) (West Supp. 1987).
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Sections 5032 through 5035 of the Act concern the employment of
black labor in South Africa by the U.S. government and its nationals.
These provisions encapsulate a standard of conduct regarding the
treatment of black labor in South Africa and outline normative standards for business and governmental operations in which black labor
is prominent. For example, section 5032 requires all U.S. government
agencies to adhere to the Sullivan Principles 3- and section 5034 requires all U.S. companies employing twenty-five or more employees
in South Africa to implement and observe the Sullivan Principles.
Also, section 5036 of the Act prohibits assistance to groups which
have members who have committed human rights violations in South
Africa.
Subchapter II is not unproblematic, however, section 5031, which
concerns expanding economic partipation by blacks and other nonwhites, urges the U.S. government to provide appropriate assistance
to help them realize "their rightful place in the South African economy." 3 55 However, section 5031(c) empowers the Secretary of State
and any other U.S. department or agency head,56 "notwithstanding
any other provision of law," to terminate the sanctions contained in
subchapter III for business enterprises in which beneficial ownership
by black and other nonwhite South Africans is more than fifty per35 7
cent.
This provision wields a double-edged sword. It provides an incentive for white-dominated South African businesses to widen economic
participation in order to: (a) prosper through the rewards of the Act;
(b) broaden their participation in trade; and (c) gain access to trade
credits with the United States.- However, it is possible for corporations to diversify their patterns of ownership solely as a paper exercise
and be in compliance with the guidelines provides in section 5031(c).
Also, it is not altogether clear that black-owned businesses in the
bantustans may not technically fall within these guidelines. However,

354. See Editorial, Ending Real Constructive Engagement, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, at
Y18, col. 1. Cf. Davis, South Africa: Sullivan Callsfor Pullout: Only Sanctions Can Dismantle
Apartheid, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1987, at Y2, col. 3; Feder, A Wary Reception for Sullivan
Stand, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, at Y5, col. 5. See also Claiborne, Sullivan Urged Not to Quit
Apartheid Fight, Wash. Post, June 10, 1987, at A20; Editorial, Sullivan Pulls Out, Baltimore
Sun, June 11, 1987, repinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 24, at 4; Raspberry, Sullivan, Principles
and Peer Pressure, Wash. Post, June 10, 1987, at A17.
355. See 22 U.S.C. § 5031(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
356. Id. § 5031(c).
357. Id.
358. Id.; see infra notes 385 and 467.
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section 5031(c) is far-reaching because it suggests that the Secretary
of State establish a procedure to determine precisely which businesses
fall under its auspices and which do not. Particularly, the procedure
should assure that the recognition of black businesses will not be
construed so as to further the balkanization of South Africa along
apartheid lines.
A second major reservation concerns the adoption of the Code of
Conduct known as the Sullivan Principles. The Act is disturbingly
vague about the procedure for determining when U.S. companies are
in compliance with this code of conduct. Section 5034(a) provides that
any national of the United States which employs more than twenty-five
persons should take necessary steps to insure the Code's implementation, while section 5035 sets out the substantive aspects of the Code.
Neither, however, provides any means for enforcing the Code. Section
5035 states that the President "may issue additional guidelines and
criteria" to assist in compliance with the principles in the Code of
Conduct. Thereunder, the President may issue advisory opinions as
to whether [a national] is subject to this section or would be considered
to be in compliance with the principles of the Code.
However, section 5035 is weak and couched in permissive language
indicating what the President may do: "issue additional guidelines and
criteria to assist . . . and upon request give an advisory opinion." 9
The President may only give an opinion about compliance that is
"advisory" and then only "upon request." This section fails to indicate
precisely who may do the requesting, although it seems to imply that
businesses subject to the Code may invoke the President's advice. If
so, advisory opinions will not be issued since businesses not in compliance are unlikely to request review.
Section 5035(d) provides that the President may require U.S. nationals subject to section 5034 to register with the U.S. government.
Registration constitutes a weak degree of permissive control, further
diluted by the prescription that the President may - but is not mandated to - invoke the powers of registration. Section 5035 does empower the President to enter into contracts "with one or more private
organizations or individuals to assist" in its implementation.36 But this
language is also permissive and the notion that private organizations
may assist in the implementation of the Act is bereft of any tighter
policing or enforcement mechanism.
Section 5036 prohibits assistance to "any group which maintains
within its ranks any individual who has been found to engage in gross

359.
360.

See 22 U.S.C. § 5035(c) (West Supp. 1987).
Id. § 5035(e).
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violations of internationally recognized human rights."36 A determination is required of what exactly is meant by the words, "maintains
within its ranks. '' 362 Some patterns of affiliation are fairly easy to
determine. But in South Africa, where a great deal of political organization is clandestine and extremely fluid, many individuals enjoy various group lives while functioning quite autonomously from group discipline. It may be that no question exists about the identity of a person
who has committed gross human rights violations, but the notion of
"group responsibility" on the basis of such a vague legislative test is
patently unworkable. On the other hand, the prohibition could be
applied quiet easily to groups that find disfavor with any U. S. administration. To put the matter bluntly, where it is politically expedient
to paint specific groups with the brush of human rights violations, the
language of section 5036 provides any administration with a flexible
political brush to paint those groups in sweeping ideological colors not
bordered by explicit standards.
Section 5038 contains language similar to that found in section 5036
but applies it to the problem of necklacing. A group is tainted even
if it "indirectly engages in, advocates, supports or approves" necklacing
executions. It is important to determine how far back the chain of
causation reaches in order for an affiliated individual to stigmatize an
organization as one that indirectly engages in necklacing. Would mere
organizational advocacy of the end of white supremacy, which may
lead indirectly to violence and necklacing, bring that organization
within the reach of section 5038? More poignantly, could advocacy per
se for the end of apartheid, which is silent about the methods to
achieve that end, amount to an approval of necklacing? As with section
5036, it may be that the real purpose of section 5038 is to promote
an ideological test to curtail groups which oppose the perceived foreign
policy interests of the United States.
B.

Subchapter III: Negative Sanctions: Economic Coercion

Subchapter III enacts a program of immediate economic sanctions
against South Africa- and thus has received the widest publicity.
Congressional policy includes a measure covered by President
3
Reagan's Executive Orders of September 9- and October 1, 1985, 6
361.
362.
363.
364.
stronger
ures.
365.

Id. § 5036.
Id.
Id. §§ 5051-5073.
See background set forth in supra note 19. President Reagan's strategy was to preclude
congressional sanctions by the executive issuance of extremely limited sanctions measId.
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but expands the scope of economic sanctions well beyond that envisioned by President Reagan. These sanctions now include prohibitions on: the importation of Krugerrands;366 the importation of ammunition, military vehicles, etc. ;367 imports of products of South African
parastatals (with some exceptions); 368 the export of computers, computer software, goods and technology to all apartheid-enforcing agencies including the military and the police;369 loans to the South African
government or governmental entities (excluding loans for educational,
housing and humanitarian purposes);3 70 air transportation between the
United States and South Africa (excluding emergency landings); 37' the
export of nuclear materials, component parts, technical data, etc.
(excluding health- and safety-related items) - however, this ban may
be lifted if South Africa subscribes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or
maintains International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities; 372 U.S. banks from holding deposits of the Pretoria
authorities or its parastatals (excluding deposits for diplomatic and
consular matters);373 the importation of uranium ore, uranium oxide,
and textiles; 374 (termination of) the United States-South Africa Double
Taxation Treaty;375 the export to South Africa of items on the U.S.
munitions list (exluding exports for commercial purposes as determined
by the President);376 the importation of iron and steel; 377 the importation
of oil and petroleum; 371 and, prohibitions against U.S. agencies from
cooperating directly or indirectly with the South African armed forces
(excluding cooperation, directly and indirectly, for the purpose of col79
lecting intelligence)2
Section 5061 provides for the termination of the Act's sanctions
(or, conversely, for the option of further sanctions under subchapter
V, if necessary). The preconditions for termination of sanctions include:

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

22 U.S.C. § 5051 (West Supp. 1987).
§ 5052.
§ 5053.
§ 5054.
§ 5055.
§ 5056.
§ 5057.
§ 5058.
§ 5059.
§ 5063.
§ 5068.
§ 5070.
§ 5071.
§ 5072.
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(1) the release of political prisoners, including Nelson
Mandela;1 0
(2) the release of all political detainees and the lifting of
the state of emergency;
(3) the unbanning of democratic political parties and the
free exercise of political rights by all South Africans;
(4) the repeal of the Group Areas Act and the Population
Registration Act; and
(5) the South African government's public commitment
to good faith negotiations with truly representative members
of the black marjority without preconditions.
The Act's sanctions include a list of economically relevant categories
sharply tailored to the structure and process of bilateral economic
relations between South Africa and the United States. This list is not
without controversial elements. For example, nuclear trade with Pretoria is viewed as a volatile and provocative component of bilateral
trade.- ' The relative ease with which nuclear technologies for peaceful
purposes can be transformed into military weaponry takes the nuclear
problem out of the orbit of purely bilateral United States-South African

380. It is not clear why the South African government released ANC leader Govan A.
Mbeki in 1987. Mbeki was convicted during the Rivonia trials and had been kept at the infamous
Robben Island prison. While release of Mbeki is consistent with the Act's demand that political
prisoners be freed, Nelson Mandela and many others, of course, still remain in prison. See
Battersby, PretoriaFrees a Black Leader Jailed 23 Years, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1987, reprinted
in AFPC, XXII, No. 44, at 1.
381. For a recent affirmation that nonproliferation remains a basic goal of U.S. foreign
policy, see Richard T. Kennedy, Nonproliferation as a Fundamental Policy Goal Current
Policy, No. 1020, (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, (1988)). Kennedy notes
that "South Africa has recently announced its willingness to discuss" joining the nonproliferation
treaty. Ned Temko maintains that South Africa's uranium enrichment technology "ensures" that
South Africa has a nuclear weapons capability. Temko, S. Africa Hopes Nuclear Energy Program

Will Short-Circuit Sanctions, Christian Sci. Mon., Oct. 21, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII,
No. 42, at 2. South Africa's willingness to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is viewed
by a leading commentator as a sign of "maturity." Rothberg, The Bomb and South Africa,
Christian Sci. Mon., Oct. 8, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 40, at 6. Rothberg sees this
as an indicator that South Africa does not have the bomb.
However, there is considerable circumstantial evidence that South Africa is indeed a nuclear
power. See Anderson, South Africa's Secret Uranium Process, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1980,

reprinted in AFPC, XV, No. 37, at 6; Anderson, The Mystery Flash: Bomb or Phenomemon,
id., Sept. 15, 1980, reprintedin AFPC, XV, No. 37, at 6. See also Murphy, Embargo S. Africa
A-Plans, id., Sept. 12, 1980, at A 24, col. 3. South Africa's "hint" that it is willing to sign the
non-proliferation pact is viewed as an important signal that it has a nuclear weapons capability.
See Temko, South Africa Signal on Nuclear Pact Suggests It Has Bomb, Christian Sci. Mon.,

Sept. 29, 1987, at 9, col. 1.
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concerns. A nuclear weapons capability in Pretoria poses a major
threat to regional and hemispheric stability. The use, or threatened
use, of nuclear capabilities in an arena of increasing conflict presents
a very real possibility of heightened conflict between the world's major
2
nuclear powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union.3
From a policy-making standpoint, the issue is quite difficult. Since
Pretoria has an advanced base for the development of nuclear
technologies (and might even have the bomb), a ban on nuclear trade
which imposes a high measure of self-sufficiency on the Pretoria authorities might constitute neither a hawk nor dove approach but, instead, an ostrich-like approach to an impending crisis. Section 5057
practically terminates all nuclear trade with Pretoria but leaves the
door open for a policy review if and when the Pretoria authorities
becomes a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or "otherwise maintains International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities."This language suggests that Pretoria's nuclear capability makes it
government an important player in regional, hemispheric and global
politics. It is in the best interest of the superpowers, and the common
interest of the entire global community, that all governments, irrespective of their ideologies, subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
maintain critical safeguards over the peaceful uses of nuclear
technologies. Thus, this provision makes a blanket economic embargo
appears like cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. It is a further
indication that the business of economic sanctions against any member
of the UN must involve a carefully tailored response designed to
promote the common interest in matters of international peace, security and social reconstruction.
Section 5060(a) prohibits new investment by U.S. nationals in the
economy of South Africa- and is probably the most devastating provision in the Act from the standpoint of actually sanctioning the apartheid government. Since a capitalist system promotes the expansion
of markets, access to raw materials and investment opportunities, the
section 5060(a) prohibition on new investment strikes at the heart of

382. Id.
383. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signatures, July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
384. This section may have had an effect on the "voluntary" departure of U.S. corporations
from South Africa in the aftermath of the Act. See Cowell, The Ambiguity of South African
Divestment, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1986, at Y1, col. 1. We may also note in this context that
one of the effects of sanctions is loss of business confidence. See Loss of Business Confidence
is a Sanction on South Africa, ECONOMIST, June 21, 1986, 67 (U.K. ed. at 69).
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the entrepreneurial dynamic. The fallout of section 5060 has been the
withdrawal of several highly-capitalized U.S. corporations from South
Africa, which, in turn, has precipitated a great lack of confidence in
the attractiveness of the South African investment market.
Subchapter IV: Economic Coercion: International Cooperation

C.

Subchapter IV of the Act defines U.S. policy as seeking "international cooperative agreements with the other industrialized democracies to bring about a complete dismantling of apartheid. '' 5 Section
5081(a) acknowledges that unilateral imposition of economic sanctions
by the United States against Pretoria may simply create conditions
of economic opportunism for other industrial democracies.-6 Should
those democracies bow to temptation and exploit short-term gains,
the economic impact within Pretoria could drastically undermine
United States' efforts to extinguish apartheid. Moreover, such action
could undermine the leadership initiative taken by the United States
in enacting policies designed to bring South Africa in line with contemporary standards of international law and morality. The United States
cannot be an effective leader without equally committed allies and
followers.
Section 5081 establishes a framework and timetable within which
the President, or, at his direction, the Secretary of State, is to reach
cooperative sanctions agreements with other nations.3 7 Additionally,
section 5081(e) specifically directs the President to instruct the permanent U.S. representative to the UN to propose that the Security
Council, acting under article 41 of the UN Charter, impose sanctions
against South Africa "of the same type as are imposed by this chapter."-w Section 5082 authorizes the President to impose sanctions on
any foreign country should that country seek to benefit or take "commercial advantage" of the U.S. sanctions program.3 9

385. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 5081-5083 (West Supp. 1987). See also Japan Warns South Africa
It May Adopt New Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1986, at Y4, col. 3. Japan (whose nationals

are treated as "honorary whites" in South Africa) is now also about to join the sanctions
bandwagon. Id. It should be noted, however, that Japanese trade with South Africa exceeds
that of the United States since the passage of the Act. Israel has also enacted limited sanctions
in an effort to reduce ties with South Africa. These actions are designed to "avoid endangering
relations with the U.S. Congress." See Reuters, Israeli Discount Pretoria,Wash. Times, Sept.
18, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 37, at 4.
386. See 22 U.S.C. § 5081(a) (West Supp. 1987).
387.

Id. § 5081(b).

388.

Id. § 5081(e).

389.

Id. § 5082.
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Section 5083 authorizes an additional sanction against business interests at home and abroad which seek to take advantage of any U.S.
national which is required under the Act to limit or terminate business
activities in South Africa. 3 - A private right of action may be brought
"in the United States district court for the District of Columbia or
the Court of International Trade." 391 Damages may be recovered by
a private party for lost profits as well as costs "including a reasonable
attorney's fee. "392 A party claiming damages must show not only that
the defendant had an opportunistic animus in obtaining a commercial
9
but also that the damage sustained was the "direct result
advantage,'3
of defendant's action taken with the deliberate intent to injure the
party. ' ' s - The injured party must establish liability by a "preponder' 39
ance of the evidence. 7 5
The supplemental sanctions of sections 5082 and 5083 are designed
to punish efforts on the part of foreign economic interest which would
seek to benfit from U.S. sanctions. These provisions are aimed at
many of the United States' most aggressive trading partners, including
West Germany and Japan. Indeed, the trade imbalance that the United
States already experiences with both these countries may improve
considerably should West Germany and Japan seek to fill the economic
vacuum left by the United States in South Africa.3 -

390. Id. § 5083.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. In February 1987, the United States and Great Britain vetoed a Security Council
Resolution on economic sanctions against Pretoria. West Germany cast the only other negative
vote while Japan and France abstained. The Reagan Administration thus maintained the historic
position of the United States - protecting South Africa from a mandatory and binding international sanctions program. This veto was a direct repudiation of the policies of the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Shannon, U.S. and Britian Veto Propiosalfor U.N. Economic
Sanctions on S. Africa, L.A. Times, Feb. 21, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 8, at 3.
The Reagan Administrations's justification for the veto was premised on the policy of constructive
engagement and its underlying contention that sanctions are impossible to enforce. This position
implies that the Reagan Administration does not believe in the full enforcement of the congressional sanctions program which it is obliged to implement.
For an update on the Reagan Administration's UN policy, see U.S. and BritainVeto a U.N.
Move to Impose Penalties on Pretoria, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1988, at Y2, col. 3. A U.N.
Security Council resolution "would have imposed an oil embargo and other sanctions against
South Africa for its imposition of restrictions on 17 anti-apartheid groups," but the United
States and Britain vetoed the resolution. Id.
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In summary, the President has authority to negotiate international
agreements to consolidate and make more effective the program of
economic sanctions against South Africa.197 The President is required
to report to Congress regarding the state of these negotiations. The
President also has the authority to modify the U.S. sanctions program
by ensuring that it conforms to the contents of international agreements which the President has seen fit to negotiate. 3 9 Finally, the
Act permits public and private sanctions against foreign countries or
foreign economic enterprises seeking to take commercial advantage of
the U.S. sanctions program.
D. Subchapter V: Policy Evaluation Framework
Subchapter V of the Act attempts to formulate procedures for
policy appraisal. '31It also extrapolates predictions regarding the efficacy of the various provisions with an eye toward alternative or supplemental sanctions that might be necessary to secure U.S. objectives.4- These provisions are encapsulated under the heading, "Future
Policy Towards South Africa." 4'
Subchapter V requires that reports be prepared to cover a variety
of issues deemed to be of specific importance to the Act and its policies,
e.g., health conditions in the homelands of South Africa; 02 strategic
minerals imported from South Africa;403 relations between other industrialized democracies and South Africa; 414 and, possible violations of
the international embargo on the export of military articles to South
Africa. 40
Section 5099 of the Act requires the President to prepare a report
on communist activities in South Africa.4 - Since none of the Act's
other provisions is explicit about the communist role in the negotiations
process, it may be that this report will be crucial to answering certain
questions posed earlier herein. 0 7 Section 5101 requires a report on
the ANC and other organizations covering possible violations of the

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See 22 U.S.C. §§ 5081-5083 (West Supp. 1987).
Id.
Id. §§ 5091-5101.
Id. § 5091.
Id. §§ 5091-5101.
Id. § 5093.
Id. § 5094.
Id. § 5096.
Id. § 5098.
Id. § 5099.
Id.
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Foreign Agents Registrations Act of 1938. It is unclear whether any
reported violation may affect the projected role of the ANC as a
participant in negotiations or whether such a report may be a congressional device for ultimately excluding the ANC from the negotiations
process altogether.
E.

Subchapter VI: Coercive Implementation

Section 5113 of the Act covers matters of enforcement and penalties. 0 8 Section 5113(a) empowers the President with general authority
to monitor compliance with the Act and to establish mechanisms to
ensure that the purposes of the Act are expedited. 40 9 Section 5113(b)
provides for both civil and criminal penalties including fines and the
0
possibility of imprisonment.'1

XIV.
A.

THE IMPACT OF THE ACT

The Implementation of Economic Sanctions Against
South Africa Under the Act

Pursuant to the passage of the Act, President Reagan issued executive order #2571. This order delegated to the appropriate branch
agencies of the executive the task of implementing the Act. In a
report'I recently published and critical of the executive implementation of the Act, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the
Law, (Southern Africa Project), carefully analyzed the characteristics
of the Act relating to economic sanctions as compared to sanctions
imposed against other U.S. antagonists (North Korea, Cambodia, Vietnam, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, and Libya). Second, the report also
carefully analyzes the practice of the executive branch under the implementing order of President Reagan. Third, the report gives an
appraisal of the economic sanctions provisions of the Act as implemented. The authors of the report note that while sanctions
targeted at the North Koreans, the Cubans, the Nicaraguans are
"uniformly comprehensive," sanctions under the Act "are significantly
more limited in their scope and application.'42 The principal weaknes-

408. Id. § 5113.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Implementation of The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, A Report by The
Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 56 (1986),
[hereinafter Report].
412. Id.
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ses in the Act are: (1) the Act does not impose a comprehensive trade
embargo; (2) the Act does not require corporate withdrawal from
South Africa; (3) the Act does not require the termination of all financial transactions between South Africa and the United States; (4) the
Act's import restrictions leave untouched key points of leverage in
the South African economy. While the Act prohibits the importation
of Krugerrands, it does permit other forms of gold to be imported.414
Gold is South Africa's key export commodity. 415 In addition, the authors
of the report show that "congressional intent has in many respects
been eroded through exceptions and loopholes in the regulations promulgated by executive branch agencies responsible for implementing

the

law.'416

To illustrate, the report focuses on, for example, the restriction
language of section 5053(a) which prohibits importation into the United
States of any "article which is grown, produced, manufactured by,
marketed, or otherwise exported by a parastatal organization of South
Africa . . . . ,,417
The report goes on to show that the distinction is
basically unworkable and that efforts to give it implementation result
in significant circumventions of congressional intent which undermine
41
the integrity of the Act. 1
The report also critically reviews the exemption from the Act of
strategic minerals. Pursuant to the implementing order, the Secretary
of State published on January 7, 1987 the following list of minerals
which he certified were "essential for the economy or defense of the
United States and unavailable from reliable and secure suppliers.'419
The list of minerals includes: andalusite, antimony, asbestos,
chromium, cobalt, diamonds, manganese, platinum, titanium, and vanadium.4- ° The report is critical of the overinclusiveness of the list of
minerals exempted and does not accept the proposition that a complete
ban would undermine long-term essential military and industrial

uses. 421
A third and significant controversy concerns the ban on uranium
imports under section 5059(a) of the Act. Key sponsors of the Act

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
For full discussion, see Report, supra note 411, at 13-23.
52 Fed. Reg. 4454 (1987).
See Report, supra note 411, at 22-23.
Id. at 37.
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have maintained that the ban on uranium was meant to be inclusive.
The Treasury Department however promulgated rules which permitted firstly the "transshipment of South African uranium through the
United States for processing or refinement, enroute to third countries
. ...- 2 It also permitted the importation of South African uranium
hexaflouride (UF 6). This rule was justified on the basis that UF 6 was
substantially transformed and therefore different to the banned product. 423 With regard to the transshipment rule the Treasury Department
42
has retreated from its earlier position and permitted the rule to lapse. 4
Regarding the exemption for UF 6 and the doctrine of substantial transformation, the matter came before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), the agency that controls uranium trade in the United States.
The NRC upheld the Treasury Department ruling that UF 6 is not
barred by the Act.425 The issuance of NRC licenses is presently under
review before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
426
Columbia.
The report also examines import restrictions on iron and steel,
agricultural commodities, sugar, coal, and textiles and determines that
in each of these areas implementation could be more inclusive and
more effective.427
The Lawyers Committee Report is also critical of the enforcement
process governing South African imports. The Report indicates that
the classification system in effect permits South African products to
enter the United States via third countries where these products are
"substantially" transformed. The authors recommend that implementation should be modelled on the Cuban sanctions policy: any product
derived in whole or part from a South African product should be
2
banned.4
Additionally, the report notes that increased resources will be
needed to fully enforce the prohibition of South African imports under
the Act 429 since the priorities established by the U.S. Customs Service
(narcotics, high technology to the Soviet bloc, pornography, etc.) do
not give priority to an effective enforcement of the Act.

422.

Id. at 39.

423.

Id.

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

52 Fed. Reg. 25576 (1987).
Advanced Nuclear Falls Corp. Docket No. CLI-87-9, at 5 (N.R.C. Sept. 21, 1987).
See Report, supra note 411, at 46.
Id. at 47-53.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53 n.152.
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On the export side of the sanctions ledger are computers and other
technology wares which cannot be sold to the South African government, the ban on the export of nuclear material and technology, items
on the U.S. munitions list, etc. These provisions in large measure
simply codify prior U.S. export sanctions, 430 and do not close
"loopholes" at the implementation stage. 4 1 Indeed, the report concludes in context of computer exports that the "Act appears to have
done relatively little to foreclose the availability of U.S. computers
' 432
and computer technology to South Africa."
It is similarly contended that the ban on nuclear trade and military
exports as well as the ban on military exports remains basically as
they were prior to the passage of the Act. It may be plausibly urged
that the "commercial use" exception in the munitions context and the
petrochemicals exception in the crude oil-petroleum context again
serve to limit the efficacy of both the Act and prior practice under
comparable regulations. A general criticism of the export provisions
is that they are narrow rather than comprehensive and their implementation permits practices ostensibly inconsistent with the overall intent
4
of the Act. 3
It is the provisions that prescribe what new investment does not
include that raise a serious question about the "seriousness" of
economic sanctions in this context. 4 - For example, U.S. corporations

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

Id. at 59-60.
Id.
Id. at 61 n.186.
Id. at 66-70.
11 U.S.C. § 5001(4)(B) (West Supp. 1987), provides:
(i) the reinvestment of profits generated by a controlled South African entity
into that same controlled South African entity or the investment of such profits
in a South African entity; (ii) contributions of money or other assets where such
contributions are necessary to enable a controlled South African entity to operate
in an economically sound manner without expanding its operations; or (iii) the
ownership or control of a share or interest in a South African entity or a controlled
South African entity or a debt or equity security issued by the Government of
South Africa or a South African entity before October 2, 1986, or the transfer or
acquisition of such a share, interest, or debt or equity security, if any such transfer
or acquisition does not result in a payment, contribution of funds or assets, or
credit to a South African entity, a controlled South African entity, or the Government of South Africa.
Id. 22 U.S.C. § 5001(2) provides:
[T]he term "controlled South African entity" means a corporation, partnership, or
other business association or entity organized in South Africa and owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a national of the United States, or a branch, office,
agency, or sole proprietorship in South Africa of a national of the United States.
Id. 22 U.S.C. § 5001(7) provides:
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may reinvest profits; they may make investments to "maintain their
operations." Clearly U.S. corporations are not required to disinvest
or divest from their South African business ventures. The actions of
General Motors (G.M.), International Business Machines (IBM), and
Ford are good illustrations of the new investment prohibitions.
B.

Financial Transaction Implementation

As indicated previously the Act prohibits three kinds of financial
transactions: loans and credit by U.S. nationals to the South African
government and any entity controlled or owned by it; acceptance,
receipt or the holding of deposits by a U.S. depository institution;
new investments in South Africa by U.S. nationals. 435 By executive
order President Reagan 436 delegated the enforcement of these provisions to the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, (OFAC). The Treasury Department regulations do not go
further than the language of the Act. Again the efficacy of the Act's
sanctions program rests more in the matter of implementation processes than in the actual prescriptive content of the statute. For example,
OFAC uses two standard regulatory tools for enforcing its mandate.
These tools are licenses and reporting. Two kinds of licenses are operative: the general license which permits transactions to occur without
special authorization (by special permit). Under this process control
and regulation is a function of "reporting." This process implies an
operational notion of self-policing. Other "exceptions" are enforced by
37
the Treasury Department through the issuances of special licenses.4
The operation of the special license process is through a form of nonpublished private rulings after representations by interested parties.
The reporting requirement means that a licensee may be required to
file reports. The self-policing character of this process and the semi-private character of license requests and approvals make it difficult to
publicly appraise the effect of the Act on financial dealings with South
Africa. Moreover, the potential for abuse is an omnipresent reality as
the cases involving the interpretation of "new investments" by U.S.
interests in South Africa imply.

[T]he term 'South African entity' means a corporation, partnership, or other business association or entity organized in South Africa; or a branch, office, agency,
or sole proprietorship in South Africa of a person that resides or is organized
outside South Africa.
435. See Report, supra note 411, at 71.
436. Exec. Order No. 12,571, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,505 and 51 Fed. Reg. 41,906 (1986).
437. See Report, supra note 411, at 71-2.
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Section 5060 of the Act says that "no national of the United States
may, directly or through another person, make any new investment
in South Africa." The concept of "new investment" is defined as a
commitment, or contribution of funds or other assets, and a loan or
other extension of credit. 43 8 U.S. corporations may reinvest profits;
they may make investments to "maintain their operations." Clearly
U.S. corporations are not prima facie required to disinvest or divest
from their South African business ventures. The actions of G.M., IBM
and Ford as earlier indicated are good illustrations of the new investment prohibitions in operation.
In October 1986 G.M. and IBM indicated that they were withdrawing from South Africa. The plan they formulated for withdrawal was
in effect a seller-financed scheme. Under the plan, the seller "lends"
the South African purchaser the funds to finance the purchase of the
interest. The "loan" plus interest is to be repaid over a period of years
out of the operations working captial and profits. The IBM plan envisioned repayment in a five year period, but also gave an exclusive
franchise to the South African entity to import and market IBM goods
and services. More pertinently, the deal guaranteed access to new
IBM technology. 439 G.M. sold its South African plant to a group of its
local managers. G.M. "financed" some forty-five million dollars to cover
the debts of its South African subsidiary and agreed to postpone
payment of the purchase price which was to be made out of the expected profit.O Again, the consideration for the transaction gives G.M.
license fees for its trademarks, income from "sale of automobile kits
and components and its exclusive franchise arrangement with the new
South African company."44
The critical question of whether these kinds of seller withdrawalfinancing deals are a violation of section 5060 has not yet been
answered. The regulations to implement section 5060 are silent on the
lawfulness of these transactions. And, indeed in the best formulated
intentions of formulations, pose the paradoxical issue of whether such
deals are in effect "new investments" for the purpose of "disinvestment." The position of OFAC is that these deals will be reviewed on
a case by case basis.4 2

438. 22 U.S.C. § 5060 (West Supp. 1987); id. § 5001(4)(A).
439. See Report, supra note 411, at 89.
440. Id.
441. Id. Claiborne, IBM, GM Map Restructuring in S. Africa, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1986,
at Al, col. 6, A26, col. 1.
442. See Report, supra note 411, at 90.
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A further problem dealing with the U.S. corporate presence in
South Africa is illustrated in the case of the Ford "withdrawal." The
Act prohibits "new investment" in South Africa, but creates an exemption for contributions of either money or assets "necessary to enable
a controlled South African entity to operate in an economically sound
44 3
manner, without expanding its operations. "
Ford's corporate presence in South Africa was changed in 1985,
when its South African subsidiary merged with the Anglo American
corporation to form the South African Motor Corporation (Samcor).
Ford owned forty-two percent of the equity of Samcor. Samcor (and
in result Ford) experienced substantial losses in 1986. Ford for a
variety of reasons decided to "withdraw" from South Africa.
Again the organization of Ford's "withdrawal" leaves several questions about its lawfulness under the Act unanswered, and to the extent
that its withdrawal process might be viewed as licit under the Act,
raises more serious questions about the efficacy of the limited nature
of economic sanctions under the Act.
The Ford withdrawal required a ten million dollar contribution to
programs for humanitarian assistance to black South Africans (housing,
education, legal aid). Twenty-four percent of Ford's equity in Samcor
was put in "trust" for Samcor's employees. Eighteen percent (the
remainder) was to be transferred to Anglo-American for a consideration of one dollar. Ford products would continue to be sold in South
Africa, and Ford would supply Samcor with "components" permitting
'4
the "licensed use of the Ford trademark." 44
The real issue in the transaction was the cash contribution Ford
made to Samcor ($61,000,000). This contribution was deemed basic to
Samcor for Ford's withdrawal although it was made conditional on
the Treasury Department's acceptance of it. Without this contribution,
Anglo-American would have simply closed out Samcor's operations.
Ford explained and justified its "contribution" as follows:
(i) The equity contribution was to be employed to retire
Samcor debt of an equal amount prior to disinvestment by
Ford; (ii) the contribution amount was established through
analysis of Samcor's financing requirements to operate in an
economically sound manner, and would not enable Samcor
to expand its business; (iii) the R203.3 [R is for Rand, basic
unit of South African currency] million was Ford's proportionate share of Samcor's financing requirement, but it pre-

443.
444.

22 U.S.C. § 5001(4)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1987); see id. at 90.
See Report, supra note 411, at 91.
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ceded Anglo's contribution because the Ford contribution
had to be made before investment, while the Anglo contributions were to be made as required by Samcor; (iv) the contribution was necessary because Samcor, with its heavy debt
burden, could not sustain additional debt necessary to finance
a replacement vehicle for the Escort-size that accounted for
sixty-one percent of its volume, and that vehicle needed to
be replaced because the primary supplier, Mazda, was discontinuing component production; and (v) Anglo was to assume full financial responsibility for Samcor after the Ford
disinvestment would not allow Samcor to commit to tooling
and development contracts unless Samcor's viability had been
restored through the Ford equity contribution.4
The Ford organization of its "withdrawal" raises the question of
whether the "withdrawal" in fact and in law entails new investment
within the meaning of the Act, since the Act (which does not require
withdrawal) requires a restriction on the growth of investment in
South Africa. Legislative background also suggests the no "new investment" rule did not exclude investments "necessary to maintain operations." This could mean that when as in the Ford case a corporation
was losing money, it could infuse funds to maintain continuing operations. However, some uncertainty must repose in the critical data one
uses to define current level of operation. Whether the Ford case contribution is new investment must meet a still further hurdle. Is the
Samcor operation with Ford's "withdrawal" still a subsidiary of Ford
sufficient to bring Ford's contribution within the exemption envisioned
6
in the Act?"
The Treasury Department accepted Ford's brief and Ford implemented its plan fully. The decision is not evidenced as a public
7
record.4
It may be urged that the precedent set by this agency ruling
undermines the no "new investment" provisions of the Act in the sense
that the balance struck between investor security and the integrity
of the Act is weighted in favor of the former. Here the Lawyer Committee Report concludes that the Treasury Department's interpretation of Ford's claim provides a significant loophole in the Act. The
Report suggests that the exemption be confined to natural disasters
that may impact upon the current operating level of a U.S. subsidiary.

445.
446.
447.

Ford Motor Company Briefing on South Africa Disinvestment (Dec. 7, 1987).
See Report, supra note 411, at 93-4.
Id. at 97.
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The Report suggests insurance as a means of protecting the investor
in this context, and only where this is unavailable should recourse be
had to an exemption.
There are also several other aspects of the economic sanctions
envisioned in the Act that generate concerns about the efficacy of the
Act itself. These include secondary market transactions in South African securities, investments in firms owned by South African banks;
private licenses; and changes in U.S. tax laws relevant to South Africa."- However, we have outlined the main elements in this brief
overview of the economic aspects of our present sanctions policy
targeted at South Africa.
C.

President Reagan's Appraisal

In the midst of the controversy surrounding the unsuccessful nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court,
President Reagan submitted to Congress his mandatory Report on
the effects of the past year's sanctions. 449 With media attention fixed
on the Bork nomination, the President's release of the sanctions Report
received little critical scrutiny.
The Report asserted that the President has faithfully and fully
implemented the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Indeed,
the Report compliments the respective executive departments and
' '4 °
agencies in "carrying out this complex piece of legislation. -

448. Id. at 98-ff.
449. President'sReport on the Effects of Sanctions (1987) [hereinafter President's Report].
The General Accounting Office (GAO), the congressional investigative arm, has been highly
critical of the Administrations's "faithful" and "full" implementation of the Act. Strategic minerals
have been imported into the United States through third-party intermediaries (Japanese, West
Germans and others). The President has also not sought to buttress the Act by proposing that
the Security Council impose similar sanctions; no effort has been made to convene a conference
of industrial nations to coordinate strategy for the elimination of apartheid; and, reports required
under the Act from the executive department and its agencies have been tardy. The GAO report
illustrates how uranium ore and oxide, processed in Europe into the gaseous uranium nexaflouride, have reached the United States. The GAO report indicates that 28% of all uranium
enriched for re-export as fuel rods for foreign utility corporations are South African in origin.
Litigation on this matter has been initiated by the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law. See Robertson, GAO Faults Administration on South Africa Sanctions, Wash. Post, Oct.
24, 1987, A5, col. 5. President Reagan's Report maintained that the Act has no effect on the
South African government and that South Africa is "not any closer in late 1987 to respecting
free speech and free political participation by all its citizens than it was a year ago." See Ottaway,
Reagan Opposes New Sanctions Against S. Africa, Wash. Post Oct. 3, 1987, at A19, col. 3.
450. President's Report, supra note 449, at 2.
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The Report covered five broad inquires: (1) the status of apartheid
(October 1986 to October 1987); (2) the internal situation in South
Africa; (3) the white community perspectives; (4) the South African
economy; and (5) Presidential recommendations. The President found
that very little has happened by way of changes toward ending apartheid, that the state of emergency is still in force, and that cross-border
violence and human rights violations may have even "gotten worse."451
The Report underlined the fact that recent white elections showed
a distinct drift to the right, 45 2 and that the Botha regime has been
cool to the notion of a regional experiment in interracial political accommodation reflected in the KwaZulu Natal Indaba.4' The Report also
pointed out the the South African government has sponsored cross-border raids as well as covert operations designed to destabilize the
frontline states. The Report said that sanctions have been followed

451. Id. On the effects of South African destabilization of Mozambique, see Honey, In
Mozambique, War and Terrorism Make Refugees of 1.5 Million, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 31, 1987,
reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 13, at 11. Cf. Jolafre, Angolan People Fee Fearsome Effects of
Protracted War, Christian Sci. Mon., Mar. 30, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 13, at 7.
452. President's Report, supra note 449, at 5. Attacks on U.S. business interests have
become fashionable. For example, the South African Institute for American Affairs maintains
that U.S. firms adhering to the Sullivan Principles are violating the apartheid system and are
following a pattern of direct confrontation with the South African government. See Claiborne,
U.S. Firms Accused of Violating Apartheid, Wash. Post, May 13, 1987, at A30. Indeed, it is
estimated that some eighty U.S. firms may be under threat of prosecution for violations of the
Group Areas Act. See Honey, South Africa Tightens Enforcement of SegregationLaw, Baltimore
Sun, May 13, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, May 15, 1987, No. 19. On the emergence of
anti-Americanism among South Africa's whites, see Lawrence, Anti-Americanism Among South
African Whites Grows, reprinted in AFPC, XXI, Nov. 28, 1986, No. 46, at 8.
453. The Indaba was concerned with the problems of multi racial political participation and
the relevance of a bill of rights. But see Burns, A Plan to Share Power Falters in South Africa,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1988 at Y4. The establishment of a multi-racial, 10-member joint executive
authority to administer KwaZulu and Natal province was also given guarded approval by President Botha. See Honey, Multi Racial Council Formed in KwaZulu - Natal gets Botha's
Guarded Blessing, Baltimore Sun, Nov. 4, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 20, at 3-4.
The Indaba plan is potentially one of the most far-reaching experiments in South Africa.
The proposed plan would merge the bantustan of KwaZulu and the "white" province of Natal.
A two chamber legislature is envisioned with blacks voting on a one person, one-vote basis for
one chamber, and whites, coloureds and Indians voting for the other chamber. A decision of
each Chamber would be subject to veto by the other Chamber. A strong bill of rights is proposed
which some South Africans believe may be a model for a future constitution. See Claiborne,
South African Province Dares to Hope for One-Man, One-Vote, Wash. Post, May 18, 1987, at
A21.
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by an increase of "such ill-considered actions. ' ' 4- The President concluded in this regard that "Pretoria appears less inclined to consider
'' 4
external views than was previously the case."
The Report noted the "ferment" among the Afrikaners symbolized
by the "revolt" of the University of Stellenbosch academics, the Dakar
meeting between leading Afrikaners and ANC leaders in exile, and,
very importantly, the initiative of the Afrikaner intellectual, Friedrick
van Zyl Slabbert, in establishing the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA).456 While these developments were
in evidence before the passage of the Act, these processes may be
pushed further by the Act as nongovernmental actors increase their
agitational and promotional activities for the realization of democratic
alternatives.
The Report's appraisal of the economic effects of sanctions indicated
that South Africa's prime exports (gold 457 and mineral products) have
ready international markets and are not affected by sanctions. The
Report also indicated that since the imposition of sanctions, South
Africa has developed new export markets (especially in Africa) and
has experienced a net trade surplus since last year. But even President
Reagan conceded that not all the effects of sanctions have been without
bite.
The Reagan Report concluded that sanctions have hurt three sectors of the South African economy: coal; iron and steel; and, sugar.
However, the Report cautioned that these components of the South
African economy must be viewed against the background of an economy in recession since 1981. Sanctions joined with an existing recession
to precipitate a decline in new investments. The Report conceded that
these factors together have been "major elements in the country's
poor economic performance."'4 A genuine economic crisis may develop

454. President's Report, supra note 449, at 3. After the 1987 election, the South African
government once again vigorously enforced laws that are the cornerstone of the apartheid
system, such as the Group Areas Act. See Honey, supra note 449, at 1. Parliamentary by-elections held in the rural Transvaal province districts of Standerton and Schweiger-Reneke during
March 1988 were won by the staunchly pro-apartheid Conservative Party.
455. President's Report, supra note 449, at 3.
456. Id. at 4.
457. It has become apparent that since South Africa's main export is gold, the South African
economy has, in the short term, been shielded from an immediate economic crisis. See Claiborne,
Gold Shields South Africa From Crisis, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII,
No. 44, at 4.
458. President'sReport, supra note 449, at 5. It should be noted that gross income in South
Africa has dropped 8.2% in the past five years. Without foreign capital the economy cannot
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from the meager gross domestic products growth rate and South Africa's population dynamics.
The Report seemed to imply that "our sanctions" may have contributed to a slow growth rate of between 2.5-3.5 percent, whereas South
Africa requires a 5-6 percent growth rate to create jobs for the anticipated 250,000 new workers expected to enter the labor force annually. 459 The amount of U.S. direct investment in South Africa has
dropped dramatically from about $2.4 billion in 1982 to $1.3 billion in
1986, and it is presently estimated at "probably less than $1 billion.'" °
The Report also noted that divesting by U.S. corporations has
resulted in the concentration of more of South Africa's wealth in white
hands, and that there has been a corresponding loss of programs to
enhance black economic and social well being.461 The Report concluded
that the "imposition of additional economic sanctions would not be
helpful in the achievement of the objectives which Congress, the American People and I share."
The Report did not mention that within the Reagan Administration
there were those who doubted the legality of parts of the Act. Additionally, there were business leaders who believe that portions of the
Act are unlawful. Although the Reagan Administration opposed the
Act, it has been unwilling to support legal strategies to overturn the
Act or selected portions of it. Press reports claimed that there was
a major debate within the Administration (more specifically, the Justice Department) between those who viewed foreign policy as the
prerogative of the federal government and those who strongly supported states' rights and believed that states should be free to enact
local divestment laws. These laws direct pension fund managers to
sell stock they have in firms doing business in South Africa and sometimes also prohibit the award of governmental contracts to corporations
doing business in South Africa. According to Senator Lugar, however:
"[floreign relations are national relations. We cannot have individual
' '4
states and cities establish their own foreign policies."
The Act also requires the President to recommend new economic
penalties if the South Africans have not carried out specific measures

grow more than 3% per year. This growth cannot match the demographic reality of 250,000
new job-seekers entering the market every year. See Stern, Japan Is Right On South Africa,
Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1988, at 20, col. 2.
459. President'sReport, supra note 449, at 5.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 7.
462. Williams, Justice Ignores Catch 22 on U.S. Firms in S. Africa, Wash. Times, Feb.
25, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 8, at 3.
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in the Act. These include the release of Mandela and other political
prisoners, establishing a timetable for eliminating apartheid and ending
aggression against frontline states. The Administration was studing
whether President Reagan could be required by Congress to impose
new sanctions. The Act provides no penalties for the President's failure
to recommend new sanctions. 4 6 New sanctions that could be invoked
include: banning additional imports of strategic minerals; banning the
import of diamonds; and, possibly the cessation of military aid to
nations that supply arms to South Africa.
D.

Assessment of President's Report

Since the Act realistically recognizes that unilateral sanctions without international cooperation would be purely symbolic exercise, the
Reagan Administration may be fairly accused of neither "fully" nor
"faithfully" working for its implementation. 4 6 The U.S. veto of the
economic sanctions proposed before the UN Security Council is inconsistent with section 5081(e) of the Act which states:
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should
instruct the Permanent Representative of the United States
to the United Nations to propose that the United Nations
Security Council, pursuant to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, impose measures against South Africa of the
4
same type as are imposed by this [Act] chapter. 1

463. See Lewis, PretoriaSanctions Didn't Work, Reagan Report to Congress Says, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 1, 1987, at Y8, col. 2.
464. Economic sanctions will be rendered less effective and less attractive as a coercive
strategem of change if sanctions imposed by one state are regarded as an economic opportunity
by another state. See Potts, Apartheid Opponents Focus on Foreign Firms, Wash. Post, June
21, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 25, at 2. See also President'sReport, supra note 449,
at 24.
465. The GAO gives details about South African exports of strategic materials that have
somehow evaded the restrictions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Robertson,
GAO Faults Administration on South African Sanctions, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1987, reprinted
in AFPC, XXII No. 14, at 6. It should also be noted that the Reagan Administration appeared
to be confused and tentative about the formulation and execution of policy regarding South
Africa in the aftermath of the Act. The Reagan Administration still encouraged firms to remain
in South Africa. However, it ignored their pleas for assistance in challenging "state and local
anti-apartheid laws that are forcing them from that troubled nation." See WilLams, supra note
462. Ambassador Perkins, in an apparent break with Reagan policy, indicated that he would
not discourage U.S. firms from leaving South Africa. See Envoy Backs U.S. Sanctions for S.
Africa, Wash. Post, June 21, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 25, at 4.
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This provision is buttressed by section 5081(a) which mandates the
President to "seek international cooperative agreements with the other
industrialized democracies to bring about the complete dismantling of
apartheid. ' ' 4- Finally, section 5082 empowers the President to limit
trade from countries benefiting from the disengagement of U.S. firms
67
from South Africa.4
The Reagan Administration, along with the Thatcher Administration, vetoed a Security Council effort to impose mandatory economic
sanctions against South Africa. 4 - The Security Council resolution included key measures found in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
of 1986.469 According to Ambassador Okun, sanctions would result in
the "progressive destruction of the South African economy," "heighten
repression," be all but impossible to enforce and be difficult to termi7
nate since no criteria exist to measure their propriety.40
Also, the international response to divestment by U.S. multinationals in South Africa has undermined the sanctions' purpose, which is
to bring about fundamental change in South Africa. Other countries
have taken advantage of the United States' withdrawal without regard
to political conscience. One of the central indicators of Japanese inter-

466. Robertson, GAO Faults Administration on South Africa Sanctions, Wash. Post, Oct.
24, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 44, at 6.
467. DeYoung, Allies Far Apart on Added Sanctiorns, id., Sept. 4, 1986, reprinted in
AFPC, XXI, No. 34, at 5. The problem of securing the economic cooperation of trading partners
has become a crucial diplomatic issue. Israel presents unique problems due to its complex ties
with South Africa and its receipt of more U.S. aid than any other country. Israel must reexamine
its South African ties if it is not to provoke a confrontation with the United States. On the
new Israeli package of sanctions, see Reuter, Israeli's Discount Pretoria, Wash. Times, Sept.
18, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 37, at 4. In 1986, South Africa exported $220 million
in goods to Israel and supplied it with 70% of its coal. According to one observer: "[wihen it
comes to Israel and South Africa, breaking up is hard to do." See Frankel, An IsraeliDilemma:
South African Ties. Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1987, at A31.
Japan presents another problem. In the aftermath of the Act, Japan became South Africa's
leading trading partner in 1987. Japan does have a limited, largely cosmetic sanctions policy
against South Africa. Indeed, the release of Japan's trade figures has generated unwelcome
attention from abroad and Japanese businessmen have suggested that, for example, Japanese
automakers "curb" their imports to South Africa. See Stern, Japan is Right oi South Africa,
Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1988, at 20, col. 3. Japan does not permit direct investment in South
Africa and restricts commercial loans to firms in South Africa. Recently, Japan banned computer
sales to the South African security police and has prohibited iron and steel imports from South
Africa. Nevertheless, from an international perspective, Japan's continuing economic presence
in South Africa undermines the broad purposes of the Act.
468. See Shannon, supra note 396.
469. Id.
470. Id.
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national trade irresponsibility is the rate at which the Japanese are
moving into the trade vacuum created by the withdrawal of U.S.
47
companies which have pulled out since the imposition of sanctions. '
According to news reports, "Japan has replaced the United States as
South Africa's leading trade partner."472 It remains to be seen whether
the Reagan Administration or its successor will have the integrity to
act against Japanese opportunism as is authorized by section 5082 of
the Act.
The Japanese have been reluctant to release their trade 4- figures
with South Africa, but as a U.S. Trade Representative was quoted:
"You can hardly ignore Japan. ''1 74 Japanese diplomats have, however,
conceded that Japan has replaced the United States as South Africa's
leading trade partner. Trade estimates indicate that Japanese trade
was about $3.1 billion for 1987, while U.S. trade was about $2.5 billion.475 In 1985 Japanese imports of South African coal were worth
$1.57 billion and Japanese automobile sales in South Africa were up
a whopping sixty-two percent over 1984. Anti-apartheid groups within
South Africa are seriously considering a boycott of Japanese products.
Moreover, the Rev. Leon Sullivan, father of the Sullivan Principles,
has "specifically listed Japan as a possible target of an American con'4 76
sumer boycott.
South Africa's other major trade partner, Israel, has expressed
concerns that its cooperative posture vis-A-vis the South African government not generate a hostile reaction in the U.S. Congress. Israel
too has embarked, for reasons of self interest, on a program of mild
sanctions.
When the President's Report is viewed in the larger picture of
superpower politics, and diverse ideological perspectives are accounted
for, the Act's fundamental problems become more focused. Although
there is a long history of mainly noneconomic international sanctions
against South Africa, the growing escalation of violence and repression
has generated more accentuated international concern. However, the
perspective of the South African government must also be clearly
understood.

471. Id.
472. Id.
473. See also supra note 467; Auerbach, JapanOutstrips United States as S. African Trade
Partner,Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 42, at 4.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
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A central strategy of the South African government has been promotion of the so-called "total onslaught" concept.4 77 Underlying this
concept is South Africa's perception that it is standing "alone" against
Moscow, and that the ANC is a mere bit player - a front for Soviet
expansionism. From this perspective, the prize to the Soviets is calculated in East-West geo-political and geo-economic terms. Apartheid
is a problem fostered by Soviet propaganda and liberal dupes in the
and geo-economic considerations
West which masks crucial geo political
478
in the disposition of global power.
Consequently, South Africa has concluded that Western strategic,
political and economic interests will trump the moral disquiet about
South Africa's "reformed" race policies (neo apartheid) and that the
West will bail out South Africa's white tribes rather than see them
crucified on the cross of international communism. United States
foreign policy, reflected in such conceptions as the notorious "Tar
Baby Option" set forth in National Security Study Memorandum 39
and the Reagan policy of constructive engagement,4 79 has served to
fuel the belief in South Africa that the United States, and indeed the
West, will tolerate neo-apartheid, whatever the verbal protestations
proferred, because the real issue is much larger than African
nationalism or apartheid - the real issue is, of course, to borrow a
phrase from Kipling: "the great game." 0
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 has generated considerable confusion about the appropriate posture of the United States
and the West,411 since it suggests, with some ambivalence, that wor-

477. See Nagan, supra note 6.
478. For a current analysis of Soviet-U.S. relations in light of the Gorbachev era, see
Armacost, U.S.-Soviet Relations: Coping with Conficts in the Third World, Current Policy No.
879, (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State 1988).
479. See A. LAKE, THE TAR BABY OPTION: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN
RHODESIA (1976); see also NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 39: THE KISSINGER
STUDY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (E1-Khawas and Cohen eds. 1976).
480.

R. KIPLING, KIM 186 (1918).

481. One of major events immediately preceding passage of the Act was the visit to South
Africa by the Eminent Persons Group (the Group), a seven-member delegation representing
the Commonwealth. The Group made several special proposals for a negotiated solution to South
Africa's problems. It met with Nelson Mandela in prison and emerged with the conclusion that
he must be a lead figure in any negotiations. The South African authorities undermined the
Group's efforts by conducting military interventions into frontline states while the Group was
still in South Africa.
Malcolm Fraser, former conservative Prime Minister of Australia, emerged from South Africa
with an extremely pessimistic forecast stating that millions might be killed if a peaceful solution
was not found. Fraser was convinced that war is a very possible future scenario in southern
Africa. The final report of the Group stresses, indeed urges, that broad sanctions be applied
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shipping at the alter of anti-communism does not guarantee policy
flexibility and freedom of action and that in the crunch, white South
Africans may not rely on the West to shield them from the full measure
of international censure. As an institutional matter,48 2 the Act changes
the nature of the game - South Africa is still a player, but its hand
is weaker.
It may be pure coincidence, but in the aftermath of sanctions,
Afrikaners now see the Soviet Union as "easing" up on South Africa.
The future implication of this perspective is that South Africa may
have a hand to play with the Soviet Union if national interest requires
it and the West proves to be a shaky ally.483
South African policy-makers have come to the reluctant conclusion
that the assumption that the United States will do "anything" in the
cause of anti-communism is overstated and dangerous. They now seem
to acknowledge that the label "anti communism" obscures many complex interests. The national interests of the United States and the
interests of Afrikaner nationalism do not inherently coincide and U.S.
policies reflect what Americans perceive as their own national interests.5 1
E.

Appraisal of Implementation of Economic Sanctions

The commitment to limited rather than comprehensive economic
sanctions generates a plethora of technical problems for implementation. First, exemptions and loopholes require interpretation and/or
supplementation in application. Without explicit guidance in the legis-

against South Africa. It is very likely that U.S. congressional leaders were influenced by Malcolm
Fraser's appraisal of the South African situation as well as the final report of the Group. See
DeYoung, Commonwealth Group Ends S. African Effort, Wash. Post, June 8, 1986, at A24.
See also Conlon, ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTS WITH
RESPECT TO SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA, (UN Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents 86 23210, 1986). For a restatement of the Administration's South Africa policy in light
of the Act, see Schultz, The Democratic Future of South Africa, Current Policy No. 1003
(Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept of State 1987); Crocker, A DemocraticFuture: The Challenge for South Africans, Current Policy No. 1009 (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of
State 1987); Freeman, South Africa: What are America's Options, Current Policy No. 1033
(Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State 1987).
482. The immediate effects of sanctions have been primarily symbolic or psychological. See
Cutting Ties to a Troubled Land, TIME, June 29, 1987, reprintedin AFPC, XXII, No. 25, at 3.
483. It is instructive to compare East-West concerns with those of the UN For an outline
of the UN position on South Africa, see APARTHEID: THE FACTS, supra note 1; cf. E. SCHMIDT,
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE CASE OF SOUTHERN

(UN Centre Against Apartheid, Notes & Documents No. 87-03834, 1987).
See supra note 481.

RHODESIA,

484.
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lation or the background legislative history the implementing agencies
will do one of three things: first, they may do nothing or very little
to implement the Act. Second, they may seek guidance from other
contexts, which guidance may either frustrate or further the purpose
of the Act. In other words, implementation becomes a bureaucratic
crapshoot. Third, since the statute is a minimum ambiguous or incomplete, the process of supplementation becomes informed not by the
imperative major purposes envisioned by Congress, but by the
priorities of the executive branch, since any interpretation and application of the Act that limits its scope and efficacy is in effect more
congruent with the Reagan executive policy of constructive engagement than a full-blooded implementaiton of the Act in terms of its full
reach. The Act is a repudiation of the executive's policy of constructive
engagement with South Africa. The executive's implementation of the
Act's policy base confronts it with having to implement a policy not
only that it rejects, but which withstood an executive veto.
The relationship between the prescriptive process of the Act and
the executive applicative processes raises an interesting jurisprudential problem. It indicates that the fine print of implementation sows
the seeds for prescriptive change or more importantly, for the termination of prescription. Legislation like the one under discussion depends in substantial measure on some indices of efficacy for its integrity. If these indices are absent, the legislation becomes a futile gesture. To the extent therefore that implementation is crucial to the
efficacy of the Act, a policy of implementation that erodes the efficacy
of the Act - to make sanctions against South Africa "bite" - is in
effect a policy to either ameliorate the possible effects of the Act upon
the failed policy of constructive engagement, or to generate a climate
of opinion in opinion influencing circles that sanctions against South
Africa cannot work. In effect, implementation strategies suggest an
indirect but real strategy for termination of the economic sanctions
Congress originally prescribed against South Africa.
F.

Broader Perspectives on the Act

The Act has brought U.S. policy into much closer proximity to
positions taken by the UN.- Although the Act's references to the
UN are limited to the Security Council, these policy pronouncements
represent a significant closing of ranks between the United States and

485.

See supra note 483.
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the vast majority of UN members. 4 - The earliest UN resolutions,
designed to pressure the South African government to negotiate, have
now become, after many deaths, atrocities and other acts of war, a
major component of U.S. policy towards South Africa. Therefore, a
central divisive issue between the UN and the United States - the
South African issue - may be removed, thus opening the way to a
stronger U.S. presence in the UN and also in the Third World.
Since it is widely acknowledged that the Reagan Administration's
foreign policy was in shambles, particularly in the aftermath of the
sale of arms to Iran and diversion of funds to the contras, the U.S.
sanctions initiative, although belated, is an important force for stabilizing U.S. foreign relations in a manner that upholds solidarity with
the values and standards of conduct associated with the UN Charter.
The Act's great ambiguity lies in how the United States should
respond to movements of national liberation which have communist
influences. The Act mirrors the survival of the national phobia of
anti-communism, a prominent feature of the political climate in the
United States since post-World War II (as was symbolized by Senator
Joseph McCarthy's public "witch hunts"). A pervasive concern of the
Act is fear that the national liberation movements of South Africa are
controlled, or might be controlled, by elites with communistic ideological affiliations. Indeed, a leitmotif of the Act is the fear that liberation
in South Africa will ultimately be a victory for international communism. This point, however, is not meant to depreciate the important
differences in policy that the Act codifies in light of the prior policies
of the Reagan Administration.
The policy of contructive engagement, which the Act purports to
repudiate, is also informed by a pervasive and explicit anti-communist
theme, a hallmark of the Reagan Doctrine. That Doctrine's anti-communistic fervor has, in attempting to safeguard perceived U.S. in-

486. See supra note 481. Opinions in the United States indicating that sanctions are an
appropriate response to South African intransigence include the following: Abrahams &
Orentlicher, Sanctions as a Means to an End, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, at Y19, col. 2; Kennedy,
The Sanctions are Working, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1987, at A23; cf. Greenberger, U.S. Trade
Sanctions on South Africa Starting to Pay Long-Term Dividends, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1987
at 24.
An articultate opposing view is that of Simon Jenkins who is convinced that sanctions against
South Africa are a failure. Jenkins, Why Sanctions Are a Failure,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 21, 1987, reprinted in AFPC, XXII, No. 38, at 2. According to Jenkins, sanctions are
unsuccessful forms of "aggression" (i.e., coercion) for four reasons: 1) greed prevails in the
market; 2) sanctions are "notoriously" ineffective in securing 'local" political change; 3) sanctions
hurt the wrong people; and 4) sanctions generate unrealistic expectations and lead to disillusionment. See also Jenkins, Good Morals, Good Business, Reviewing SAMPSON, supra note 31, in
Times Literary Supplement, Apr. 3, 1987, at 343.
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terests, resulted in support for the "reformist" policies of the white
elites who now control the South African government. As indicated
earlier, the Reagan Doctrine was but a refined version of the Nixon
Doctrine and was committed to the cultural and political hegemony
practiced previously by the white regimes of Southern Africa due to
their perceived need to contain Soviet expansionism through its national liberation movement surrogates.
The Act does not represent a total repudiation of Cold War concerns. But neither does it endorse a blank check for racial hegemony.
The Act acknowledges the communist threat, but does not assume
that a communist presence in the ANC necessarily means a communist,
and therefore Soviet, control over the structure and operations of the
ANC.
The Act is ambiguous about the consequences of the communist
presence in the ANC. Will they be permitted to participate in the
agreement-negotiation process? Are agreements and negotiations subject to the precondition that the communist presence be reduced or
extinguished? If communists are a significant force in the national
liberation movement, then the Reagan Administration feared that the
liberation process would be controlled by Moscow. The resultant
scenario would be an escalating East-West conflict with Soviet and
U.S. puppets killing and dying for their masters in the cause of a
distant "ideological freedom" associated with U.S. capitalism or Soviet
communism. Alternatively, the blacks and whites of South Africa will
continue to escalate the pattern of violence and conflict because, as
"surrogates," they are committed not to ideological freedom, but to a
strong identification with the process of Soviet or U.S. hegemony.
These scenarios rest on terribly flawed assumptions about the nature of human behavior and, more pertinently, human political behavior. They assume that the black and white political elites of South
Africa are motivated by the highest ideals of ideological purity indeed that the ideologies of distant foreign powers are the key, if
not sole determinant, of political behavior. It is a great mistake to
equate the asserted justifications for political behavior with the real
conditions that define how decisionmakers act in concrete situations.
Ideology is not the only isolatable variable, nor is it necessarily the
key condition motivating the political behavior of the Afrikaner elite
or the liberation movements. More important conditions might include
culture, class, personality, and crisis as more critical and determinative variables is vital in understanding the causes and consequences
of political behaviors.- 7 It requires no great political or legal insight
to acknowledge that decisionmaking is complex and that justifications
487.

See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 1.
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- especially ideological justifications - are better seen as rationalizations for decision rather than explanations of political behavior.
The intellectual efforts to rethink the foundations of political science
and, in particular, to reexamine the assumption that political behaviors
are predominantly a matter of ideology, was perhaps nowhere more
elegantly expressed than in Professor Lasswell's seminal book Power
and Personality.488 According to Lasswell a focus on both the operations of actual political actors, as well as on their perspectives, lies
at the heart of a realistic science of political behavior. That work, and
others, led ineluctably to the isolation of a key variable in the study
of both politics and law: the human personality.489 Lasswell, in an
equally telling statement, described the political personality in terms
private motives displaced onto public objects and rationalized in the
public interest. Private motives may emanate from conscious or unconscious psychological processes. Commendable motives may lead to disastrous public policy. Contemptible motives may end up as a blessing
for the public order. The fact is that political behavior may be a
function of greed - the lust for power, the need to be loved - as
much as an orientation to reality and an altruistic identity with core
values of human dignity. In this view, ascribing a pro- or anti-communism label to the behavior of national liberation movement elites
represents extreme naivete. The men and women of these movements
are certainly no different than the best and worst politicians in
Washington, London, Bonn, New Delhi or Moscow. Their personality
dynamics include both conscious and unconscious processes.
For the liberation forces to sell a revolution or a vision of radical
change, or for states to sell a sacrificial defense of the status quo,
some justification is required. Ideology is the traditional tool for justifying political behavior and decision. It is hard to sell military service
on the Namibian border on the theory that Mr. Botha has an authoritarian need to be loved, and that one's service over there fulfills that
need! Similarly, it is hard for revolutionary commanders to sell the
idea that perhaps they too are power-personalities for whom the pragmatics of power consolidation and credibility are as important to them
as the idealistic promise of realizing revolutionary ideals through sacrificial guerrilla raids. The fundamental point is that to hide these
operative psychological realities under the crude ideological blankets
of anti-communism vs. anti-capitalism, or American imperialism versus

H. LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1984); see also H. LASWELL, WORLD
(1935); H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND
SOCIETY (1965).
489. Id.
488.

POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY
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Soviet expansionism, will make it exceedingly difficult for South Africans to address and negotiate the real issues that must be resolved
if a catastrophe is to be avoided. 490 Unfortunately, the Act does not
acknowledge the complex mosaic of this reality.
Additionally, two other principal weaknesses of the Act stand out.
First, enormous discretion 49 1 was given to the President to promote
and implement policies which represent a repudiation of the cornerstone of the Reagan policy of constructive engagement. Why then
would the Reagan Administration faithfully execute the Act's policies?
South Africa will reappraise its position with a new president.49
Another glaring weakness in the Act is that it legitimizes intelligence cooperation with the South African security apparatus. Therefore, as a matter of public policy, and in unprecedented fashion, intelligence collaboration with the Pretoria Authorities has been
legitimized. South Africa is keenly interested in the deployment of
ANC operatives as well as the strategic and tactical thinking of the
ANC leadership. Since the prime object of the South African security
system is to monitor and destroy the liberation movements, especially
the ANC, there is a serious question whether mutual trust can be
490. The UDF drafted a document on the future of South Africa under black rule which
basically promotes the principle of mass political participation as well as political accountability.
The document does not resemble traditional Marxist models used in the socialist world. See
Sparks, Blueprint Drawn for Black-Ruled S. Africa, Wash. Post, May 10, 1987, at A22. The
ANC position isreported in Claiborne, ANC Chief Says PretoriaMust Yield, id, Wash. Post,
Dec. 2, 1987, at A34. Cf. Temko, S. Africa's Black Nationalists Resist Pressures to Join
Political Talks, Christian Sci. Mon., Sept. 26, 1987, at 12; see also Sparks, Election in South
Africa: No Hope for Peaceful Change, Wash. Post, May 10, 1987, at R5; Battersby, Botha
Landslide Worries Foes, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1987, at Y2, col. 1; Editorial, South Africa Treks
Backward, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1987, at Y30, col. 1
491. The Act, as noted, sets out a "laundry list" of sanctions. For an excellent outline of
the problems inherent in a "laundry-list" approach to export restrictions to South Africa, see
Mehlman, Milch & Taumanoff, United States Restrictions on Exports to South Africa, 73 AM.
J. INT'L L. 581 (1979). The article concludes that many restrictions on supplying the South
African security forces were exempted by classifying articles as "non-combat military equipment"
or "dual-use civilian" equipment such as computer technology, civilian aircraft and "communications equipment." Id. at 591. Indeed, the article points out that "end use" restrictions and
"destination control statements" are largely meaningless. Id. at 593, 596.
The Reagan Administration would like to resolve the issue of uranium policy since one of
the major points of controversy in the Act is the problem of uranium imports. Some congressional
leaders believe that uranium imports for processing and immediate re-export were meant to be
exempted from the Act. See Walsh, 'Case of the Missing Colloquy' May Affect S. Africa
Sanctions, Wash. *Post, Feb. 17, 1987, at A15.
492. It would appear that both public opinion and the Democratic Party leaders are fully
committed to sanctions. See, e.g., Davis, South Africa: Sullivan Calls for a Pullout; Only
Sanctions can DismantleApartheid, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1987, at Y2, col. 3; Robertson, More
South African Sanctions Demanded, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1987, at A31.
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established between the liberation movements and the U.S. government in light of this intelligence collaboration. It cannot be forgotten
that Nelson Mandela was an early casualty of CIA collaboration and
betrayal to the South African security policy. 493
Since the key political forces in South Africa appear to be committed to the use of violent strategies to change or protect the status
quo, it would seem that coercive, but nonviolent strategies, such as
economic sanctions, are a strategem for change consistent with the
goals and mandate of the UN Charter.-9 But, the key question is
whether sanctions, however justified, can do the job. 495 That is, will
sanctions either persuade the ruling caste to negotiate meaningfully
about South Africa's future or generate a leadership change making
fundamental political change easier to accomplish? The impact of sanctions will not be drastically felt in the short term. (If other examples
are instructive there may even be a short-lived pattern of economic
vitality.) The long term effects of sanctions are harder to predict
because of the difficulty in determining how a substantial downswing
in the South African economy will directly serve to destabilize the
apartheid order.
However, when the sanctions program is viewed from a broader
contextual framework, it becomes apparent that sanctions are both a
condition and a consequence of political, social and economic forces
operating both inside and outside of South Africa. In combination,
those forces make the transformation of South Africa's social process
a likelihood. The most important contribution that economic sanctions
may make is the promotion of a lack of elite confidence in South
Africa's status quo which underscores the operative reality: that South
Africa's social, political and economic processes are interdependent
with those of the world community and, correspondingly, that international judgment and action results from failure to abide by the norms
of the UN Charter and principles of international human rights law.
In conclusion, we must emphasize that United Nations policy has
consistently held that economic sanctions are the least coercive

493. On the CIA role in the capture of Nelson Mandela, see Cockburn, A Loophole in U.S.
Sanctions Against Pretoria, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, at Y18, col. 1.
494. See RESOLUTIONS, supra note 1.
495. While it is difficult to estimate the cost of sanctions to South Africa, it has been
generally stated that the party subject to sanctions pays more for the goods it wants, and has
to sell its goods more cheaply. According to Roger Thurow, "[ilt may be difficult to imagine,
but in South Africa, where being white used to guarantee economic comfort, the breadline is
becoming integrated. 'For the first time in years some whites are ending up losers,' says Nico
Czypionka, the Chief economist at Standard Bank." Thurow, Poor Whites Join South Africa
Breadlines:Apartheid No Longer GuaranteesTheir Security, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1988, at 9.
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strategem to induce change in South Africa. However, the sanctions
program envisioned by the UN will not work in any measurable manner unless two conditions are present. First, sanctions must be made
mandatory. So long as states and nonstate actors can benefit from the
sanctions imposed by others by exploiting market and resource opportunities, sanctions will not be effective. Second, sanctions must aspire
to universality. Unless there is a collective expression of solidarity
about the appropriateness of economic sanctions, any sanctions
strategem will not be effective in otherwise limiting the damage which
will result from the inevitable political and social transformation of
South Africa.
VX.

POST SCRIPT

As to a conclusion to this article - appropriate to the difficult
challenges for international order that the South African problem presents, I am reminded of the lines of the poet W. B. Yeats from The
Second Coming:
THE SECOND COMING

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The Falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The Ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.
The darkness drops again; but now I know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
4
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 9

496.

THE LITERATURE OF ENGLAND

3d ed. 1979).

1147 (G. Anderson, M. Buckler & M. Veeder eds.,
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APPENDIX

Calendar No. 993
100TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H.R. 1580

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
SEPTEMBER 7, 1988
Received; and read the first time
SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
Read the second time and placed on the calendar

AN ACT
To prohibit investments in, and certain other activities with
respect to, South Africa, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; REFERENCES; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a)

SHORT TITLE. -

This Act may be cited as the "Anti-Apartheid Act Amendments of

REFERENCES. -

References in this Act to "the Act" are to the Comprehensive Anti-

1988."
(b)

Apartheid Act of 1986.
(c)

TABLE OF CONTENTS. -

TITLE I -

SANCTIONS AGAINST INVESTMENT IN, AND EXPORTS TO, SOUTH AFRICA AND

OTHER MEASURES (EXCEPT IMPORT RESTRICTIONS) TO END APARTHEID
Sec. 101.

Prohibitions on investment in, and exports to, South Africa.

Sec. 102.
Sec. 103.

Prohibition regarding involvement in the South African energy sector.
Prohibition on nuclear assistance to South Africa.

Sec. 104.

Prohibition on United States intelligence and military cooperation with South Africa.
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Sec. 105. Coordinator of South Africa sanctions; inter-agency coordinating committee on South
Africa.
Sec. 106. Independence of Namibia.
Sec. 107. Penalties.
Sec. 108. Assistance for disadvantaged South Africans.
Sec. 109. Sense of Congress regarding antitrust investigation of South African diamond cartel,
study of diamond origins, and enforcement of prohibition on importation of South African diamonds into the United States.
Sec. 110. Study of measures to reduce South Africa's foreign exchange earnings from gold.
Sec. 111. Sense of Congress regarding South African consulates and approval of visas.
Sec. 112. Report on South Africa's involvement in international terrorism.
Sec. 113. Technical and conforming amendments.
II

TITLE

-

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES

See. 201. Prohibitions on imports from South Africa.
Sec. 202. Multilateral measures, including import restrictions, to dismantle apartheid.
Sec. 203. Referral in the House of joint resolutions pertaining to import restrictions.
See. 204. Reports on United States imports from member states of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance.
Sec. 205. Program to reduce dependence upon importation of strategic minerals from South
Africa.
Sec. 206. Preventing circumvention of United States import restrictions.
TITLE III -

Sec. 301.
TITLE

I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Effective date.
-

SANCTIONS AGAINST

INVESTMENT IN,

AND

EXPORTS To,

SOUTH

AFRICA

AND OTHER MEASURES (EXCEPT IMPORT RESTRICTIONS) To END APARTHEID
SEC.

101.

PROHIBITIONS

ON

INVESTMENT

IN,

AND

EXPORTS

To,

SOUTH

AFRICA

(a) PROHIBITIONS ON INVESTMENT. - Effective 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, section 301 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (hereafter in this Act
referred to as the "Act") is amended to read as follows:
"PROHIBITION ON INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

"SEC. 301. (a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c), a United States person may not purchase,
acquire, own, or hold any investment in South Africa.
"(b) The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not apply to any investment in a business
enterprise owned and controlled by South Africans economically and politically disadvantaged
by apartheid where after the investment such business enterprise is not less than 90 percent
owned by, and is under the control of, South Africans economically and politically disadvantaged
by apartheid.
"(c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), any individual described in paragraph (2), may continue to own and hold investments in South Africa during any period and to the extent that
such investments are considered South African emigrant non resident assets and subject to
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restrictions on their transfer or disposition under the exchange control regulations of the Government of South Africa (promulgated pursuant to the Currency and Exchange Act of 1933 and
as in effect on June 2, 1988) which limit the ability of such an individual to comply with such
prohibitions under subsection (a).
"(2) An individual, for purposes of paragraph (1), is an individual who, on the date of the
enactment of the Anti-Apartheid Act Amendments of 1988, is "(A) a former citizen or resident of South Africa; and
"(B)(i) a citizen of the United States; or
"(ii) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States.".
(b) PROHIBITION ON EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA. - Effective 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, section 303 of the Act is amended to read as follows:
"PROHIBITION OF EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE UNITED STATES

"SEC. 303. (a) No goods or technology subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
may be exported, or re-exported, to South Africa. No goods or technology may be exported,
or re-exported, to South Africa by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The prohibitions under subsection (a) shall not apply to "(1) publications, including books, newspapers, magazines, films, television
programming, phonograph records, video and audio tape recordings, photographs,
microfilm, microfiche, posters, and similar materials;
"(2) donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as food,
clothing, and medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for medical purposes;
"(3) commercial sales of agricultural commodities and products; and
"(4) goods and technology for use in the gathering or dissemination of information by news media organizations subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
which provide an assurance to the Secretary of State that such goods and technology
will not be used, leased, sold, or transferred to any South African entity.

"(b)

"(c) The prohibitions under subsection (a) shall not apply to any goods that are the direct
product of technology of United States origin under a written agreement entered into on or
before April 20, 1988, and that are exported prior to the date which is one year after the date
of the enactment of the Anti-Apartheid Act Amendments of 1988.
"(d)

The prohibitions under subsection (a) shall not apply to "(1) economic assistance or human rights programs for disadvantaged South
Africans, South African blacks or other nonwhite South Africans, or victims of
apartheid in South Africa pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, or any other provision of law authorizing economic
or human rights assistance programs; and
"(2) contributions to charitable organizations engaged in social welfare, public
health, religious, educational, and emergency relief activities in South Africa.".

(c) WAIVER. - A person affected by the prohibition under section 301 of the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (as amended by subsection (a)) may apply to the President for a
one-time waiver of the prohibition. With respect to any applicant, the President may waive the
application of section 301 for not more than 180 days after such section takes effect. Such waiver
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may be granted only for good cause. During any period of waiver under this subparagraph, the
provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 as in effect before the date of the
enactment of the Anti-Apartheid Act Amendments of 1988 shall apply and the President may
not waive any such provision.
(d)

REPEAL OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. -

Effective 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act of 1986 is amended by striking sections 212, 304, 309, 310, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, and 323.

(e)

DEFINITIONS. -

(1) Paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 3 of the Act are amended to read as follows:
"(3) the term 'investment in South Africa' means "(A) a commitment of funds or other assets (in order to earn a financial
return) to a South African entity, including "(i) a loan or other extension of credit made to a South African entity, or
security given for the debts of an entity;
"(ii) the beneficial ownership or control of a share or interest in a South
African entity, or of a bond or other debt instrument issued by such an entity; or
"(iii) capital contributions in money or other assets to a South African
entity; or
"(B) the control of a South African entity in cases in which subparagraph
(A) does not apply;
"(4) the term 'loan' "(A) means any transfer or extension of funds or credit on the basis of
an obligation to repay, or any assumption or guarantee of the obligation of
another to repay an extension of funds of credit, including "(i) overdrafts;
"(ii) currency swaps;
"(iii) the purchase of debt or equity securities issued by the Government
of South Africa or a South African entity on or after the date of enactment of
this Act;
"(iv) the purchase of a loan made by another person;
"(v) the sale of financial assets subject to an agreement to repurchase;
"(vi) a renewal or refinancing whereby funds or credits are transferred or
extended to the Government of South Africa or a South African entity;
"(vii) short-term trade financing, as by letters of credit or similar trade
credits;
"(viii) sales on open account in cases where such sales are normal business
practice; and
"(ix) rescheduling of existing loans; and
"(B) does not include, a loan for which an agreement was entered into
before April 20, 1988, so long as such a loan is maintained under the terms
in effect on such date;"
Section 3 of the Act is further amended by (A) striking "and" after the semicolon in paragraph (8)(B);
(B) striking the period at the end of paragraph (9) and inserting a
semicolon; and
(C) adding at the end of such section the following:
"(10) the terms 'United States person' and 'person subject to the jurisdiction
(2)
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of the United States' mean "(A) any person, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of the
United States;
"(C) any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or
of any State, territory, possession, or district of the United States; and
"(D) any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization,
wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by persons
specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph;
"(11) the terms 'goods' and 'technology' have the meanings given such terms
by section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979;
"(12) the term 'goods subject to the jurisdiction of the United States' includes
goods that are the direct product of technology of United States origin; and
"(13) the term 'foreign person' "(A) means any person who is not a United States person or subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, and
"(B) does not include any government or any agency or other entity or
instrumentality thereof (including a government sponsored agency) unless
any such agency, entity, or instrumentality is a business enterprise.".
(3) The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(f)

NEGOTIATIONS WITH EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS REGARDING TERMINATION OF IN-

VESTMENT. - A controlled South African entity, subject to the investment prohibition under
section 301 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (as amended by subsection (a)),
that employs more than 24 South Africans (1) shall notify all South African employees and their employee organizations
of such termination of investment not less than 90 days prior to such termination;
and
(2) shall enter into good faith negotiations with representative trade unions,
particularly those representing disadvantaged South Africans, (or with other representative worker organizations if there are no such unions) regarding the terms
of a termination.
Negotiations shall include discussions and agreements concerning pension benefits; relocation of
employees; continuation of existing union recognition agreements; severance pay; and acquisition
of the terminated business or the business assets by representative trade unions, union-sponsored
workers' trusts, other representative worker organizations, or employees.
SEC. 102.

PROHIBITION REGARDING INVOLVEMENT IN THE
SOUTH AFRICAN ENERGY SECTOR.

(a)

RESTRICTIONS REGARDING INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ENERGY SEC-

- The Act is amended by adding after section 303 (as amended by section 101 of this
Act) the following new section 304:
TOR.

"RESTRICTIONS REGARDING INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ENERGY SECTOR

"SEC. 304. (a) A United States person may not, directly or through an affiliate, provide
transport to South Africa of a commercial quantity of crude oil or refined petroleum products.
The prohibition under this subsection includes transport on a vessel of United States registry
and transport on a vessel owned, directly or indirectly, by a United States person.
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"(b)(l) Effective 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary
of the Interior may not issue any lease pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the Mineral
Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, or the Geothermal
Steam Act of 1970 to any national of the United States which is controlled by, or under common
control with, any foreign person who "(A) purchases, acquires, owns, or holds any investment in South Africa; or
"(B) exports to South Africa, directly or indirectly, any crude oil or refined
petroleum products.
"(2) Prior to issuing any lease referred to in paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Interior
shall require an applicant for such a lease to certify that the applicant is not subject to the
provisions of paragraph (1).".
(b) WAIVER OF PROHIBITION ON ISSUANCE OF LEASES. - A person affected by the
prohibition under section 304(b) of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (as amended
by subsection (a)) may apply to the President for a one time waiver of the prohibition. With
respect to any applicant, the President may waive the application of section 304(b) for not more
than 180 days after such subsection takes effect. Such waiver may be granted only for good cause.

SEC.

103.

PROHIBITION ON NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA.

Section 307 of the Act is amended to read as follows:
"PROHIBITION ON NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA

"SEC. 307.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Energy shall not,
under section 57 b. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, authorize any person to engage,
directly or indirectly, in the production of special nuclear material in South Africa.".

SEC.

104.

PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AND
MILITARY COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

(a)

AMENDMENT TO COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF

1986.

-

The Act is

amended by striking section 322 and adding after section 308 the following new section:
"PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AND
MILITARY COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

309. (a)(1) No agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities
may engage in any form of cooperation, direct or indirect, with the Government of South Africa
(specifically including the authorities administering Namibia so long as Namibia is illegally
occupied).
"(2) The prohibition under paragraph (1) may not be construed to affect the collection of
intelligence under any circumstances which do not involve any form of cooperation, direct or
indirect, with the Government of South Africa.
"(b) No agency or entity of the United States may engage in any form of cooperation,
direct, or indirect, with the armed forces of the Government of South Africa.
"(c) The prohibitions of this section shall not apply to the conduct of diplomatic activities
or to intelligence information concerning the military activities or equipment in southern Africa
"SEC.
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of Cuban military forces or of another Communist country acting in concert with Cuban military

forces.
"(d) Funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by the Congress
(including funds specified in a classified schedule of authorizations or appropriations) may not
be obligated or expended by any agency or entity of the United States for any expenses related
to any cooperation prohibited by this section.
"(e) Consistent with the objectives of this section it is the sense of the Congress that the
President should not "(1) assign or detail any member of the United States Armed Forces to serve
as, or otherwise perform the functions of, a defense (or military) attache in South
Africa; or
"(2) accredit any individual to serve as, or otherwise perform the functions
of, a defense (or military) attache at a South African diplomatic mission in the
United States.".
(b) AMENDMENT TO INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987. Section 107 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (Public Law 99-569) is
hereby repealed.
SEC.

105.

COORDINATOR OF SOUTH AFRICA SANCTIONS;

INTERAGENCY COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICA.

The Act is amended by adding after section 606 the following new sections:
COORDINATOR OF SOUTH AFRICA SANCTIONS

"SEC. 607. (a) There is established within the Department of State a coordinator of South
Africa sanctions who shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for matters pertaining to
the implementation of sanctions against South Africa, in accordance with the provisions of this
subsection.
"(b)

The Secretary of State, through the coordinator of South Africa sanctions, shall "(1) lead and coordinate all executive agency activities concerning monitoring
of compliance with, and enforcement of, this Act;
"(2) lead and coordinate monitoring by appropriate executive agencies of other
countries' trade and financial flows with South Africa (including economic relations
which may undermine the effects of United States sanctions);
"(3) assist the Department of Commmerce, the Department of the Treasury,
and appropriate intelligence and other agencies in carrying out the functions of
such agencies under paragraphs (1) and (2); and
"(4) annually prepare and submit, on February 1 of each year after 1989, a
comprehensive report to the Congress which "(A) describes specific actions taken during the preceding year by each
affected executive agency to monitor compliance with, and enforce, the provisions of this Act;
"(B) describes the trade and financial flows (by commodity, activity,
total volume, and value) during the preceding year between South Africa
and each of its trading and financial partners, including economic relations
which may be subject to penalties under section 402;
"(C) includes the information required under section 402(b)(3);
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"(D) describes the resources utilized by the coordinator, the Department
of State, and other executive agencies in carrying out their functions under
this Act in the preceding year, including an evaluation of whether such
resources were adequate; and
"(E) provides any recommendations of the Secretary of State for improving the effectiveness of the coordinator.
"(c) In carrying out the functions under subsection (b), the coordinator shall place particular
emphasis on activities related to strategically important trade in oil, coal, computers, specialized
machinery and arms, and to financial credits.
"INTERAGENCY COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICA

"SEC. 608. (a) There is established an Interagency Coordinating Committee on South Africa.
The Committee shall coordinate and monitor implementation of this Act.
"(b)

The committee shall be composed of "(1) the Secretary of State,
"(2) the Secretary of Treasury,
"(3) the Secretary of Defense,
"(4) the Secretary of Commerce,
"(5) the Secretary of Agriculture,
"(6) the Attorney General,
"(7) the United States Trade Representative, and
"(8) such other heads of executive agencies with functions under this Act as
the President considers appropriate.

The Secretary of State shall be the chairperson of the Committee.".
SEC. 106.

-

INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA.

(a) ADDITIONAL MEASURE FOR TERMINATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
Section 311 of the Act is amended (1) in subsection (a)(A) by inserting "402(a)," before "501(c)" in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
(B) in paragraph (4) by striking "and" after the semicolon,
(C) in paragraph (5)by striking the period and inserting ";and", and
(D) by adding after paragraph (5) the following new paragraph:
"(6) ends the illegal occupation of Namibia and implements United Nations
Resolution 435 which calls for the independence of Namibia."; and
(2) in subsection (b)(A) by inserting "402(a)," before "501(c)", and
(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
"(2) taken four of the five actions listed in paragraphs (2) through (6) of subsection (a), and".
(b)

ACT.

POLICY TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA. - Section 101(b) is amended
(1) in paragraph (5) by striking "and" after the semicolon;
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(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6) and inserting ";and"; and
(3) by adding after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph (7):
"(7) end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and implement United
Nations Resolution 435 which calls for the establishment of an independent
Namibia."
SEC. 107.

PENALTIES.

Effective 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, section 603(b) of the Act is
amended (1) in paragraph (2) (A) by inserting "(A)" after "(2)";
(B) by adding at the end of subparagraph (A) (as so designated by
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph) "and"; and
(C) by adding at the end of the following new subparagraph:
"(B) any person, other than an individual that knowingly violates the provisions
of this Act, or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this Act shall
be fined not more than $500,000; and"; and
(2) in paragraph (3) (A) by inserting "(A)" after "(3); and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(B) any individual who knowingly violates the provisions of this Act, or any
regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this Act shall be fined not more
than $250,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.".
SEC. 108.

ASSISTANCE FOR DISADVANTAGED SOUTH AFRICANS.

(a) AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961. Assistance Act of 1961 is amended (1) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:

Section 535(a) of the Foreign

"SEC. 535. ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR DISADVANTAGED SOUTH AFRICANS. - (a)(1) Up
to $40,000,000 of the funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out this chapter and any
other economic development assistance activities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for
the fiscal year 1989 and each fiscal year thereafter, shall be available for assistance 'for disadvantaged South Africans. Assistance under this section shall be provided for activities that are
consistent with the objective of a majority of South Africans for an end to the apartheid system
and the establishment of a society based on nonracial principles. Such activities may include
scholarships (including scholarships for study in the health care professions and the health
sciences), assistance to promote the participation of disadvantaged South Africans in trade unions
and private enterprise, alternative education and community development programs, and training
and other assistance including legal aid in challenging government media restrictions) for South
African journalists.".
(2) in paragraph (2) by striking "programs for South Africa's trade unionists."
and inserting "and other support programs (including legal assistance) for trade
unions in South Africa and Namibia, including COSATU (Congress of South African
Trade Unions), NACTU (National Council of Trade Unions), and NUNW (National
Union of Namibian Workers), their affiliates, and other viable unions in order to
develop a balanced assistance program which is representative of the trade union
movement."; and
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by adding after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

"(3)(A) Not less than $4,000,000 of the amounts provided for each fiscal year pursuant to
this subsection shall be available for programs of refugee education and assistance for South
Africans and Namibians.
"(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), funds provided pursuant to this paragraph "(I) may not be used for assistance to individuals who are residing in areas
under the control of or administered by the South West Africa People's Organization
(hereinafter referred to as 'SWAPO') or the African National Congress (hereinafter
referred to as 'ANC'); and
"(II) may not be administered through SWAPO, and ANC, or any other group
or individual affiliated with SWAPO or the ANC.
"(ii) The President may waive any limitation concerning the African National Congress
(ANC) under clause (i) if the President determines that the ANC has provided assurances that
it does not support any form of violence against individuals who are not members of the South
African military or security services actually engaged in military or paramilitary operations
against the ANC or other resistance organizations or if the President determines that it is in
the national security interests of the United States.".
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. 1, 1988.

SEC. 109.

The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect October

SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION OF SOUTH

AFRICAN DIAMOND CARTEL, STUDY OF DIAMOND ORIGINS, AND ENFORCEMENT OF
PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN DIAMONDS INTO THE UNITED STATES

It is the sense of the Congress that (1) the President should direct the Attorney General of the United States to
conduct an investigation of the South African-controlled international diamond cartel
in order to ascertain if any enforcement action is appropriate under the antitrust
laws of the United States;
(2) the President should direct the Secretary of Commerce and the Commissioner of Customs to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of identifying at
port of entry, without harm to producers and processors of diamonds outside of
South Africa, the national origin of diamonds entering the United States; and
(3) the President should (A) ensure effective and rigorous enforcement of a prohibition on the
importation into the United States of uncut diamonds of South African origin
by (i) applying direct pressure on the Central Selling Organization in London
to identify and segregate diamonds by country of origin and encouraging other
nations (including diamond-producing nations) to take appropriate measures to
achieve that result; and
(ii) entering into negotiations for agreements with the principal exporting
nations of uncut diamonds to the United States (particularly the United Kingdom
and Switzerland) to ensure that uncut South African diamonds will not be
exported to the United States;
(B) pursue effective enforcement and undertake appropriate actions to
obtain the identification and segregation of uncut diamonds of South African
origin, provided such enforcement and other actions do not interfere with
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the ability of United States importers to import uncut diamonds of other
countries of origin despite any unknowing importation of unidentified uncut
South African diamonds which may occur; and
(C) direct the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report on the
status of the effort to identify and segregate uncut South African diamonds
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180
days thereafter.
SEC. 110.

STUDY OF MEASURES TO REDUCE SOUTH AFRICA'S

FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS FROM GOLD.

(a) STUDY. - In consultation with other industrialized nations and international financial
institutions, the President shall conduct a study of possible actions by the United States to
reduce the foreign exchange earnings of South Africa which accrue through sales of gold. The
President shall consider possible international and domestic consequences of any course of actions
and shall evaluate mechanisms to avoid or minimize any adverse effects on the United States
gold mining industry.

(b) REPORT. - Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to the Congress a report of the findings of such study.
SEC. 111.

SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING SOUTH AFRICAN CONSULATES AND
APPROVAL OF VISAS.

It is the sense of the Congress that (1) South Africa has effectively banned 19 major anti apartheid organizations,
forbade the major trade union federation, COSATU, from engaging in political
activities, and denied permission for travel to the United States to numerous South
Africans;
(2) the repression by South Africa of domestic and foreign media has prevented
the free flow of information essential to the advance of any national dialogue
between the government and the nonwhite majority which actively opposes apartheid, and has restricted the ability of the foreign press to report developments
in South Africa;
(3) the President should immediately close two of South Africa's consulates
general, eliminate all honorary consuls which South Africa has in the United States,
and forbid South Africa to expand the staffing of its embassy beyond the level of
January 1, 1988; and
(4) approval of temporary United States visas, especially to South African
government personnel, should be granted on a case-by-case basis only after close
scrutiny of the South African Government's record of allowing South African citizens, particularly those who are members of anti-apartheid organizations, to travel
to the United States.
SEC. 112.

REPORT ON SOUTH AFRICA'S INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

Not less than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall prepare and submit a detailed report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
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of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate concerning the extent
to which, if at all, the Government of South Africa has been involved in or has provided support
for acts of international terrorism.
SEC. 113.

TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

AMENDMENTS TO THE TABLE OF CONTENTS. -

(a)

(1) The table of contents in section 2 of the Act is amended by amending the
items relating to title III to read as follows:
"TITLE III -

MEASURES BY THE UNITED STATES TO UNDERMINE APARTHEID

"Sec. 301. Prohibition on investment in South Africa.
"Sec. 302. Prohibition on imports into the United States from South Africa.
"Sec. 303. Prohibition of exports to South Africa from the United States. "Sec. 304. Restrictions regarding involvement in the South African energy sector.
"Sec. 305. Prohibitions on leans to the Government of South Africa.
"Sec. 306. Prohibition on air transportation with South Africa.
"Sec. 307. Prohibition on nuclear trade with South Africa.
"Sec. 308. Government of South Africa bank accounts.
"Sec. 309. Prohibition on United States intelligence and military cooperation with South Africa.
"Sec. 311. Termination of certain provisions.
"Sec. 312. Policy toward violence or terrorism.
"Sec. 313. Termination of tax treaty and protocol.
"Sec. 314. Prohibition of United States Government procurement from South Africa.
"Sec. 315. Prohibition on the promotion of United States tourism in South Africa.
"Sec. 316. Prohibition on United States Government assistance to, involvement in, or subsidy
for trade with, South Africa.".
(2) The table of contents in section 2 of the Act is further amended (A) by striking the item relating to section 212;
(B) by amending the items relating to sections 402 and 502, respectively,
to read as follows:
"Sec. 402.

Limitation on imports from and contracting with certain foreign persons.

"Sec. 502. Reports on United States imports from member states of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance."; and
(C) by adding after the items relating to section 606 the following items:
"Sec. 607.

Coordinator of South Africa sanctions.

"Sec. 608.

Interagency coordinating committee on South Africa.".

(b)

CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT. -

(1) Section 602(a)(1) and 602(b)(1) of the Act are amended by striking "318(b),".
(2) Section 602(c) is amended by striking paragraph (2) and redesignating
paragraphs "(3)" and "(4)" as paragraphs "(2)" and "(3)", respectively.
(3) Section 603(b) of the Act is amended by striking paragraph (4).
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(4) Section 603(c) of the Act is amended by striking paragraph (2) and by
redesignating paragraph "(3)" as paragraph "(2)".
(5) Section 501(c) of the Act is amended (A) by inserting "or other measures" after "additional measures"; and
(B)(i) by striking paragraphs (2) and (4);
(ii) by inserting "and" at the end of paragraph (1);
(iii) by striking ";and" and inserting in lieu thereof a period at the end
of paragraph (3); and
(iv) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph "(2)".
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. - The amendments made by this section shall take effect 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
TITLE

II

-

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS
INTO THE UNITED STATES

SEC. 201.

PROHIBITIONS ON IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA.

(a) PROHIBITION ON IMPORTS - Effective 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, section 302 of the Act is amended to read as follows:
"PROHIBITION ON IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES FROM SOUTH AFRICA

"SEC. 302. (a) No article which is grown, produced, extracted, or manufactured in South
Africa may be imported into the United States.
"(b)

The prohibition of subsection (a) shall not apply to the import of "(1) any strategic mineral (including any ferroalloy thereof) with respect to
which the President certifies to the Congress for purposes of this Act that the
quantities of such mineral which are essential for the economy, public health, or
defense of the United States are not available from alternative reliable suppliers;
and
"(2) publications, including books, newspapers, magazines, films, television
programming, phonograph records, video and audio tape recordings, photographs,
microfilm, microfiche, posters, and similar materials.

"(c) The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not apply to imports from business enterprises
in South Africa that are wholly-owned by persons economically and politically disadvantaged by
apartheid.
"(d) The prohibition under subsection (a) includes "(1) uranium hexafluoride that has been manufactured from South African
uranium or uranium oxide; and
"(2) fish or seafood "(A) purchased from a ship owned by a South African or of South
African registry,
"(B) purchased from a South African,
"(C) processed in whole or part by a South African ship or person, or
stored in or shipped from South Africa.".
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(b) CERTIFICATION. - The certification of the President with respect to any strategic
mineral under section 303(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (as in effect
prior to the date of the enactment of this Act) shall be effective for purposes of section 302(b)(1)
of such Act as amended by this Act, unless the President rescinds or modifies such a certification.
SEC. 202. MULTILATERAL MEASURES, INCLUDING IMPORT RESTRICTIONS, TO
DISMANTLE APARTHEID.

(a)

NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY. -

(1)

Section 401(b) of the Act is amended to read as follows:

"(b)(1) The President, or at his direction, the Secretary of State (in consultation with the
United States Trade Representative), shall, consistent with the policy under subsection (a),
confer with the other industrialized democracies in order to reach cooperative agreements to
impose sanctions against South Africa to bring about the complete dismantling of apartheid.
"(2) Before the 180th day after the date of the enactment of the Anti-Apartheid Act Amendments of 1988, the President shall submit a report to the Congress containing "(A) a description of United States efforts under paragraph (1) to implement
multilateral measures to bring about the complete dismantling of apartheid;
"(B) his evaluation regarding whether the efforts described in subparagraph
(A) have been successful in achieving multilateral measures to bring about the
complete dismantling of apartheid; and
"(C) if the efforts described in subparagraph (A) have been successful, a detailed description of economic and other measures adopted by the other industrialized countries to bring about the complete dismantling of apartheid, including
an assessment of the stringency with which such measures are enforced by those
countries.".
(b) UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS. - Section 401(e) of the Act is amended by striking "It
is the sense of the Congress that the President should" and inserting "The President shall".
(c)

SONS. -

LIMITATION ON IMPORTS FROM AND CONTRACTING WITH CERTAIN FOREIGN PER-

Section 402 of the Act is amended to read as follows:

"LIMITATION ON IMPORTS FROM AND CONTRACTING WITH CERTAIN FOREIGN PERSONS

"SEC. 402. (a)(1)

Subject to subsection

(b), effective on and after the 180th-day after the date of the enactment of the Anti-Apartheid
Act Amendments of 1988 (or the 360th day after such date if the evaluation of the President
under section 401(b)(2)(B) is affirmative), to the extent that a foreign person takes significant
commercial advantage of any sanction or prohibition imposed by or under this Act, the President
shall impose not less than one of the penalties under paragraph (2).
"(2) The President may impose one or both of the following penalties under paragraph (1):
"(A) Limit the importation into the United States of any product or service
of the foreign person.
"(B) Restrict the foreign person from contracting with departments, agencies,
and instrumentalities of the United States Government.
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For purposes of applying this subsection "(A) the European Community shall be treated as being a single industrialized
democracy; and
"(B) any limitation imposed under paragraph (2)(A) shall, to the extent possible, offset the value of the significant commercial advantage obtained by the foreign
person.

"(3)

"(b)(1) The President may waive the application of subsection (a) with respect to foreign
persons of an industrialized democracy that is party to an agreement that has entered into force
with respect to the United States under section 401.
"(2) The President shall revoke, for such time and subject to such conditions as he considers
appropriate, a waiver made under paragraph (1) if the President finds that the industrialized
democracy that is party to the agreement in force under section 401 is not adequately enforcing
the measures provided for under the agreement.
"(3) The annual report required under section 607(b)(4) shall include, with respect to the
period covered by the report--"(A) an evaluation of the extent to which the import restrictions, if any, provided for under each agreement in force under section 401 are being enforced by
the industrialized democracy concerned and the effect of such enforcement; and
"(B) the reasons for each waiver and revocation made under paragraphs (1)
and (2).".
SEC.

203.

REFFERAL IN THE HOUSE OF JOINT RESOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO
IMPORT RESTRICTIONS.

Section 602(a)(2) of the Act, is amended to read as follows:
"(2)(A) A joint resolution, other than a joint resolution referred to in subparagraph (B),
shall, upon introduction, be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
"(B) A joint resolution under "(i) section 311(b), if the joint resolution suspends or modifies any import
restriction in effect under title III, section 402(a), 501(c), or 504(b);
"(ii) section 401(d), if the joint resolution approves an agreement encompassing
any import restriction measure; or
"(iii) section 501(d), if the joint resolution would enact any import restriction
under section 501(c);
shall, upon introduction, be jointly referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.".
SEC.

202.

MULTILATERAL MEASURES,

INCLUDING IMPORT RESTRICTIONS,

To

DISMANTLE APARTHEID.

Section 502 of the Act is amended to read as follows:
"REPORTS ON UNITED

STATES

IMPORTS FROM MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL FOR

MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
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"SEC. 502. Beginning 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Anti-Apartheid Act
Amendments of 1989, and every 30 days thereafter, the President, through the Secretary of
Commerce, shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report setting forth the average
amounts of imports of coal or any strategic and critical material entering the United States
from each member country and observer country of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(C.M.E.A.).".
SEC. 205. PROGRAM TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE UPON IMPORTATION OF STRATEGIC MINERALS FROM SOUTH AFRICA.

Section 504(b) of the Act is amended to read as follows:
"(b)(1) The President shall develop a program to reduce the dependence, if any, of the United
States on the importation from South Africa of the materials identified in the report submitted
under subsection (a). In the development of such program, the President shall determine (in
consultation with knowledgeable individuals in industry, government, and academia) whether,
to what extent, and in what time period, adequate quantities of such materials could reasonably
be obtained from (A) alternative reliable domestic and foreign sources, and (B) improved and
effective methods of manufacturing, substitution, conservation, recovery, and recycling. Such
determination shall include consideration of the quality and cost of such materials.
"(2) Not more than 270 days after the date of the enactment of the Anti-Apartheid Act
Amendments of 1989, the President shall submit a report to the Congress concerning the
program under paragraph (1), particularly the respective roles in the implementation of such
program of the Federal Government, users of such materials, and other affected persons. On
February 1, 1991, and on February 1 of each subsequent year until the termination of sanctions
under this Act, the President shall submit a report to the Congress concerning progress in
implementing such program."
SEC.

206.

PREVENTING CIRCUNVENTION OF UNITED STATES IMPORT RESTRICTIONS.

"Within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and at such times thereafter
as are appropriate, the President, or the designee of the President, shall confer with the
governments of the African "frontline" states regarding the content and implementation of
appropriate measures to prevent the circumvention by South Africa of the import restrictions
on South African products placed in effect by the United States under the authority of this Act.
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